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Abstract: We are occupants of a body that receives diverse sensory input via our visual and somatosen-
sory system. Furthermore, as we are the agent of our own body, the brain must also deal with both the
afferent and efferent signals that occur with movement, namely the motor system. How do we perceive
our stationary or moving body as well as the world around us as a coherent whole? Mental representations
are assumed to support and modify our perception, as well as the resulting behaviour, the action. In this
thesis, representational processes in the perception of the body and its movements are discussed in rela-
tion to the particular systems: vision, somatosensory, and motor. In chapter 1, the general introduction,
the terms „representation￿ and „images￿, as well as „body representation￿ and „movement representa-
tion￿ are described along the lines of previous research and defined for their appropriate use within this
thesis. Specific background literature and concepts with respect to the experiments are discussed in the
introductory sections within each individual chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 explore representations of the
stationary body by the sensory modalities vision, proprioception, and touch, whilst chapter 4 deals with
mental representation in movement. Overall, the results of these investigations exemplify the adaptability
of representational processes based on different sensory systems in the stationary and the moving body
(see chapter 5). The three experiments combined in chapter 2 investigated body representations based
on the visual sensory system. The question was, to what extent does the form of what we visually per-
ceive influence our mental transformation processes? All three experiments gave evidence that different
3 forms of body representations in response to vision are behaviourally not as disparate as suggested
by previous investigations. For example, participants needed more time to mentally transform visually
presented stimuli with increasing angular disparity between them. This was the case for abstract objects
as well as for bodies when no rotation in depth was necessary (Experiment 1). The response pattern for
identifying the outstretched arm in a body figure was thus comparable to that when identifying abstract
objects. Hence without depth rotation, egocentric body transformation is akin to mental object rotation.
In contrast to the hypothesis on effects of expertise, however, no effect could be observed between sub-
jects: The reaction times between dancers, who are experienced in mentally transforming bodies, and
novices did not differ significantly (Experiment 2). Surprisingly, when body postures were presented in
the abstract dance notation of Laban (Experiment 3), no mental rotation costs were measured. These
three experiments showed that mental transformations were available in different prospects, of which one
is perspective-independent. Consequently, in certain conditions the mental presentations seem to switch
quickly from a perspective dependent to an independent form. Accordingly, mental representations are
not singularly dependent on the presentation form. Cognitive processing of either visually perceived
abstract objects, body drawings, or body-related symbols were comparable, whereas the spatial frame
of reference, the orientation between the observer and the perceived orientation of the stimuli, was of
primary relevance. The type of visual presentation only defines the form of mental representation used
for the transformation when a mental rotation in depth is needed. 4 The experiments in chapter 3 looked
at how we sense the body in egocentric space based on somatosensory perception. In particular, the first
of these psychophysical investigations was concerned with the perception of body limbs in space, that
is, proprioceptive sensory mode (Experiment 4). The second was an experiment on tactile perception
on the body surface, that is, tactile sensory mode (Experiment 5). Proprioception is the sense which is
thought to give us the experience of our own body posture. The tactile sensory mode consists of two
distinct perceptual processes: the tactile experience itself (tactile recognition) and the localisation on
our body surface (tactile localisation). Both proprioception and tactile localisation revealed effects of
adaptability on body reference points. The experiment on proprioception showed that actively pointing
to a location in egocentric space is biased by two reference centres of the body located at each shoul-
der in all but the visual condition. Dancers showed a smaller bias of the two reference centres; but
interestingly, they also showed it in the visual task. Therefore, the perception of the self in egocentric
space referred to different functional body references according to both the sensory modality used and
the individual￿s motor expertise. Moreover, the modality can be substituted with simulation, such as
simulated proprioception in the dancers￿ group. The experiment on tactile localisation showed that the
point of sensations of touch was located closer to the body centre than the original stimulation. This
was the case in both sensory modes that were available to localise a point of touch: vision (by visual
estimation) and motor (by pointing). Thus, the body centre acts as a reference point independent of the
response mode. Interestingly, additional tactile information from the tip of the finger caused a switch
in the direction of the mislocalisation from the body centre to the periphery. Consequently, 5 represen-
tations of the egocentric space are adaptable in both the short- and long-term, and this adaptability is
dependent on both sensory input and expertise, respectively. Further, tactile perception is immediately
integrated in the perception of the body space and has a dramatic effect on spatial localisation on the
body surface. Chapter 4 discusses how movement representations can evolve by motor imagery training
compared to common execution training. Mentally rehearsing the abduction of the big toe, a movement
without established motor command, caused a reduction in the time taken to move whereas exertion
force was most increased by execution training (Experiment 6). This finding shows conceptually different
training effects between imagery and execution. It goes beyond previous behavioural studies that have
shown differences between imagery training and execution training in the level of performance increase
alone. In addition, a representation of the movement goal (anticipation) surprisingly improved partic-
ipants￿ movement abilities, as could be observed by a performance increase in the movement range of
the abduction. Thus along with representations of the stationary body, mental representations can be
consciously instrumentalised in the moving body, such as motor imagery or anticipation; they can also
show short- and long-term performance adaptations, respectively. Chapter 5 is a general discussion of the
experimental results. The data from this thesis supports the existence of a nonmodular adaptable body
representation that can accommodate long-term changes (through experience) as well as rapid switches
(from different sensory feedback information). Representations are hypothesised to be the effect of adapt-
ability processes. In addition, the importance of differential observation is highlighted. Der Körper ist
unser Instrument, mit dem wir uns in der Welt zurechtfinden. Űber die verschiedenen Sinnessysteme des
Körpers können wir unsere Umwelt sowie die ‚Körperinnenwelt￿ erfahren. Das visuelle System ermöglicht
ein Abbild der Aussenwelt. Das somatosensorische System, bestehend aus der Propriozeption und der
Berührungsempfindung ist wichtig, um die Position unseres Körpers im Raum sowie die Gestalt unseres
Körpers wahrzunehmen. Nebst diesen im passiven Körper vorhandenen Sinneseindrücken haben wir aber
auch Bewegungsempfindung: Wir sind nicht nur Empfänger von Sinneseindrücken, wir agieren aktiv
mit unserem Körper in der Umwelt. Im Gehirn findet ein Zusammenspiel sowohl von solchen afferenten
als auch efferenten Signalen statt. Wie aber ist es möglich, dass wir trotz der Information von ver-
schiedenen Sinnessystemen unseren passiv oder aktiv (bewegten) Körper sowie die Welt um uns herum
als eine zusammenhängende kohärente Entität wahrnehmen? Mentale Repräsentationen sind ein zen-
trales Element in diesem Integrationsprozess: Sie spielen eine wichtige Rolle in dem Zusammenspiel von
Wahrnehmung und resultierendem Verhalten (die Handlung). In dieser Arbeit werden mentale Repräsen-
tationen der Wahrnehmung des Körpers und seiner Bewegungen in Bezug auf die besonderen Sinnessys-
teme besprochen: visuelle, somatosensorische und motorische Sinneswahrnehmung. Das erste Kapitel
gibt eine Einführung in die Begriffe Repräsentation und mentale Bilder, sowie Körperrepräsentation und
Bewegungsrepräsentationen. Insbesondere wird der spezifische Gebrauch der Begriffe innerhalb dieser
Arbeit 7 definiert. Weitergehende Einführungen sind in den Einleitungen der jeweiligen experimentellen
Kapitel zwei bis vier zu finden. Die mentale Körpertransformation basierend auf dem visuellen System
wird in Kapitel zwei besprochen. In Experiment 1 wurden die Prozesse in der mentalen Rotation von Ob-
jekten und Körpern untersucht. Dabeit hat sich gezeigt, dass insbesondere die Rotation in der Tiefe das
Verhalten der Versuchspersonen beeinflusst. Versuchspersonen benötigen für die Diskriminierung zweier
abstrakter Objekte in der Regel länger, je grösser die Diskrepanz in der Ausrichtung der zu beurteilenden
Objekte ist. Dieser Rotationseffekt konnte auch bei der Identifizierung von Körperstimuli nachgewiesen
werden, jedoch nur wenn die Ausrichtung der Stimuli mit der egozentrischen Perspektive der Versuchsper-
son übereinstimmte, das heisst, wenn keine Rotation in der Tiefe notwendig war. In Experiment 2 wurde
der Einfluss der generellen Bewegungsexpertise von Tänzern auf die mentale Transformation von Körpern
untersucht. Die Daten der beiden bis auf die Probandengruppe identischen Experimente 1 und 2 zeigten
keinen Unterschied zwischen Tänzern und nicht- Tänzern in Bezug auf die mentale Körperrotation. In
Experiment 3 wurde schliesslich untersucht, welchen Einfluss die Form des visuell präsentierten Körpers
auf die mentale Repräsentation und Transformation hat. Dazu wurde in der Hälfte der Bedingungen der
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Körper in der Labanotation, einer etablierten Tanzschrift dargestellt. In der Labanotation werden ar-
biträre Symbole für die Darstellung der verschiedenen Körperglieder verwendet. In der Diskriminierung
zweier Körperpositionen in unterschiedlicher Orientierung haben sich erhöhte Reaktionszeiten nur bei
Stimuli in Form von Fotos einer Tänzerin, nicht aber in Form von abstrakter Labanotation gezeigt.
Das heisst, die mentale 8 Repräsentation von Körpern und/oder deren Prozesse sind perspektiven- un-
abhängig, wenn die Repräsentation von arbiträren visuellen Körperstimuli generiert wurden. Die drei
Experimente im ersten Kapitel zeigten, dass die Repräsentation von Körpern und Objekten sowie deren
mentalen Transformation von der Form der visuellen Stimuli und insbesondere auch von deren Orien-
tierung abhängig ist. Die Prozesse der Repräsentationen zeigten sich teilweise bei identischer primärer
visueller Darstellung unabhängig und teilweise abhängig von Perspektivenwechsel. Dieser Effekt lässt eine
hohe Adaptabilität der Repräsentation von Körpern basierend auf visueller Wahrnehmung vermuten. In
Kapitel drei wird die Verarbeitung und Wahrnehmung des Körpers im egozentrischen Raum basierend auf
somatosensorischer Empfindung untersucht und dargestellt. Im vorhergehenden Kapitel hat sich gezeigt,
dass die Perspektivenabhängigkeit, und somit der egozentrische Referenzpunkt der Körperrepräsentation
von den visuellen Stimuli beeinflusst ist. Die Experimente 4 und 5 untersuchten die Referenzpunkte in-
nerhalb der Wahrnehmung des eigenen Körpers in der motorischen Interaktion im egozentrischen Raum.
Mittels Experiment 4 konnte gezeigt werden, dass die beiden Schultern als Referenzpunkte wirken, wenn
Probanden Punkte im Raum lokalisieren mussten. Die Bewegungserfahrung von Tänzern jedoch führte
erstens zu geringeren Schätzungsfehlern basierend auf einem Referenzpunkt im Körperzentrum. Zweit-
ens zeigten Tänzer dieselben Abweichungen in der Lokalisierung bei visuellem wie bei propriozeptivem
Feedback. Möglicherweise haben die Tänzer in der visuellen Bedingung ein ‚virtuelles￿ propriozeptives
Feedback generiert. In Experiment 5 mussten die Probanden taktile Berührungspunkte auf dem Arm
lokalisieren. Die Punkte wurden konsistent zu nah am Körper geschätzt. Wenn 9 die Probanden je-
doch zusätzlich taktile Stimulation am Finger erhielten, kehrte sich die Unterschätzung der Distanz vom
Körperzentrum zum Berührungspunkt in eine Überschätzung um. Eine kurzfristige Integration zusät-
zlicher Berührungspunkte wurde vermuted. Beide Experimente zeigten unterschiedliche anpassungsfähige
Körperreferenzpunkte, kurzfristig in bezug auf die vorhandene sensorische Information sowie langfristig
basierend auf Erfahrung. Schliesslich wird in Kapitel vier der Einfluss der motorischen Vorstellung auf
die Bewegungsrepräsentation untersucht. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass mentales Training und physisches
Bewegungstraining sich nicht nur in der Intensität unterscheiden, sondern vermutlich zwei verschiedene
Prozesse sind. Mentales Training führte zu einer rascheren Ausführung der erlernten Bewegung während
Bewegungstraining die Kraft erhöhte. Die Bewegungsrepräsentation ist daher unterschiedlich adaptiv,
abhängig davon, wie sie angesprochen wird. Die Befunde der Experimente 1 bis 6 werden in Kapitel
fünf diskutiert. Mentale Repräsentationen zeigten sich in dieser Arbeit über verschiedene Sinnessysteme
hinweg anpassungsfähig. Die Resultate lassen vermuten, dass die effiziente Interaktion mit der Umwelt
durch einen adaptiven Mechanismus mentaler Repräsentationen ermöglicht wird. Repräsentationen in
dem Sinne können als Effekte der Adaptabilität verstanden werden. Unter dieser Annahme wird das
aktuelle Forschungsvorgehen diskutiert. Jeder Körper, jeder Geist sowie deren assoziierten Repräsenta-
tionen haben sich adaptiv an die Umwelt angepasst und tun dies kontinuierlich in einem individuellen
Sinne. Um adaptive Prozesse in der Kognition zu entdecken, scheint es entgegen dem gebräuchlichen
methodischen Vorgehen angebracht, das Augenmerk auf individuelle Ausprägungen zu richten. 10
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Summary 
We are occupants of a body that receives diverse sensory input via our visual 
and somatosensory system. Furthermore, as we are the agent of our own body, 
the brain must also deal with both the afferent and efferent signals that occur with 
movement, namely the motor system. How do we perceive our stationary or 
moving body as well as the world around us as a coherent whole? Mental 
representations are assumed to support and modify our perception, as well as 
the resulting behaviour, the action. In this thesis, representational processes in 
the perception of the body and its movements are discussed in relation to the 
particular systems: vision, somatosensory, and motor. 
In chapter 1, the general introduction, the terms „representation‟ and 
„images‟, as well as „body representation‟ and „movement representation‟ are 
described along the lines of previous research and defined for their appropriate 
use within this thesis. Specific background literature and concepts with respect to 
the experiments are discussed in the introductory sections within each individual 
chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 explore representations of the stationary body by the 
sensory modalities vision, proprioception, and touch, whilst chapter 4 deals with 
mental representation in movement. Overall, the results of these investigations 
exemplify the adaptability of representational processes based on different 
sensory systems in the stationary and the moving body (see chapter 5). 
The three experiments combined in chapter 2 investigated body 
representations based on the visual sensory system. The question was, to what 
extent does the form of what we visually perceive influence our mental 
transformation processes? All three experiments gave evidence that different 
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forms of body representations in response to vision are behaviourally not as 
disparate as suggested by previous investigations. For example, participants 
needed more time to mentally transform visually presented stimuli with increasing 
angular disparity between them. This was the case for abstract objects as well as 
for bodies when no rotation in depth was necessary (Experiment 1). The 
response pattern for identifying the outstretched arm in a body figure was thus 
comparable to that when identifying abstract objects. Hence without depth 
rotation, egocentric body transformation is akin to mental object rotation. In 
contrast to the hypothesis on effects of expertise, however, no effect could be 
observed between subjects: The reaction times between dancers, who are 
experienced in mentally transforming bodies, and novices did not differ 
significantly (Experiment 2). Surprisingly, when body postures were presented in 
the abstract dance notation of Laban (Experiment 3), no mental rotation costs 
were measured. These three experiments showed that mental transformations 
were available in different prospects, of which one is perspective-independent. 
Consequently, in certain conditions the mental presentations seem to switch 
quickly from a perspective dependent to an independent form. Accordingly, 
mental representations are not singularly dependent on the presentation form. 
Cognitive processing of either visually perceived abstract objects, body drawings, 
or body-related symbols were comparable, whereas the spatial frame of 
reference, the orientation between the observer and the perceived orientation of 
the stimuli, was of primary relevance. The type of visual presentation only defines 
the form of mental representation used for the transformation when a mental 
rotation in depth is needed. 
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The experiments in chapter 3 looked at how we sense the body in 
egocentric space based on somatosensory perception. In particular, the first of 
these psychophysical investigations was concerned with the perception of body 
limbs in space, that is, proprioceptive sensory mode (Experiment 4). The second 
was an experiment on tactile perception on the body surface, that is, tactile 
sensory mode (Experiment 5). Proprioception is the sense which is thought to 
give us the experience of our own body posture. The tactile sensory mode 
consists of two distinct perceptual processes: the tactile experience itself (tactile 
recognition) and the localisation on our body surface (tactile localisation). Both 
proprioception and tactile localisation revealed effects of adaptability on body 
reference points. The experiment on proprioception showed that actively pointing 
to a location in egocentric space is biased by two reference centres of the body 
located at each shoulder in all but the visual condition. Dancers showed a smaller 
bias of the two reference centres; but interestingly, they also showed it in the 
visual task. Therefore, the perception of the self in egocentric space referred to 
different functional body references according to both the sensory modality used 
and the individual‟s motor expertise. Moreover, the modality can be substituted 
with simulation, such as simulated proprioception in the dancers‟ group. The 
experiment on tactile localisation showed that the point of sensations of touch 
was located closer to the body centre than the original stimulation. This was the 
case in both sensory modes that were available to localise a point of touch: vision 
(by visual estimation) and motor (by pointing). Thus, the body centre acts as a 
reference point independent of the response mode. Interestingly, additional tactile 
information from the tip of the finger caused a switch in the direction of the 
mislocalisation from the body centre to the periphery. Consequently, 
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representations of the egocentric space are adaptable in both the short- and 
long-term, and this adaptability is dependent on both sensory input and expertise, 
respectively. Further, tactile perception is immediately integrated in the 
perception of the body space and has a dramatic effect on spatial localisation on 
the body surface. 
Chapter 4 discusses how movement representations can evolve by motor 
imagery training compared to common execution training. Mentally rehearsing 
the abduction of the big toe, a movement without established motor command, 
caused a reduction in the time taken to move whereas exertion force was most 
increased by execution training (Experiment 6). This finding shows conceptually 
different training effects between imagery and execution. It goes beyond previous 
behavioural studies that have shown differences between imagery training and 
execution training in the level of performance increase alone. In addition, a 
representation of the movement goal (anticipation) surprisingly improved 
participants‟ movement abilities, as could be observed by a performance increase 
in the movement range of the abduction. Thus along with representations of the 
stationary body, mental representations can be consciously instrumentalised in 
the moving body, such as motor imagery or anticipation; they can also show 
short- and long-term performance adaptations, respectively. 
Chapter 5 is a general discussion of the experimental results. The data 
from this thesis supports the existence of a nonmodular adaptable body 
representation that can accommodate long-term changes (through experience) 
as well as rapid switches (from different sensory feedback information). 
Representations are hypothesised to be the effect of adaptability processes. In 
addition, the importance of differential observation is highlighted. 
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Zusammenfassung (Summary in German)  
Der Körper ist unser Instrument, mit dem wir uns in der Welt zurechtfinden. Űber 
die verschiedenen Sinnessysteme des Körpers können wir unsere Umwelt sowie 
die ‚Körperinnenwelt‟ erfahren. Das visuelle System ermöglicht ein Abbild der 
Aussenwelt. Das somatosensorische System, bestehend aus der Propriozeption 
und der Berührungsempfindung ist wichtig, um die Position unseres Körpers im 
Raum sowie die Gestalt unseres Körpers wahrzunehmen. Nebst diesen im 
passiven Körper vorhandenen Sinneseindrücken haben wir aber auch 
Bewegungsempfindung: Wir sind nicht nur Empfänger von Sinneseindrücken, wir 
agieren aktiv mit unserem Körper in der Umwelt. Im Gehirn findet ein 
Zusammenspiel sowohl von solchen afferenten als auch efferenten Signalen 
statt. Wie aber ist es möglich, dass wir trotz der Information von verschiedenen 
Sinnessystemen unseren passiv oder aktiv (bewegten) Körper sowie die Welt um 
uns herum als eine zusammenhängende kohärente Entität wahrnehmen? 
Mentale Repräsentationen sind ein zentrales Element in diesem 
Integrationsprozess: Sie spielen eine wichtige Rolle in dem Zusammenspiel von 
Wahrnehmung und resultierendem Verhalten (die Handlung). In dieser Arbeit 
werden mentale Repräsentationen der Wahrnehmung des Körpers und seiner 
Bewegungen in Bezug auf die besonderen Sinnessysteme besprochen: visuelle, 
somatosensorische und motorische Sinneswahrnehmung.  
Das erste Kapitel gibt eine Einführung in die Begriffe Repräsentation und 
mentale Bilder, sowie Körperrepräsentation und Bewegungsrepräsentationen. 
Insbesondere wird der spezifische Gebrauch der Begriffe innerhalb dieser Arbeit 
 8 
definiert. Weitergehende Einführungen sind in den Einleitungen der jeweiligen 
experimentellen Kapitel zwei bis vier zu finden. 
Die mentale Körpertransformation basierend auf dem visuellen System 
wird in Kapitel zwei besprochen. In Experiment 1 wurden die Prozesse in der 
mentalen Rotation von Objekten und Körpern untersucht. Dabeit hat sich gezeigt, 
dass insbesondere die Rotation in der Tiefe das Verhalten der Versuchspersonen 
beeinflusst. Versuchspersonen benötigen für die Diskriminierung zweier 
abstrakter Objekte in der Regel länger, je grösser die Diskrepanz in der 
Ausrichtung der zu beurteilenden Objekte ist. Dieser Rotationseffekt konnte auch 
bei der Identifizierung von Körperstimuli nachgewiesen werden, jedoch nur wenn 
die Ausrichtung der Stimuli mit der egozentrischen Perspektive der 
Versuchsperson übereinstimmte, das heisst, wenn keine Rotation in der Tiefe 
notwendig war. In Experiment 2 wurde der Einfluss der generellen 
Bewegungsexpertise von Tänzern auf die mentale Transformation von Körpern 
untersucht. Die Daten der beiden bis auf die Probandengruppe identischen 
Experimente 1 und 2 zeigten keinen Unterschied zwischen Tänzern und nicht-
Tänzern in Bezug auf die mentale Körperrotation. In Experiment 3 wurde 
schliesslich untersucht, welchen Einfluss die Form des visuell präsentierten 
Körpers auf die mentale Repräsentation und Transformation hat. Dazu wurde in 
der Hälfte der Bedingungen der Körper in der Labanotation, einer etablierten 
Tanzschrift dargestellt. In der Labanotation werden arbiträre Symbole für die 
Darstellung der verschiedenen Körperglieder verwendet. In der Diskriminierung 
zweier Körperpositionen in unterschiedlicher Orientierung haben sich erhöhte 
Reaktionszeiten nur bei Stimuli in Form von Fotos einer Tänzerin, nicht aber in 
Form von abstrakter Labanotation gezeigt. Das heisst, die mentale 
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Repräsentation von Körpern und/oder deren Prozesse sind perspektiven-
unabhängig, wenn die Repräsentation von arbiträren visuellen Körperstimuli 
generiert wurden. Die drei Experimente im ersten Kapitel zeigten, dass die 
Repräsentation von Körpern und Objekten sowie deren mentalen Transformation 
von der Form der visuellen Stimuli und insbesondere auch von deren 
Orientierung abhängig ist. Die Prozesse der Repräsentationen zeigten sich 
teilweise bei identischer primärer visueller Darstellung unabhängig und teilweise 
abhängig von Perspektivenwechsel. Dieser Effekt lässt eine hohe Adaptabilität 
der Repräsentation von Körpern basierend auf visueller Wahrnehmung vermuten. 
In Kapitel drei wird die Verarbeitung und Wahrnehmung des Körpers im 
egozentrischen Raum basierend auf somatosensorischer Empfindung untersucht 
und dargestellt. Im vorhergehenden Kapitel hat sich gezeigt, dass die 
Perspektivenabhängigkeit, und somit der egozentrische Referenzpunkt der 
Körperrepräsentation von den visuellen Stimuli beeinflusst ist. Die Experimente 4 
und 5 untersuchten die Referenzpunkte innerhalb der Wahrnehmung des 
eigenen Körpers in der motorischen Interaktion im egozentrischen Raum. Mittels 
Experiment 4 konnte gezeigt werden, dass die beiden Schultern als 
Referenzpunkte wirken, wenn Probanden Punkte im Raum lokalisieren mussten. 
Die Bewegungserfahrung von Tänzern jedoch führte erstens zu geringeren 
Schätzungsfehlern basierend auf einem Referenzpunkt im Körperzentrum. 
Zweitens zeigten Tänzer dieselben Abweichungen in der Lokalisierung bei 
visuellem wie bei propriozeptivem Feedback. Möglicherweise haben die Tänzer 
in der visuellen Bedingung ein ‚virtuelles‟ propriozeptives Feedback generiert. In 
Experiment 5 mussten die Probanden taktile Berührungspunkte auf dem Arm 
lokalisieren. Die Punkte wurden konsistent zu nah am Körper geschätzt. Wenn 
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die Probanden jedoch zusätzlich taktile Stimulation am Finger erhielten, kehrte 
sich die Unterschätzung der Distanz vom Körperzentrum zum Berührungspunkt 
in eine Überschätzung um. Eine kurzfristige Integration zusätzlicher 
Berührungspunkte wurde vermuted. Beide Experimente zeigten unterschiedliche 
anpassungsfähige Körperreferenzpunkte, kurzfristig in bezug auf die vorhandene 
sensorische Information sowie langfristig basierend auf Erfahrung.  
Schliesslich wird in Kapitel vier der Einfluss der motorischen Vorstellung 
auf die Bewegungsrepräsentation untersucht. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass mentales 
Training und physisches Bewegungstraining sich nicht nur in der Intensität 
unterscheiden, sondern vermutlich zwei verschiedene Prozesse sind. Mentales 
Training führte zu einer rascheren Ausführung der erlernten Bewegung während 
Bewegungstraining die Kraft erhöhte. Die Bewegungsrepräsentation ist daher 
unterschiedlich adaptiv, abhängig davon, wie sie angesprochen wird. 
Die Befunde der Experimente 1 bis 6 werden in Kapitel fünf diskutiert. 
Mentale Repräsentationen zeigten sich in dieser Arbeit über verschiedene 
Sinnessysteme hinweg anpassungsfähig. Die Resultate lassen vermuten, dass 
die effiziente Interaktion mit der Umwelt durch einen adaptiven Mechanismus 
mentaler Repräsentationen ermöglicht wird. Repräsentationen in dem Sinne 
können als Effekte der Adaptabilität verstanden werden. Unter dieser Annahme 
wird das aktuelle Forschungsvorgehen diskutiert. Jeder Körper, jeder Geist sowie 
deren assoziierten Repräsentationen haben sich adaptiv an die Umwelt 
angepasst und tun dies kontinuierlich in einem individuellen Sinne. Um adaptive 
Prozesse in der Kognition zu entdecken, scheint es entgegen dem 
gebräuchlichen methodischen Vorgehen angebracht, das Augenmerk auf 
individuelle Ausprägungen zu richten.  
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Chapter One 
General Introduction 
The perception of our human bodies and their movements is a fascinating subject 
for both scientific research and everyday life. We experience ourselves and a 
sense of agency of our own body by integrating information from different 
sensory systems. For instance, while typing this sentence, I can see my hands on 
the keyboard while I sense the fingers‟ positions as I feel the touch on my finger 
tips. Besides the sensation of our own body, the visual perception of other 
stationary or moving bodies can be a pleasurable experience, an example of 
which is the form of dance. Dance also illustrates several aspects of body and 
movement representations. For instance, dancers use various techniques in 
imagery and training in order to improve their physical performance and 
emotional expression. For that reason, dancers have often been used as experts 
in recent scientific research (for a review see Jola & Mast, 2005). In this thesis, 
dancers were tested as experts in all but one experimental study. However, as 
well as dancers, any healthy individual has a clear sense of one‟s own body. 
Combining the body‟s movements and its position in space is a generic ability 
and gives a sense of what it means to be oneself. 
The cognitive and neuronal mechanisms underlying self-related 
perceptions of the body are intriguing and challenging to study scientifically, 
because representational processes are not directly accessible. For instance, 
while movement characteristics can be classified by visual observation, the 
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mental processes in response to particular movement characteristics cannot: 
When a dancer learns a new movement pattern, he or she can verbally describe 
the movement characteristics, but these do not necessarily have to correspond 
with the features of his or her representation of the movement. Neuronal 
activation from sensory inputs of a stationary body can be inferred from data of 
current methodological techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). Further, how the body and its movements are experienced and 
accordingly represented in the mind, is subject to interpretation from data 
collected by behavioural experiments (e.g., Calvo-Merino, Jola, Glaser,  
& Haggard, 2008). To clarify, instruments to extract and analyse movement 
parameters do exist: When watching a dance performance, body orientations, 
gesture directions, movement speed, and body limb alignments can be perceived 
and analysed with the help of systems, such as the Bartenieff Fundamentals 
principles (Hackney, 1998). The changes in movement quality can be detected 
with such movement analysis systems and be used to compare training effects 
(e.g., Barnea, 2006). Yet the captivating question of how the performance is 
represented in the dancers‟, the choreographers‟, or the audiences‟ minds, goes 
beyond pure visual perception. In order to understand and model mental 
processes, a scientific approach is required. 
The experimental studies presented in the following chapters focus on the 
body and its movement representations separately. The fact that we are 
constantly moving has to be integrated in the body representation. The ability to 
move constitutes our perception of the world. However, it is only recently that the 
relationship between the body and its movement representations has been 
investigated. Most studies on bodily representations have focused on the 
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stationary body, even though they have incorporated aspects of movement. In 
this thesis, body representations in the stationary body are discussed with 
respect to different sensory modalities, and movement representations in the 
moving body are investigated by a motor learning experiment. The representation 
of the self based on different sensory modalities is discussed in chapter 2 and 3, 
whereas chapter 4 deals with motor imagery and visualisation effects on 
movement representations. 
It is important to investigate both body and movement representations in 
order to capture similarities, such as the feature of adaptability. For example, 
over the centuries, dance styles have changed dramatically and the connotation 
of the body has undergone immense cultural changes. Thus body representation 
as well as movement representations are thought to be highly adaptable. On the 
one hand, characteristics of the body representation can be influenced by 
movements. On the other hand, movement types seem to be dependent on 
particular body representations. However, how movements are generated and 
what role the body representation plays in movement is less clear. Furthermore, 
the way in which particular movement types modify the body representation itself 
remains unresolved. This thesis is considered a first step into the novelty 
perspective of looking at body and movement representations by their 
adaptability alone. Further studies investigating how the body directly affects 
movement representation and how movement affects body representation would 
extend the current investigation and should be considered for future research. 
In the following sections of the introduction I will highlight some of the few 
earlier experimental works that initiated the study and development of mental 
representations and which reflect properties in mental representations relevant 
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within this thesis. Furthermore, current concepts of body and movement 
representations will be outlined to position and structure the content of the 
present work. Detailed information and references related to each experimental 
work are outlined in the introductory sections within each particular chapter.  
Mental Representations and Mental Imagery 
Definitions  
In general, a representation is a substitution in the absence of the thing it refers 
to, most often something in the external world or even something mentally 
generated (Eysenck & Keane, 2000). In cognitive neuroscience, the term 
„representation‟ has many different meanings. Mental visualisations, such as 
visual images, generally represent objects or actions. Further, representation is 
used for mere unconscious mental surrogates, often described by the terms 
„schemata‟ and „template‟. However, representation is also used to describe the 
somatotopical organisation of the body in the somatosensory and motor cortex. 
The term „representation‟ is also closely related to „mental images‟, yet the 
distinction is not always clear (Cooper, 1995). Several forms of mental images 
have been reported in the literature on imagery research over the past 20 years. 
In particular: visual images representing real perception in a depictive way  
(e.g., Kosslyn, 1996), spatial images representing spatial relations among entities 
(e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983), and motor images representing the motor action 
from an egocentric perspective (e.g., Annett, 1996). Not only the content but also 
the processes related with these images are proposed to be different. Operations 
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such as mental rotation and mental scanning of visual images are seen as 
isomorphic to corresponding operations on real perceptions, whereas the 
construction and manipulation of spatially organised mental models only 
represents a possible state of affairs described in the premises independent of 
visual processing (Knauff, Jola, & Strube, 2001; Knauff, Strube, Jola, Rauh,  
& Schlieder, 2004). Further, motor imagery is viewed distinctive from visual 
imagery in respect to its inherent egocentric perspective (Jeannerod, 1995) as 
well as its neural substrate (Decety & Jeannerod, 1995). Jeannerod implies that 
in motor imagery, “the subject feels himself executing a given action, whether it 
involves the whole body (e.g., running), or it is limited to a body part (e.g., writing, 
pointing to a target or holding pressure against an obstacle)” (p. 1420).  
In this thesis I consider „representation‟ as the internal conceptualisations 
derived from multiple sensory information of either side of the body; the world 
around us and the inside. I use the term „mental images‟ with respect to 
Jeannerods‟ (1995) view on motor imagery. His idea is that motor imagery is part 
of the motor representation which is unconscious but can be accessed 
consciously under certain conditions: A motor image is a conscious motor 
representation. Thus, an „image‟ delineates the conscious accessible part of a 
„representation‟ which can be experienced either as pictorial or kinesthetic. 
However, both mental representations and mental images are based on 
multisensory information and they both inherently contain phenomenal 
experiences which are partly voluntarily perceivable and partly controllable (see 
p. 25). Besides bottom-up information from sensory receptors, mental 
representations and images can also be generated and modulated top-down by 
cognitive processes, such as mental simulation. It is probably the multisensory 
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aspect that has led to several distinct definitions. For example, as mentioned 
above, mental images are often subdivided into motor images, visual images, 
and kinesthetic images. Correspondingly, mental representations were mostly 
investigated as either visual or motor representations. To summarise, 
representations and images are not used interchangeably within this thesis. The 
term „representation‟ is defined as a superordinate concept for cognitive 
processes that provide perception of the body, its movements, and the world 
around us. Mental images, however, are used to describe forms of representation 
that are consciously experienced. 
History 
The foundation of the current research on mental representation is built on three 
classic experiments. The tradition of research on mental representation 
processes started with the work of Tolman (1948). He showed that mice who 
were food deprived found the shortest yet unknown way to the food when the 
previously learned path has been restricted. Tolman concluded that this was only 
possible because the mice constructed a cognitive map of their environment. He 
was the first of the Behaviourists who made clear suggestions on cognitive 
processes instead of looking at the brain as a black box situated between 
stimulus and behaviour. Today, years after Tolman‟s finding, cognitive maps and 
other forms of mental representations are widely accepted to play an important 
role in human cognition. 
The next important step that has been taken in research was by Shepard 
and Metzler (1971). The authors‟ experimental work shed light into the 
transformational processes of mental representations. In their classical mental 
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rotation task, participants were presented with two abstract cubes in different 
angular orientations while they had to identify whether the stimuli were identical 
or not. The experiment revealed that participants took longer to respond when the 
orientation disparity between the two cubes increased. This increase in reaction 
time with increasing angular disparity has since been regarded as the expression 
of the rotation time needed to align the two objects mentally, according to real 
rotation time. For the first time, strong evidence for functional processing of 
mental images was revealed. 
Finally, new brain imaging techniques such as functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) enabled further insight into the neuroanatomical 
correlates of mental representations and mental transformations. Kosslyn et al. 
(1999), for example, was one of the first to show brain activation correlates in 
visual areas during visual imagery. This finding supported the existence of visual 
imagery as well as its modular characteristics. 
These three basic steps differ firstly in their propositions on the spatial 
content within the representations and secondly with regards to their propositions 
about neuronal manifestation. Ever since, these features remain as the basic 
differences between scientific investigations on mental representations. First, 
mental maps (i.e., Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978; Tolman, 1948) are supposedly 
mental representations of spatial maps inherently containing spatial relations. 
Mental representations (i.e., Shepard & Metzler, 1971) have a spatial content, but 
the spatial relation is referenced between the objects, while the spatial reference 
frame of the observer, the participant, remains fixed. The spatial relations in 
mental maps can be perceived either from an egocentric or allocentric 
perspective. From an egocentric viewpoint, the observer can flexibly modify his or 
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her frame of reference. This means, a perspective change of the observer can be 
achieved by egocentric mental transformation. However, in the allocentric 
perspective, the map is an external representation, which is adjusted according to 
the spatial orientation of the observer. It was only a decade after mental object 
rotation was defined by Shepard and Metzler that the egocentric reference frame 
was taken into account (Parsons, 1987a, 1987b). In these tasks, bodies or body 
parts instead of objects had to be identified by the participants. In this thesis, 
differences between mental rotation of objects, bodies, and symbols are 
investigated in chapter 2. Second, unless otherwise stated, concepts of body and 
movement representations are investigated herein regardless of their neuronal 
manifestation. This study investigates behavioural effects of representations 
rather than neuronal substrates of representations. Nevertheless, the „hardware‟ 
of representational processes may indeed play any role in how cognitive 
processes are actually implemented in the brain and how neuronal manifestation 
restrict or enable cognitive processes. For a general understanding of the human 
brain, the neuronal substrate of representations must be taken into account. 
Nevertheless, this can be done in addressing functional properties of 
representation processes on different levels. Marr‟s (1982) three independent 
level discrimination in cognitive modelling – computational, representation, 
implementation – is addressed (see p. 21) in order to understand the level of 
investigation within this thesis.  
Functions  
Do we really need mental representations? What is their functional role? Mental 
representations are thought to play a role in visual recognition and object 
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identification (Kosslyn, 1996). For example, when we look at a photograph of a 
former friend, we are able to recognise our friend when the representation stored 
in our memory matches the representation of the photograph we are actually 
looking at. Consider that we are not very sure about whether the person is really 
the one we have in mind. We can verify this by identifying particular known facial 
or bodily features as well as behavioural characteristics of our friend. For 
example, if he or she is writing a letter in the photograph, we can identify the 
writing hand. To do so, we can easily think ourselves into the person in the 
photograph and feel which hand is holding the pen. This means we are able to 
transform the mental representation of ourselves into the visual representation of 
the body in the photograph. In accordance with Kosslyn‟s model, recognition is 
dependent on visual representations whereas identification relies on associative 
memory and includes multimodal inferences. As in the example outlined above, 
to identify whether it is the left or right arm with which we „feel‟ the pen, we need 
to have a sensation of our own body. This internal body perception or 
proprioception is often called the „sixth sense‟ since Sherrington (1906). A clear 
representation of our body in space is built by using the sensory information from 
our joints, muscle spindles, and tendons. However, without available sensory 
information, conceptual knowledge may be used to solve such tasks, as 
discussed by the role of learned conceptual representations in Experiment 3. 
Furthermore, in the example outlined above, a change in perspective took place 
when thinking oneself into the body of somebody else. It is widely debated 
whether visual representations are viewpoint-dependent or not. When the body is 
involved in the representation, the viewpoint should be considered as playing an 
important role (see chapter 2). However, investigations involving tactile or 
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proprioceptive (body) representations often question the centre of reference 
within the egocentric perspective (see chapter 2). Furthermore, mental images or 
representations are sometimes regarded as an epiphenomenon of cognitive 
processes and their pictorial aspects doubted (Pylyshyn, 2003). The propositional 
theory, for example, suggests that cognitive processes are not based on the 
mental images but on computational steps. Conversely, a theory from 
computational science does not support the idea that observed behaviour is 
represented as such (Brooks, 1986). The behaviour is defined by the way in 
which the body is constructed and interacting with its environment. Actions, 
intentions, and motivations are embodied. What we perceive as motives is 
interpreted when we observe other species or robotics behaviour – and perhaps 
even ourselves.  
Two points speak in favour of representations. Firstly, our conscious 
experiences of representations, so-called „images‟, and secondly, experimental 
investigations such as the aforementioned classical studies which showed strong 
evidence for a functional value of representations. For example, several 
investigations showed that training by mental imagery demonstrates effects on 
motor performance (see chapter 4). Even if some images were just by-products, 
experimental investigations have revealed evidence that at least some forms of 
images are substantial parts of cognitive processes. However, part of the mental 
representations – unlike mental images – cannot be accessed at all (see sections 
on body and movement representations below). It is not entirely clear whether 
mental representations do exist, whether they are implemented in the cognitive 
processes, or whether these representations are just concepts that evolve when 
we try to infer models of the brain‟s functions by experimental approaches. Even 
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though the representations outlined herein are just explanatory, they further the 
understanding of functional processes in the cognitive apparatus. Consequently, 
it is important to clarify the level on which mental representations are 
investigated.  
Marr (1982) suggested a model with three levels of mental 
representations: the computational, the representational, and the 
implementational level. In this thesis, I sometimes refer to questions or 
experimental evidence on how mental representations are computed or 
implemented in the neuronal system. However, these are just stated in order to 
support the findings of mental representational properties. Another regularly 
stated distinction in different representations is between iconic, abstract, and 
symbolic form in Psychology as well as between projectional (isomorph) and 
computational maps in Neurobiology (Paillard, 1991). Representations do not 
necessarily have to be isomorphic relations of the observed actions or the 
sensory inputs. I do not claim that representations and the neuronal 
implementations - or representations and sensory inputs - have to be 
isomorphically matched. For example, when we observe others‟ actions or 
emergent behaviour, we intend to see motivations which we expect to be 
implemented as such but may not be so. The fact that we immediately apply 
intentions to perceived actions is further evidence for representational concepts. 
We build and rely on representations within the whole process from recognition to 
understanding to action. Therefore, it might even be possible that we do not 
process the images or representations themselves, but represent particular 
features. The understanding of how these features are processed can be well 
explained by models of mental representations. 
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To sum up, the idea is that models of representation help explain a concept or 
process within cognitive functions. I do not claim how representations are 
materialised in the cognitive processes, but rather focus on how mental 
representations are organised. 
Sensory Systems  
Since cognitive maps were introduced by Tolman (1948), experimental 
investigations on mental representations have increased enormously and have 
led to a number of supposedly distinctive forms. Some examples include:  
(a) maps in spatial cognition such as egocentric maps and allocentric maps, (b) 
body representations such as body image and body schema as well as (c) visual 
or motor images, which are widely discussed and described in more detail below. 
The investigations have often been separated with respect to the sensory mode 
of perception (vision, touch, proprioception) instead of common features in 
transformational processes. Correspondingly, this thesis is structured by the 
sensory systems that led to the representation. 
In the literature, sensory systems are classified either by sensory organs (eyes, 
skin, nose, etc.) or by neurophysiological pathways (visual, tactile, 
proprioceptive). Each sensory system is thought to be cortically represented in 
different anatomic areas. For instance, in the visual sensory system, the external 
world is perceived by projection of visual features from the sensory organ, the 
eyes, to the occipital areas of the brain. Further, the somatosensory system 
enables identification of objects in the external world through both touch and the 
proprioceptive (or kinesthetic) sense, together also referred to as the haptic 
sense (Gibson, 1962). Information about the position of body limbs in space and 
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the detection of tactile stimulation on the body surface is projected to the 
somatosensory cortex from muscles, tendons, and joint receptors in the former 
and skin receptors in the latter. The proprioceptive sensory mode is also 
responsible for detecting internal sensory states such as temperature and 
pressure which are represented in different areas of the human brain. Even 
though this thesis is structured according to this cortical modularity of the sensory 
system, the concept of mental representations and images used is distinct from 
cortical representation. The functional role of a mental representation or image 
can be distinguished from cortical representation as supported by experimental 
evidence and subjective experience. For example, the size of the receptive field 
of a particular body area is corresponding to its size in the somatosensory and 
motor cortex. Thus, the area of a body part in the cortical representation 
corresponds with the sensitivity of its real surface. Furthermore, the spatial 
organisation of body parts in the cortex does not match with that of the real body. 
Mental representations and images are thus viewed as higher-order 
representations enabling a coherent perception of ourselves and the world that 
deals with the body and its neurophysiologic manifestation. 
Several psychophysiological and neuronal experiments have shown 
evidence for different behavioural patterns and neural activations with respect to 
the particular representation form. For example, several studies disentangled 
ego- and allocentric neuronal representation (Neggers, Van der Lubbe, Ramsey, 
& Postma, 2006). Nevertheless, chapter 2 considers different processes within 
egocentric frames. It will be questioned whether there is a functional argument to 
define numerous different maps with respect to the different sensory modalities 
(vision, touch, proprioception, and motor). If the representations based on 
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different sensory modes share similar features, a superordinate representation 
may be more applicable than multiple single representations.  
Body Representations 
The body plays a special role in our existence. We are all occupants of a single 
body with which we have grown up with over several years. Moreover, we are 
allied to other bodies for communication purposes. Having a body means having 
to deal with input from the external world via our perceptual, tactile, and 
proprioceptive senses. In addition, it also means coping with input from internal 
states. Nevertheless, the classifications of the sensory systems are manifold. 
Often, sensory systems are distinguished in relation to the sense organ that 
constitutes the sense, such as the eye for vision or the nose for olfactory 
sensation. However, this clear distinction does not hold for the more complex 
senses of touch and proprioception. The skin might be considered as the sensory 
organ for touch, but there are also tactile sensations within the body. Also, no 
single sensory organ is responsible for the sense of proprioception. Furthermore, 
even within one sensory mode multiple sensory perceptions are possible, such 
as pressure, temperature, and weight in the tactile mode. In addition, a sensory 
property can be perceived by different sensory modes as it is the case for spatial 
relations. The way in which different sensory perceptions from different sensory 
modes are fused to a coherent experience of our whole body and the world 
around us remains an intriguing question. 
Vision, touch, and proprioception are most important in the perception of 
our body. For example, when we are touched we can immediately point to the 
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location on the body where the tactile sensation was experienced. 
A representation of the body is necessary in order to accomplish such 
localisation. Sherrington (1906) was the first to define proprioception. Since his 
early work the position sense, also called „sixth sense‟ is commonly termed 
proprioception and thought to give rise to a sense of ourselves. However, the 
body plays a particular role also in the visual sense. It could be shown that when 
seeing other bodies relational body information is processed mandatorily (Reed  
& Farah, 1995). 
Figure 1: Example of a dance practice. The dancer was instructed to make the shape of 
the letter ‘F’ with her body limbs. Position information from joints, muscle spindles, and 
tendons give rise to a proprioceptive representation of the body position while also a 
visualisation of the letter ‘F’ in form of a mental image can be superimposed on the body 
position sense. 
This thesis investigates body representation in the aforementioned sensory 
modes, vision (chapter 2), proprioception, and touch (both in chapter 3). These 
sensory modalities, vision, touch, and proprioception, are not the only modalities 
relevant to mental representations. Studies that have investigated other sensory 
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modes, for example audition, have also found evidences for mental 
representations (De Volder et al., 2001; Haueisen & Knosche, 2001). 
Characteristics  
The terms „body image‟ and „body schema‟ have recently become very popular. 
Attempts to distinguish between these two representation forms by their 
functional and neuronal properties are ongoing. Most often, body image and body 
schema are distinguished by the level of consciousness and their adaptive 
aspects. The body image is thought to be conscious and closely related to visual 
perception while the body schema is thought to be unconscious and associated 
with the motor mode. The body schema is suggested to be especially adaptive 
with experience. Short- and long-term adaptabilities are necessary as the relation 
of body parts and the size of our body changes over time whilst we must still be 
able to make appropriate movements and maintain balance. Despite the 
suggested distinctions, these two body representations, body image and body 
schema, are widely debated. For example, Head and Holmes (1911) were the 
first who mentioned schema in their observations on sensory disturbances from 
cerebral lesions. In the authors‟ view, it is the schema and not the visual or motor 
image to which body positions are referred to in the instantaneous way:   
When we sit immobile and imagine our fingers touching some object on 
the table, many of us see, at once, the picture of an outstretched arm; the 
only image in consciousness is a visual one… the final product of the 
tests for the appreciation of posture or passive movement rises into 
consciousness as a measured postural change. For this combined 
standard, against which all subsequent changes of posture are measured 
before they enter consciousness, we propose the word “schema”. By 
means of perpetual alterations in position we are always building up a 
postural model of ourselves which constantly changes. Every new 
posture or movement is recorded on this plastic schema, and the activity 
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of the cortex brings every fresh group of sensations evoked by altered 
posture into relation with it. (p. 187).  
Therefore, it is worth considering other general characteristics of the 
representation of the body as discussed below, independently of body image and 
body schema classifications. 
The Body’s Reference Systems 
The representation of the body immediately questions the reference to the 
representative‟s position. It is thought that we are able to position our body within 
the surrounding environment in different frames of reference. We can either 
represent our body in an egocentric space or in allocentric reference system. 
Considering the egocentric space of the individual in question alone, several 
reference systems are possible within their body. Experimental investigations 
revealed different reference points within the body, such as the trunk (Mouchnino, 
Aurenty, Massion, & Pedotti, 1993), the shoulders (Haggard, Newman, Blundell, 
& Andrew, 2000), or the joints (Cholewiak & Collins, 2003). References such as 
joints divide the body into different parts. Interestingly, body segmentation is 
viewed differently for the sensing and acting body (de Vignemont, Tsakiris,  
& Haggard, 2005) and also with respect to characteristics in neural 
implementation in the somatosensory and motor cortex. It is therefore necessary 
to investigate not only body representation based on different sensory modalities, 
but also movement representation altogether. 
The Awareness of the Body’s Representation 
The aforementioned difference between body image and body schema in 
consciousness accessibility of the representation is illustrated within the sensory 
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mode of proprioception in Figure 1 (p. 25). In correspondence with Cooper (1995) 
a representation can be understood as one form of mental image. While the 
mental image can be consciously accessed and the experienced cognitive 
transformations of the image are corresponding to the experimental outcomes, 
representations also have unconscious elements. As illustrated in Figure 1  
(p. 25), the dancer can generate a mental image of her body position. The shape 
of the body limbs are experienced in a visual representation and matched with 
the form of the letter F. However, can the whole body posture also be mentally 
perceived in another nonvisual modality, such as the rotation angles of the joints? 
The spatial orientation and relation of body limbs to each other can be sensed. 
Such an image is however far more difficult, if at all possible, for the whole body 
to experience (and that‟s where the aforementioned reference points come into 
play). Head and Holmes (1911) describe a patient who never failed to localise 
where he was being touched, whilst he could not tell the position of his hand. The 
authors refer to another schema or model of the surface of our bodies which can 
be destroyed by cortical lesion. Conscious mental representations of sensory 
modes do not contain the sensory information itself. A good example of the 
sensory mode of touch was described by Gibson (1962), when he writes about 
the “Rigidity or Plasticity of the Phenomenal Object”: 
When pressing a finger on a rigid surface or squeezing an object with the 
hand, it is difficult to notice the increase of intensity of cutaneous 
sensation; instead the observer is primarily aware of the substance and 
its resistance. Likewise, when pressing or squeezing a nonrigid object (a 
lump of modeling clay, a rubber ball, a handful of cloth) the observer is 
aware of the yieldingness, elasticity, or softness of the substance, not of 
the (very different) intensity of the back pressure on the skin. ... 
Presumably the degree of force exerted is being registered by the joint-
and-tendon receptors and the resulting degree of skin-pressure is being 
registered by the cutaneous and deep-tissue receptors, but the intensities 
are not experienced as such. Perhaps it is the relation between these 
different intensities that is registered. The proportion of one to the other, 
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and the relative temporal buildup of these two, are different for rigid and 
for nonrigid objects. A possible hypothesis is that proportion and buildup 
are registered by the receptive system when it is operating in an 
exploratory fashion. They constitute stimulus-information about the object, 
whereas the intensities as such do not. (p. 481). 
Important in Gibson‟s illustration is, that we have a clear perception of how soft or 
hard the tissue of the touched object is, but we do not perceive the changes in 
pressure quantitatively. This example again points out how important the transfer 
from sensory information to mental representation is in our everyday life. 
Short- and Long-Term Changes 
The possible modifications in the body representation in short- and long-term are 
other important characteristics that need to be taken into account. For example, 
the aforementioned reference points can change depending on the sensory input. 
Furthermore, the body can adapt depending on the sensory information. The 
experience of a phantom limb shows a certain independence of the 
representation from peripheral sensory input. A phantom limb sensation is a 
perception of the lost body part after amputation, sometimes related with pain 
(e.g., Melzack, Israel, Lacroix, & Schultz, 1997). This representation can, 
however, be changed by sensitivity training at the corresponding limbs end which 
results in phantom pain reduction (Flor et al., 1998). Therefore, changes in the 
body representations are possible by training. In this thesis, the representations 
adaptability forms an important element. Long-term changes are studied by 
observing expertise (Experiments 2 and 4) and learning effects (Experiment 6). 
Short-term changes and adaptations are investigated by modification of the 
presented stimuli (objects vs. bodies vs. symbols in chapter 2), the available 
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sensory information (visual vs. proprioceptive in chapter 3) and the sensory 
system used for the response (visual vs. motor in chapter 4). 
Multisensory Fusion  
We do not phenomenally experience our body in everyday life in a disparate way 
dependent on the sensory information from the external world or internal 
representation states. Thus, although information is processed via distinct neural 
pathways even within a sensory modality (e.g., Goodale & Milner, 1992), sensory 
modalities are fused in the experience. Cross-modal effects could be shown 
experimentally and are important for tasks such as balance and posture. It is 
therefore important to look at the body representation characteristics across the 
different sensory systems and also in the way that sensory information 
corresponds and influences each other. 
Movement Representations 
The use of the term „representation‟ in the field of motor control is not as common 
as it is for the stationary body. Most proposed models on motor representation, 
such as comparator models (Bernstein, 1967) or the forward model (Wolpert, 
Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995), have two aspects in common. First, the models 
propose that the motor system is hierarchically organised and second, that a 
match between the desired and current state of the motor system allows motor 
control. In this thesis, „movement representation‟ is used instead of motor 
representation to emphasise both the cognitive processes and the movement. 
The neural instantiation is a necessary aspect to understand the relation between 
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action and cognition. The focus of mental representations - despite its substantial 
implementation - can give some interpretational freedom which supports the 
detection of particular representational properties. Jeannerod (1997), for 
example, hypothesised that the representation of an internal goal and intention is 
represented instead of a target or the movement itself. However, when 
considering motor image, the movement itself is consciously represented. For 
example, in dance, movements are not object-related and internal goals and 
intentions have to be represented in relation to the movement in one way or the 
other. Therefore, the term „movement representation‟ is used to describe a 
general form of movement schema which is adjusted accordingly to several 
sensory bottom-up inputs such as vision or proprioception, as well as top-down 
control from mentally generated information. A movement representation is 
responsible for movement execution, the performance, and identification 
processes when observing movement. These aspects of movement 
representation are discussed in more detail below.   
Performing and Observing Movement 
A movement is thought to be a compound of motor preparation, efferent 
commands from the brain to the acting muscle, and afferent feedback from the 
muscle to the brain. In short, when a movement is executed, efferent commands 
along the descending pathways activate the corresponding muscles and afferent 
feedback information is sent back to the cortical centres (for more detailed 
information see chapter 4; and Berthoz, 2000; or Jeannerod, 1997). Therefore, 
whenever a movement is executed, independent of its initiation and familiarity, 
efferent signals and afferent feedback are provided, as well as their estimates 
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and copies as proposed by the comparator and forward model. The concept that 
processes such as intending, imagining, observing/imitating, and performing an 
action share common structural and functional mechanisms, is widely accepted. 
Nevertheless, the cognitive processes involved in these different forms of 
movement generations are yet unresolved. For example, when we imitate a 
movement, we transfer the movement qualities from perception to action. This 
process seems to happen without awareness of a movement representation. 
However, when dancers have to laterally transfer a learned movement sequence, 
they can do so either by focusing on the changed relation between the body and 
the space or by focusing on a lateral change within the body. In the former way, 
no attention is directed on the moved body limb. Therefore as in imitation, no 
movement representation is experienced as such. Similar to Gibson‟s example in 
touch perception (see p. 28), were we are not able to quote exact parameters of 
pressure, but we have a clear phenomenological experience of the pressure 
quality; we are unaware of the actual level of the muscle contraction. Jeannerod 
(p. 187) refers to the interesting statement of Bernstein that the execution 
involves biomechanical constraints which are not necessarily represented 
centrally. Thus describing overt action does not allow full access to the central 
processes and the central processes do not necessarily specify the 
representation of the action. This means that the overt movement is not a reliable 
source of information for its own representation. For example, when painting the 
figure 8 with the right arm in space we can easily recognise the number or draw it 
while having a mental image of it. We do not consciously represent the 
movement by joint rotations or kinematic parameters such as the level and timing 
of muscle contraction as such, but, even so, we move the arm easily along a 
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visualised 8-path in space. Moreover, from the outside, we see the moving body, 
but we do not perceive the movements with respect to such points in space. 
Several good examples of intentions‟ invisibility without loss of perceptual 
pleasure can be seen in some dance performances, such as Cunningham‟s 
«OCEAN», first performed in Brussels in 1994. The choreographer divided the 
space into different sections and related the movements to these sections. 
However, even though the dancers consciously represent the movements with 
respect to points and lines in space, the audience does not consciously perceive 
the space but the movements of the dancer‟s bodies. However, the ability to infer 
movement intentions when visually observing movements is viewed as highly 
important in the understanding of others.  
Recognition 
Clearly, we have the ability to visually recognise a moving body quickly and easily 
from sparse input. Not only the particular movement itself but also the actor‟s 
identity or emotion can usually be identified by the perception of only a few point 
lights (Johansson, 1973). This effect is known as “biological motion”. In the 
biological motion paradigm, participants are presented with movements indicated 
only by some point lights placed on the actors‟ body joints while the body limbs 
are occluded in the presentation proper. Generally, the task is either to recognise 
the type of movement (e.g., walking, jumping, etc.) or the type of emotion. Recent 
research has focused on the difference in identifying or discriminating the actors 
(e.g., recognise oneself, friends or strangers). Humans are surprisingly good in all 
these slightly modified tasks. Thus, some functional form of movement 
representation based on visual input supports the identification of movements. It 
has also been shown that the visual input can be stronger than the motor 
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command. Nielsen (1963) found that participants adjusted their own movement 
on the visual perception of the movement of an alien hand while ignoring the 
motor information from their own movement. Visual perception on the other hand, 
seems to be influenced by properties of the motor system (Viviani & Stucchi, 
1992). Therefore, what role does a movement representation play in motor 
control? Moreover, is the skill of recognising human movement based either on 
visual or on movement experience (or both)? How movements are identified or 
memorised is not clear. Human movement is the only motion that we both 
produce and perceive. For that reason it is difficult to assign human movement 
recognition either to our visual or motor lifetime experience. Dancers have a very 
particular sense of their motor experience. Interestingly, dancers often insist that 
the movements are represented and stored in the muscles. This assumption is 
based on the phenomenological experience when performing a well-learnt 
movement pattern in a precise fashion (Jola, 2006). Nevertheless, it cannot be 
anatomically correct, as the memory is shown to be located in the brain and not 
the muscles themselves. Hence the phenomenological experience is not 
matching the neurophysiological properties, which highlights the difficulty in 
capturing the elusive movement representations. 
Remembering 
In cognitive neuroscience, the term „motor program‟ or „motor plan‟ is used to 
explain how stored movements or movement patterns are represented. When 
learning a new movement, neurophysiological changes can be observed at 
different levels of the motor control system (see also chapter 4). A delay in the 
movement execution in imitation studies showed evidence that movements are 
stored even when only visually perceived (Meltzoff, 1995). However, it is not clear 
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whether a motor program exists for every single movement pattern or whether 
movements are chunked motor programs. Considering the neuronal aspects of 
storage, it is unclear at which levels the mechanisms are saved. It is generally 
agreed that the cerebellum plays a role in the fine control and coordination of 
movement performance (Martin, Keating, Goodkin, Bastian, & Thach, 1996). 
However, it remains unclear whether common motor control is at the level of 
modulation of motor neuron and muscle firing rates to control for movement 
parameters or whether movements were executed based on novel combinations 
of existing downstream elements (see Thach, Goodkin, & Keating, 1992). 
It has also been suggested that movements might be represented by 
sequential ordered body representations (Head & Holmes, 1911) sometimes 
even negating a proper movement representation. Similar to cinematography, 
several following representations would elicit a sensation of movement. The 
functioning of Labanotation, a symbol language for notating dance, draws on this 
idea. In Labanotation, several body postures are indicated on a sheet of paper 
starting from the bottom to the top. When reading Labanotation, the symbols are 
transferred to a mental representation and a movement can be inferred by 
interpolating the following subsequent postures (see Experiment 3). Evidence for 
such a movement representation by combining static pictures is given by the 
apparent motion paradigm. Funk, Shiffrar, and Brugger (2005) found that a 
biologically plausible movement is perceived when participants perceived two 
alternating positions at a certain frequency. This apparent motion was observed 
even in impaired participants with an amputation of the corresponding limb. Thus 
an existing unconscious movement representation seems to define our visual 
perception of movements, but is it experienced by merging posture information? 
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Whether such sequential body representations show movement representation 
characteristics is a subject that has yet to be empirically supported. 
Sensory Information 
Clearly, as indicated above, a close connection between movement and body 
representation is likely based on sensory modalities: Afferent sensory information 
and motor action affect each other on a regular basis. For example, sensory 
afferent information plays an important role in motor learning. Also, it has also 
been shown recently that motor action unifies body limb representation  
(de Vignemont, Majid, Jola, & Haggard, 2009; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 
2006). Therefore, movement representation holds as a basis for motor control 
where sensory afferents can be integrated, but is also adding to the sensory 
experience of the body.  
The role of afferent information in motor control has been shown in 
several studies. For example, in a study with monkeys, the authors found that 
with the lack of afferent information only unfamiliar movements were severely 
impaired (Polit & Bizzi, 1979). Further, deafferented human patients were 
dependent on visual information for motor control (Cole & Sedgwick, 1992). 
Differences between visually or proprioceptively driven movements are not 
reflected in the fusimotor set (Vallbo & al-Falahe, 1990). Thus influence of 
afferent sensory information supports or substitutes any movement via movement 
representation. When a movement is familiar however, afferent information is 
less important; therefore, some movement sequences are possible in the 
absence of this peripheral feedback (Forget & Lamarre, 1987). Such movement 
representations therefore seem to cover the complete information necessary for a 
motor command. This is in accordance with Ghez, Gordon, and Ghilardi (1995), 
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who concluded that an internal model with the dynamic properties of the limb is 
required in both the planning and learning of movement. Such an internal model 
is taking into account that interaction torques act at different joints using 
proprioceptive information. Further, when proprioception is lacking, the internal 
model can partially substitute proprioceptive information within the internal model 
by vision of the limb in motion.  
Moreover, movements are not only affected by sensory afferents from 
external events such as vision; there is evidence that mental processes such as 
motor imagery influence motor performance. Thus another way of looking at 
movement representation properties is to study the effects that internally 
generated processes have on the motor performance (chapter 4). 
Mental Imagery 
What is the functional neurological property of movement representation in motor 
control (for a review see Lotze & Halsband, 2006)? Jeannerod (1995) concludes 
that the neural substrates of conscious motor imagery share functionally 
equivalent neuronal processes with unconscious motor preparation. Lotze and 
Halsband, however, suggest that imagery has an important function not only in 
movement preparation but also in movement training. In correspondence with 
Lotze and Halsband the term „movement representation‟, as it is used here, 
stands for more than mere movement preparation. Movement representation is 
handling motor plans, motor programs, movement commands (efferent 
information), bottom-up information from sensory signals (afferent information), 
as well as top-down information received from imagery, mental states, and 
visualisation processes. 
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The effects of mental and visual processes on movement representation in 
training are the subject of chapter 4. There is strong evidence for imagery training 
to increase movement performance (e.g., Yue, Wilson, Cole, & Darling, 1996; 
see also chapter 4). The relationship between imagery, movement 
representation, and actual motor actions is however unclear, and thus the effects 
of imagery on movement representation – in form of accessible motor programs – 
are investigated in that chapter. Is imagery just less than execution or is it 
something different in relation to movement representation? Clearly, a large 
number of studies have shown that motor imagery and motor executions share 
many anatomical substrates, but do not completely overlap. For an actual 
overview of current common neural activations for imagery and execution see 
Lotze and Halsband (2006). The experiment in chapter 4 is exceptional because 
it focuses on the training effects on a new nonestablished movement. This gives 
the opportunity to study the effect that mental processes have, when aspects of 
the movement representation are unsettled. In the current thesis, movement 
representation therefore stands for motor planning, motor program, and motor 
image. 
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Chapter Two 
Body Representation in Response to Vision 
Experiment 1: Mental Transformation of Objects and Bodies 
Introduction 
Mental imagery is often referred to as the ability to generate and manipulate 
mental representations of objects. Most studies on mental imagery use the 
mental object rotation task introduced by Shepard and Metzler (1971). This task 
requires the participant to decide whether two visually presented objects on the 
computer screen are the same or different. The greater the angular disparity 
between the two objects, the longer it takes the participant to respond. This 
finding was interpreted with the principle of transformational equivalence to real 
rotation of the object (Shepard & Cooper, 1982). However, mental rotation of 
objects is not the only task which requires the use of mental imagery. Different 
types of mental imagery are used to accomplish a variety of tasks (Hegarty  
& Kozhevnikov, 1999; Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave, & Wallach, 1984; Mast, Ganis, 
Christie, & Kosslyn, 2003; Mast & Kosslyn, 2002). 
An important issue is the reference frame involved when we use mental 
imagery. The mental object rotation tasks (MORTs) as used by Shepard and 
Metzler (1971) require a transformation of the relation between the two objects 
while the viewer‟s position and perspective remain fixed. Other types of tasks, 
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however, are easier if people mentally change their own perspective and mentally 
rotate themselves (i.e., the representation of their body or body parts) rather than 
the objects. In this chapter, this type of task is referred to as the mental body 
rotation task (MBRT). In the MBRT, line drawings of human bodies are presented 
with one arm outstretched (e.g., Parsons, 1987a). The participant has to judge 
which arm of the figure is outstretched (left-right discrimination). 
In everyday life, the abilities underlying the egocentric body 
transformation are used frequently in a variety of instances. For example, when 
we are in the office at work, we can visually imagine the policeman managing the 
traffic at the junction we just passed on our way to work. We can figure out in 
imagery whether the policeman was using the left or the right arm to signal the 
drivers when to go and when to stop. To extract more visual details from the 
imagined scene, we can mentally “zoom in” and thus will be able to discriminate 
smaller details. For example, we will then be able to judge whether the policeman 
was wearing glasses or not. Likewise, we can mentally “zoom out” to visualise 
the entire crossway so that we can judge in which direction the policeman was 
facing. Evidently, “zooming out” implies a change from small scale space to large 
scale space. The spatial context of the image becomes more relevant and is in 
fact needed for successful navigation. This example illustrates that the level of 
spatial resolution can be adjusted flexibly depending on the actual task. This is 
different from spatial perception, which is more or less bound to the physical 
properties of the immediate environment. Therefore, mental imagery is neither a 
large scale nor a small scale function. It seems that mental imagery operates 
widely independently of the spatial scale. The same principle may apply for 
perception where there may also be some constraints of small and large scale 
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spaces in imagery. Surprisingly, however, very few studies have been conducted 
on this topic (e.g., Malinowski, 2001). What are the spatial abilities necessary for 
mental operations in large scale space, such as navigation? In particular, 
perspective transformation turns out to be an essential strategy in navigation. 
One can take another person‟s perspective when that person, for example, asks 
for directions on how to get to a desired place of interest. This ability is 
noteworthy because it operates well in different spatial scales, in the immediately 
visible or tangible environment as well as in large scale space, outside our field of 
view. For example, we can mentally take the perspective of the Statue of Liberty 
just as well as the perspective of any normal-sized person. 
In fact, there is support for the idea that MBRTs are a special class of 
mental spatial transformation, which – at least partially – rely on mechanisms 
separate from those responsible for MORTs. Strong evidence for the existence of 
two distinct components within spatial transformation processes is based on 
behavioural data. In contrast to the MORT, the reaction times in the MBRT 
showed no increase with angle of rotation (Zacks, Mires, Tversky, & Hazeltine, 
2000). It is noteworthy, however, that there are also findings for the MBRT 
showing that error rates and reaction times depend on angular disparity even 
though the reaction times slopes were less steep than those reported for the 
MORT (see Parsons‟ Experiments 1 and 2,  1987a). Nevertheless, neuroimaging 
studies have revealed differences in brain activation when people are engaged in 
MORTs and MBRTs (Zacks, Rypma, Gabrieli, Tversky, & Glover, 1999; Zacks, 
Vettel, & Michelon, 2003). Moreover, an extrastriate body area in visual cortex 
revealed different activation when participants viewed body parts compared to 
nonbiological images (Reed & Farah, 1995).  
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The studies in this chapter further pursue the investigation of these two types of 
mental transformations. In particular, the MORT and the MBRT with exactly the 
same rotation conditions are compared. In fact, the MBRT requires the 
participants to make a perspective transformation in depth (i.e., z-axis) when the 
stimuli are presented in front view, facing the participant. However, when the 
stimuli are presented in back view (i.e., facing away from the participant) the 
participants can mentally rotate themselves in the picture plane (i.e., x-axis 
rotation) without any rotation in depth. Most studies using MORTs did not vary 
the axis of rotation. Therefore, the aim of the Experiment 1 was to compare the 
MORT and MBRT so that exactly the same geometry can be applied to perform 
the mental rotation. The rotation required to match the two cubes in the MORT 
corresponds with the rotation required to align the representation of one‟s body 
with the body stimuli in the MBRT. To the best of my knowledge, to date no study 
has yet been conducted comparing the MORT and the MBRT with the same 
rotation conditions within the same sample group. 
Two mental rotation tasks 
The reaction times (RTs) and the error rates (ERs) of two mental rotation tasks, a 
mental object rotation task (MORT) and a mental body rotation task (MBRT) were 
compared. The former was the classical Shepard and Metzler (Shepard  
& Metzler, 1971) cube rotation task with identical 3-D objects, and the latter was 
an egocentric body transformation task with body figures similar to those used by 
Parsons (1987a). In the MBRT the participants viewed schematic drawings of a 
body figure, which was presented under varying orientation conditions. The task 
was to judge which arm (i.e., left or right) of the body figure was outstretched. 
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The MBRT requires the viewer to transform the mental representation of his body 
to change the perspective in imagery. No perspective transformation was 
required for the MORT as the mental transformation of one or both objects can 
be performed without changing one‟s own perspective. 
In previous studies using the MBRT or the MORT, none of the rotation 
conditions were matched properly. Therefore, the two tasks were designed with 
corresponding rotation axes and angles of rotation. This means that identical 
angles were used to match the two cubes in the MORT and to match the 
representation of one‟s body to the body figure on the computer screen in the 
MBRT. In the classical mental rotation task, the response in the MORT is 
supposed to show a significant increase with increased rotation of the angle in 
the plane (i.e., x-axis rotation). When the stimuli are also rotated in depth (z-axis 
rotation), additional mental transformation costs are assumed, thus leading to 
increased reaction times. These results will be compared with the MBRT. A 
similar increase in reaction time for the MBRT would not corroborate the 
assumption of distinct mental rotation mechanisms underlying the MORT and the 
MBRT. Alternatively, however, if the results revealed clear differences between 
MORT and MBRT, it would speak for a potential dissociation. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-two participants, 13 female and 9 male, volunteered to participate in the 
experiment, of which 36.4% had a university degree, 54.5% had attended a 
comprehensive secondary school. The mean age was 27.6 ± 4.9 years. All 
participants gave their informed consent in a verbal agreement. 
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Materials 
Two different sorts of stimuli were presented for each task: line drawings of 
human bodies for the MBRT and cubes for the MORT. Both types of stimuli could 
appear rotated in depth (0° vs. 180°) and rotated in plane (0°/45°/90°/135°/180°). 
For the MBRT the stimuli were similar to those used by Parsons (1987a). The 
stimuli in the cube rotation task were the classical figures used by Shepard and 
Metzler (1971). 
Task and Procedure 
The participants were tested in two tasks (MBRT and MORT) individually in a 
quiet room. Before the experiment started, handedness was assessed by means 
of a questionnaire (Briggs & Nebes, 1975). The instructions to the tasks were 
standardised and participants read them on their own. The participants 
underwent a training session with 10 test trials in order to become familiarised 
with the task and the stimuli. If the error rate in the test trials was higher than 30% 
the training session was repeated. 
In the MBRT, 40 schematic line drawings of human bodies (see Figure 2, 
p. 46) were presented on a 12.1” apple computer screen (viewing angle 15.7°). 
The stimuli were rotated clockwise in 5 different plane rotations 
(0°/45°/90°/135°/180°) and 2 different depth rotations (0° vs. 180°), making a total 
of 10 possible rotation conditions. In 50% of the trials the right arm was 
outstretched and in the other 50% the left arm was outstretched. Thus, each 
rotation condition was presented with the left and the right arm, crossed and 
uncrossed, each repeated 6 times, making a total of 240 trials. The participants 
were seated upright facing the computer screen and had to judge whether the left 
or the right arm of the human body figure was outstretched, using the index finger 
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of the corresponding arm. In the examples (a) and (b) illustrated in Figure 2  
(p. 46), the participant would use the index finger of the left hand for a correct 
answer. Accordingly, the participants responded with the index finger of the same 
arm they indicated and imagined as outstretched. The use of crossed and 
uncrossed arms discouraged the use of learning strategies based on the visual 
appearance of the stimuli (e.g., the use of a strategy like “if the stimulus appears 
in front view, then push the button opposite to the side of the outstretched arm” 
for stimuli presented at 0°). That is, for 50% of the upright stimuli the 
corresponding arm was not on the same side (e.g., front uncrossed and back 
crossed). Therefore, the participants were encouraged to perform an egocentric 
body rotation to give the correct answer. 
The MORT was a same-different paradigm with same or mirror-reversed 
cubes presented in adjacent locations (left side and right side of the screen). Half 
of the trials were same trials, the other half were different trials. The task was to 
decide whether the two cubes presented simultaneously on the computer screen 
were the same or different. The cubes were presented in exactly the same 10 
possible rotation conditions as the line drawings of the human bodies  
(i.e., 5 different rotation angles clockwise in the plane, 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, and 
180°; and 2 different rotation angles in depth, 0° and 180°). As in the MBRT, the 
two planes of rotation were combined, so that, unlike in the Shepard and Metzler 
paradigm (Shepard & Metzler, 1971), a cube could be rotated in plane and in 
depth. Therefore 10 possible rotation conditions were tested; with the stimuli 
either presented with the mirror-reversed cube or the original, either with the zero 
rotation cube (i.e., 0° plane rotation, 0° depth rotation) on the left or on the right 
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side in either the same or different condition. Each condition was repeated 3 
times, making a total of 240 trials. 
For the experiment proper, the total of 240 trials in each task were divided 
into three blocks. Each of the 40 combinations in the MBRT (e.g., 90° plane 
rotation, 180° depth rotation, arms crossed) was presented 2 times in a block. 
The order of the blocks and the order of the trials within the blocks were pseudo-
randomised (i.e., the same combination did not occur more than twice in 
succession). There was no time limit for the two tasks. Between the blocks, a 
short break allowed the participants to stretch their fingers and relax their eyes.  
Figure 2. Examples of stimuli in the 45° plane rotation condition of the MORT and the 
MBRT of Experiment 1. (a) and (b): examples of MBRT with one stimulus in (a) 180° 
depth and 45° plane rotation and (b) 0° depth and 45° plane rotation from the observers’ 
upright position. (c) and (d): examples of MORT with two stimuli in (c) 180° depth and 45° 
plane rotation and (d) 0° depth and 45° plane rotation from each other. 
After each task, the participants were asked about their strategies and about any 
difficulties they experienced while solving the tasks. Moreover, they filled out 
three questionnaires translated into German; the VVIQ (Vivid Visual Imagery 
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Questionnaire, Marks, 1973), the SUIS (Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale 
Kosslyn, Shepard, Thompson, & Chabris, n.d.), and the VMIQ (Vividness of 
Movement Imagery Questionnaire, Isaac, Marks, & Russel, 1986). The scale of 
the VMIQ was inverted in order to match with the scale of the VVIQ (i.e., 5 for the 
highest imagery rating and 1 for the lowest imagery rating). Only self-ratings of 
the participants that could be analysed in both tasks were averaged. 
Analysis 
The values in the text are given as mean (M) ± standard deviation (SD) in 
milliseconds for the reaction times (RTs) and in percentages for error rates (ERs). 
In figures, deviation is indicated by standard error (SE). Only RTs from correct 
trials were used. Trials with RT values greater than M ± 3.0 x SD were defined as 
outliers and therefore excluded from the data analysis. These trials were less 
than 4% of all correct answers for each participant. Participants with ERs higher 
than 25% were excluded from data analysis. Up to 50% of their correct and false 
responses were presumably produced by guessing. For the MBRT, participants 
with ERs higher than 10% (e.g., M ± 2.5 x SD) were excluded because this task 
was easier than the MORT.  
Effects of plane rotation and depth rotation were analysed. As the MORT 
and the MBRT have not been matched for difficulty, they were analysed 
separately. Descriptive data, ANOVAs with the factors plane rotation 
(0°/45°/90°/135°/180°) and depth rotation (0° vs. 180°), deviation contrasts and 
Bonferroni post-hoc t tests were computed. Furthermore, two-tailed weighted 
(polynomial) contrasts were used to test for linear trends. In the MBRT, the 
rotation angles were defined with respect to the participant. Therefore, the body 
figures presented in back view were defined as 0° depth rotated, whereas the 
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body figures presented in front view were defined as 180° depth rotated. In the 
MORT, rotation angles were defined by the angle between the two cubes. 
Results 
Three participants had to be excluded from data analysis in the MORT. Two had 
more than 25% ERs and the RTs of one exceeded 30 s in 18.3% of the correct 
trials. All participants were included in the MBRT. Mean scores of ERs and RTs 
were higher for the MORT than the MBRT as listed in Table 1 (p. 48). 
ERs and RTs for all rotation conditions are illustrated in the Figure 3  
and 4 (p. 51). A repeated measures ANOVA for ERs with the factors plane 
rotation and depth rotation revealed significant main effects in the MORT for both 
factors plane, F(4, 72) = 20.63, p < .001, and depth, F(1, 18) = 14.32, p < .01. 
The factors plane and depth did not interact, F > 1. In the MBRT, the repeated 
measures ANOVA of ERs showed a main effect for the factor plane,  
F(4, 84) = 3.70, p < .01. The factor depth showed no main effect. There is, 
however, a significant interaction with the factor plane, F(4, 84) = 5.87, p < .001. 
Table 1. 
Mean Error Rates in % and Mean Reaction Times in Milliseconds (±SD) for Dancers 
(see Experiment 2) and Nondancers of Experiment 1 in both Mental Rotation Tasks. 
 Mental Object Rotation Mental Body Rotation 
 Dancersa Nondancersb Dancersc Nondancersd 
Error Rates 11.8 ± 5.67 12.4 ± 6.38 1.6 ± 1.84 2.2 ± 2.29 
Reaction Times 6791 ± 2447 5002 ± 1963 1453 ± 715 1280 ± 484 
Note. 
a
n = 20. 
b
n = 19. 
c
n = 24. 
d
n = 22. 
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ERs in the depth rotation condition are higher for angles less than 90° in 
the MORT and the MBRT (illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, p. 51). For plane 
rotations above 90°, stimuli with no depth rotation were more difficult in the 
MBRT. As the ERs in the MORT (see Figure 3, p. 51) showed an interaction at 
90° too, linear contrasts were computed for nondepth rotated and depth rotated 
stimuli separately as well as paired t tests (depth rotated vs. nondepth rotated 
stimuli) for both tasks, although the factors plane and depth did not interact in the 
ANOVA that was computed for the MORT. 
For RTs, the repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of the actor plane, with longer RTs for increasing rotation angle in both the 
MORT, F(4, 72) = 24.88, p < .001, and the MBRT, F(4, 84) = 36.85, p < .001. The 
factor depth rotation is significant with longer RTs for depth rotated cubes only, 
F(1, 18) = 52.22, p < .001 (MORT). The two factors plane and depth rotation 
interacted in both the MORT, F(4, 72) = 8.42, p < .001, and the MBRT, F(4, 84) = 
28.47, p < .001. 
Linear trend analysis for the MORT revealed longer RTs with increasing 
plane rotation without depth rotation, t(90) = 5.78, p < .001, and with depth 
rotation, t(90) = 2.32, p < .05. The same analysis for nondepth rotated body 
figures revealed significantly longer RTs with increasing plane rotation,  
t(105) = 7.33, p < .001, and a significant quadratic trend, t(105) = 3.42, p < .01. 
The RTs for depth rotated body figures showed neither a linear nor a quadratic 
trend. 
Paired Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons (see Table 2, p. 50) for the 
MORT showed that depth rotated cubes have significantly longer RTs than 
nondepth rotated cubes for all plane rotation conditions except for 180° plane 
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rotation where the depth rotation showed no significant effect. Comparisons 
between front and back oriented body figures revealed significantly longer RTs 
for front bodies for all plane rotations below 135°. As can been seen in Figure 4 
(p. 51), front bodies showed shorter RTs when the body figures were inverted. 
Independent samples t test for mean ERs in percentages of female 
participants, M = 11.0 ± 5.4 (MORT) and M = 2.2 ± 2.1 (MBRT), versus male 
participants, M = 13.9 ± 7.4 (MORT) and M = 2.1 ± 2.8 (MBRT) revealed no 
gender difference. Moreover, an independent samples t test did not reveal 
significant differences in RTs between female, M = 5206 ± 2486 (MORT) and  
M = 1260 ± 530 (MBRT) and male participants, M = 4775 ± 1267 (MORT) and  
M = 1310 ± 438 (MBRT). 
Table 2. 
Analysis Sample of Paired Contrasts for the Type of Rotation in Depth (0° vs. 180°) 
in Mean Reaction Times in Milliseconds and Error Rates in % (±SD) of Experiment 1 
with T- and p-Values (column right of measure). 
 Reaction Times 
 
T-Value 
 
Error Rates 
 
T-Value 
Mental Object Rotationa 
0º -1935.8 ± 1179.4  7.15***  -8.95 ± 12.01  -3.25** 
45º -1244.9 ± 1945.21  5.74***  -7.33 ± 14.18  -2.25** 
90º -1425.6 ± 1227.1  5.06***  0-.34 ± 15.19  -0.10
n.s. 
135º 1-812.3 ± 1304.9  2.71***  -7.82 ± 13.03  -2.62** 
180º 11-66.5 ± 1062.5  0.27
n.s.s
  -9.08 ± 16.65  -2.38** 
Egocentric Body Transformationb 
0º 1-422.3 ± 1279.6  -7.08***  -2.39 ± 3.25  -3.45** 
45º 1-348.4 ± 1274.4  -5.95***  -1.96 ± 4.73  -1.94
†
-*
 
90º 1-154.5 ± 1218.2  -3.32***  -0.43 ± 5.26  -0.38
n.s.
 
135º -1  22.2 ± 1310.0  -0.34
n.s.s
  -1.76 ± 3.67  -2.25** 
180º 1  774.4 ± 1726.3  -5.00***  -3.96 ± 6.93  -2.68** 
Note: 
a
n = 19. 
b
n = 22. 
†
p < .07. *p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed. ***p < .001, two-tailed. 
 51 
Figure 3. Participants’ performance in the mental object rotation task in Experiment 1  
(n = 19). Please see caption Figure 4 for axis measures and further figure explanations. 
Figure 4. Participants’ performance in the mental body rotation task in Experiment 1  
(N = 22). Data are shown for 0º (black squares) and 180º (white squares) depth rotation 
in all plane rotation conditions in means (±SE); x-axis: degrees of plane rotation; y-axis 
(left scale): reaction times in milliseconds; y-axis (right scale): error rates in %. 
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Mean scores for each of the two parts of the VMIQ (imagine oneself moving and 
imagining seeing someone else moving), for the VVIQ, and for the SUIS are 
listed in Table 3 (see column for nondancers, p. 52). The two parts of the VMIQ 
differed significantly in a paired t test, t(17) = 2.65, p < .05. There was a strong 
significant positive correlation between each of the two parts of the VMIQ and the 
VVIQ, r = .867, p < .001 (imagine oneself moving) and r = .893, p < .001 (seeing 
someone else moving). The SUIS showed no correlation with any of the two 
other questionnaires. However, it revealed a significant correlation with the RT 
and the ER of the MORT, r = 0.40, p < .05 for RT, and r = 0.41, p < .05 for ER. 
The RT of the MORT and the RT of the MBRT showed a significant correlation, r 
= 0.52, p < .05. 
Table 3.  
Mean Scores of the Imagery Questionnaires of Experiments 1 and 2 (±SD), Chi-
square, and p-Value. 
 Dancersa Nondancersb χ
2
c  
VMIQ, part 1 96.7 ± 23.8 90.3 ± 16.2 3.56
†
 
VMIQ, part 2 99.9 ± 15.4 99.5 ± 14.6 11.01
n.s.
 
VVIQ 65.5 ± 17.6 63.7 ± 18.4 11.51
n.s.
 
SUIS 41.8 ± 17.9 37.4 ± 19.2 12.18
n.s.
 
Note: Three participants of the nondancers group and eight participants of the dancers group were 
excluded due to their error rates and reaction times (see Experiments 1 and 2). Also, one participant of 
the nondancers group with an average daily physical training comparable with that of dancers was 
excluded. VMIQ = Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire (maximum score 120 for each part). 
Part 1 = imagine somebody else. Part 2 = imagine oneself. VVIQ = Vivid Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
(maximum score 80). SUIS = Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (maximum score 60). 
a
n = 19. 
b
n = 18. 
c
df = 1, N = 37. Kruskal-Wallis H-test: 
†
p < .07. 
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Discussion 
The results show that the MORT is more difficult than the MBRT. The participants 
made more errors and it took them longer to respond. The high ERs found in the 
MORT were comparable to those of other studies using cubes rotated in depth 
and in plane (Jordan, Heinze, Lutz, Kanowski, & Jäncke, 2001). Moreover, it has 
to be noted that the participants in other studies used extensive amounts of 
practice over the sessions. For example, Shepard and Metzler (1971) used 1600 
pairs divided into blocks of about 200, which were tested in 8 to 10 one-hour 
sessions. The pattern of the ERs in the MORT showed an increase in task 
difficulty with increasing angular disparity as revealed by other studies (Kosslyn, 
Thompson, Wraga, & Alpert, 2001; Wraga, Thompson, Alpert, & Kosslyn, 2003). 
The ER was higher for cubes rotated in depth than for cubes rotated in plane 
only. For the MBRT, however, the orientation of the body figures (back view or 
front view) interacted with rotation angle. ERs increased with increasing angle 
when the body figures were seen in back view whereas the ERs remained flat for 
all angles when the body figures were seen in front view. 
The analysis of RTs in the MORT shows the typical increase in RT length 
with increasing angular disparity reported by Shepard and Metzler (1971). This 
finding has also been confirmed by more recent studies (e.g., Jordan et al., 2001; 
Kosslyn, DiGirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998; Kosslyn et al., 2001). A new 
finding reported in this study is the linear relationship we found for cubes which 
were rotated in depth and in plane. Shepard and Metzler measured the two axes 
separately without combining the two rotations. In the MBRT, the RTs for body 
figures rotated in depth (the body figure is seen in front view) did not vary as a 
function of rotation angle. This result confirms earlier findings by Zacks  
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et al. (2000) who presented figures in front view only. However, the RTs 
increased with increasing angle when the stimuli were presented in back view. 
How can we explain this difference? It is possible that participants make a 
shortest path rotation when the body figures are rotated in depth. Parsons 
(1987a, Experiment 1) suggested that the shortest path accounts for about 50% 
of the variance. The idea of a shortest path rotation is supported by the inverse 
contrast in RT found for upside down body figures. The RTs were shorter when 
the figures were rotated in depth. It is assumed that the orientation of an upside 
down figure is reinterpreted and therefore viewed as someone lying on their back 
(i.e., supine). In fact, several participants described some sort of kinesthetic 
experience when they solved the task with upside down figures presented in front 
view. A few participants reported that they mentally rotated themselves backward 
(similar as if they were slipping on a banana peel). Therefore, no mental rotation 
around the longitudinal axis (depth rotation) is required to solve this particular 
condition. Interestingly, we found a similar pattern in the MORT. The RTs were 
shorter at 180° when the cubes were also rotated in depth. Even though this 
difference did not reach statistical significance it could be related to Murray‟s 
(1997) finding, which demonstrated the advantage of a strategy to mentally flip an 
inverted natural object rather than rotating it along the picture plane. 
Contrary to other studies showing gender differences in mental rotation 
tasks (Emmorey, Klima, & Hickok, 1998; Linn & Petersen, 1985; Peters et al., 
1995), no significant effect of gender was evident in this study. Also, no 
advantage for participants with high mental imagery scores could be found 
(VVIQ, VMIQ) with the only exception being the SUIS, which correlated with 
performance in the MORT (shorter RTs and lower ERs). 
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The idea that people used different strategies motivated further testing on 
another group of participants. Unlike other studies, in which the strategy was 
primed via instruction (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 2001), the current study investigated 
expertise and its possible role in acquiring different cognitive strategies. The aim 
was to compare experts with nonexperts to study possible differences in the 
mechanisms that underlie the MORT and the MBRT. 
Summary 
An important question in studies on mental rotation is whether the mental rotation 
of objects (Shepard & Metzler, 1971) and the mental transformation of bodies 
(Parsons, 1987a) rely on dissociable mechanisms. Most studies support the 
assumption that the two tasks are different either due to the task specificities 
(discrimination vs. identification) or due to the stimuli (cubes vs. body drawings). 
However, the rotation angles in most of these studies were not matched between 
the two tasks. Therefore, in this experiment, the cubes and body figures were 
presented in exactly the same rotation conditions in order to provide identical 
transformation processes; in the picture plane, 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, and 180°, and 
in combination with a rotation in depth, 0° (the stimuli are rotated in the picture 
plane only) and 180°. A linear increase in RTs with increasing angle for the cubes 
could be replicated, whereas the RTs for rotated body figures increased only 
when they were presented from the back (nondepth rotated bodies). However, 
the RTs for inverted body figures were shorter when they were rotated in depth 
(front view) compared to when they were rotated in the picture plane only (back 
view). This finding suggests that participants use different strategies depending 
on the perceived orientation of the stimulus. This finding suggests that 
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participants use different strategies depending on the perceived orientation of the 
stimulus. 
The results do not support the assumption of a clear difference between 
the mental rotation of objects and bodies. However, it can be suggested that the 
orientation of the visual stimuli defines the angle of mental rotation. In order to 
validate the influence of motor and visual experience, the same tasks were 
performed by dancers as experts in the following Experiment 2. If the orientation 
of the visual stimuli is a defining property of the mental rotation process, then 
motor experience may be beneficial to solve the task. Several studies have 
shown that the motor system is closely connected with mental representation 
processes (e.g., Wexler, Kosslyn, & Berthoz, 1998). Therefore, movement 
experts would be expected to show an advantage in general or for particular 
rotation angles only. Else if the representation form of the visual stimulus is 
responsible for differences in mental transformation processes, then visual 
experience may be beneficial. Dancers who are experienced in observing and 
representing moving bodies would be expected to show a body transformation 
advantage.  
Experiment 2: Effects of Expertise on Mental Transformation 
Introduction 
The performance of a second group of participants was tested in the identical 
tasks as described in Experiment 1. The aim was to study the influence of 
expertise on performance in the mental object rotation task (MORT) and in the 
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mental body rotation task (MBRT, see Experiment 1 for further information on the 
tasks). If the two tasks share the cognitive processes involved in mental 
transformation, we would expect a group with expertise in one task (i.e., mental 
rotation of bodies) to show a transfer effect and perform better in both tasks. If, 
however, the processes involved in the MBRT are – to some extent – different 
from those involved in the MORT it is possible that expertise is bound to only one 
of these tasks and therefore does not influence performance in the other task. 
Differences in expertise for mental imagery tasks were reported in several 
studies. For example, pilots (Dror, Kosslyn, & Waag, 1993), athletes (Ozel, 
Larue, & Molinaro, 2002), and men (Jordan et al., 2001; Jordan, Wüstenberg, 
Heinze, Peters, & Jäncke, 2002) are faster in MORTs. Several authors suggest a 
correlation with sport or gymnastic expertise (e.g., Creem, Wraga, & Proffitt, 
2001), but until now, no expertise effect has yet been published for the MBRT. 
In this comparison professional dancers were recruited as experts. 
Overby (1990) found significant differences in imagery tests (i.e., body image, 
cognitive imagery, and spatial imagery) between experienced dancers and 
novices. He postulated that it is the dancers‟ physical manipulation of space 
which enhances their ability in visuo-spatial concepts. Moreover, dancers learn 
through external feedback via the mirror and from the instructors. Therefore, they 
acquire a lot of practice in real and imagined body transformations. For example, 
Ramsay and Riddoch (2001) found greater accuracy for ballet dancers in a 
position-matching task of the upper limb. Several studies on body representation 
and sensorimotor perception have demonstrated improved proprioceptive 
discrimination abilities in professional dancers and other athletes (e.g., Barrack, 
Skinner, & Cook, 1984). Taken together, we expected dancers to perform better 
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in the MBRT as a result of their training in mental imagery, kinesthetic 
experience, and postural control. Furthermore, if the MORT and the MBRT share 
mental rotation processes, then the effect of expertise should have a benefit on 
both tasks. The aim was to compare the results we described above (nonexperts) 
with a matched expert group which therefore should differ in their expertise of 
movement only. 
Method 
Participants 
An expert group of 27 professional dancers or dance students (14 female 
dancers, 13 male dancers) were matched by age and gender to the sample of 
Experiment 1. Informed consent was given by all participants in form of verbal 
agreement. The dancers performed the same tasks as the nondancers 
(participants of Experiment 1). The sample criterion for the dancers was that they 
currently work or study as a dance performer, teacher, or choreographer or as a 
high level dance manager in a field such as ballet, modern dance, contemporary 
dance, or jazz dance. They have had at least 1 hour of coordinative dance 
training per day over the last 5 years (defined as coordinative training per day). 
The mean age of the dancers was 30.5 ± 6.8 years. They were given the same 
instructions as the participants in the previous study (Experiment 1). Regarding 
education, 37% of the dancers have a university degree, 40.7% completed a 
comprehensive secondary school. The average training time per day was  
213 ± 120.2 min and the amount of training per day was normally distributed, 
df(17) = 0.94, p = .30 (Shapiro-Wilk test). None of the dancers had participated in 
any mental rotation experiment prior to this study. 
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Materials, Design and Procedure 
The materials and tasks, the questionnaires, and the procedure, as well as the 
data analysis and participants exclusion criteria are identical to the experiment 
described above (Experiment 1). The analysis differs in the additional between-
subjects factor expertise (dancers vs. nondancers) and the supplementary testing 
of the factor spatial compatibility in the MBRT (compatible vs. incompatible). To 
conduct these between-subjects analysis properly, the two independently 
measured samples (dancers and nondancers) had to be matched except for their 
expertise of movement. The expertise of movement was defined as the daily 
training time in coordinative dance training or other forms of coordinative training 
over the last 2 years. 
Results 
In the following paragraph, the results were outlined for the effect of dance 
expertise in reaction times (RTs) and error rates (ERs) in the MORT and the 
MBRT. For comparison, the data from the nondancers (Experiment 1) are 
included in the figures. Three female dancers and 4 male dancers with more than 
25% ERs had to be excluded from data analysis in the MORT. Two of them and 
an additional female dancer had ERs higher than 10% in the MBRT. 
It is noteworthy that the average training time per day for the nondancers 
of the 1st sample differs significantly from a normal distribution, df(22) = 0.731,  
p < .001 (Shapiro-Wilk test). One participant from the nondancers group 
exceeded the average training time per day by three standard deviations (M ± 3.0 
x SD). This participant was excluded from comparison. It was considered that his 
high expertise in snowboard jumping, and therefore heightened spatial 
awareness, could be compared to a dancers‟ expertise. A nonparametric H-test 
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for a comparison between the dancers and the nondancers indicated that the 
groups differed significantly in the amount of coordinative training,  
M = 3.52 ± 2.01 for the dancers versus M = 0.35 ± 0.47 for the nondancers;  
χ2(1, N = 27) = 32.45, p < .001 (Kruskal-Wallis). However, age, gender, and 
education did not differ between dancers and nondancers.  
The responses for the experts are illustrated in Table 1 (p. 48). In the 
MORT, the ANOVA with the between-subjects factor expertise (dancers vs. 
nondancers) with the within-subjects factors plane and depth rotation revealed a 
significant effect of expertise in reaction time (RT), F(1, 36) = 7.43, p < .05, and a 
trend for interaction between the factors expertise and plane rotation in the ER, 
F(4, 144) = 1.57, p = .185. The mean RTs and ERs for the MORT are illustrated 
below in Figure 5 (p. 62) which shows shorter RTs of the nondancers compared 
to the dancers. The same trend with shorter RTs of the nondancers compared to 
the dancers in the MBRT is visible in Figure 6 (p. 62), although no significant 
main or interaction effect of expertise in the MBRT could be found. 
In the MORT, the factors plane and depth rotation showed significant 
main and interaction effects in RT, F(4, 144) = 55.9, p < .001, for plane,  
F(1, 36) = 155.91, p < .001, for depth, and for the interaction between plane and 
depth, F(4, 144) = 16.8, p < .001. Significant main and interaction effects were 
found in ERs for plane, F(4, 144) = 40.36, p < .001, depth, F(1, 36) = 19.78, p < 
.001, and the interaction between plane and depth, F(4, 144) = 7.76, p < .001. In 
the MBRT, the factor plane revealed a significant main and interaction effect in 
RT for the factor plane, F(4, 140) = 61.5, p < .001, and for the interaction 
between plane and depth, F(4, 140) = 51.23, p < .001. The factor depth showed 
no significant main effect in RT in the MBRT. In the ERs, the factor plane showed 
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a significant main and interaction effect, F(4, 172) = 8.2, p < .001, for plane,  
F(4, 172) = 11.07, p < .001, for the interaction of plane and depth. Depth showed 
a tendency for a main effect in ER only, F(1, 43) = 3.23, p = .079. As the separate 
analysis of the dancers sample revealed similar results as reported above for the 
nondancers they are not addressed in more detail here. 
It could be shown in choice RT tasks that how long it takes participants to 
respond depends on the spatial relationship between stimulus and response. 
According to the spatial compatibility effect, the RT is slowed down if the stimulus 
side is not compatible with the side of the requested response (Simon & Rudell, 
1967). In the MBRT participants made compatible conditions (e.g., stimulus 
pointing to left and for a correct answer the participant had to respond with the 
left hand) and incompatible conditions (e.g., stimulus pointing to the left and for a 
correct answer the participant had to respond with the right hand). For example, 
for upright body figures in back view the responses were spatially compatible 
when the arms were presented uncrossed. An analysis for the compatibility effect 
with the factors plane and compatibility showed significant main effects for both 
factors compatibility, F(1, 43) = 87.79, p < .001, and plane, F(1, 43) = 82.17,  
p < .001. Moreover, the two factors plane and compatibility interacted,  
F(1, 43) = 16.56, p < 0.001. Paired post-hoc Bonferroni t tests for spatially 
compatible versus spatially incompatible stimuli revealed that RTs for 
incompatible stimuli are longer at 0° plane rotation, t(21) = 5.50, p < .001, and at 
180° plane rotation, t(21) = 5.32, p < .001. 
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Figure 5. Dancers’ versus nondancers’ performance in the mental object rotation task in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (n = 20 and n = 18, respectively). Please note that the y-axis scales 
differ from Figure 6 below. Please see caption Figure 6 for axis measures and further 
figure explanations. 
Figure 6. Dancers’ versus nondancers’ performance in the mental body rotation task in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (n = 19 and n = 18, respectively). Data are shown for dancers 
(dotted lines) and nondancers (bold lines); for 0º (black squares) and 180º (white 
squares) depth rotation in all plane rotation conditions in means (±SE); x-axis: degrees of 
rotation; y-axis (left scale): reaction times in milliseconds; y-axis (right scale): error rates 
in %. Please note that the scales differ from Figure 5 above. 
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Discussion 
This study pursued two aims. The first aim was to compare the MORT and the 
MBRT with exactly the same rotation conditions. Previous studies compared 
behavioural and neuroimaging data with unequal rotation conditions (Jordan  
et al., 2001; Zacks et al., 2000). The second aim was to compare professional 
dancers‟ performance to the performance of nondancers in the MBRT and 
MORT. In particular, dancers were expected to perform better in the MBRT. 
Consistent with many other studies on the mental cube rotation task, a 
linear increase in RT with increasing angle rotation was found. One of the new 
findings reported in this study is the linear positive relationship we found for the 
RTs in the MORT when the cubes are rotated in depth and in plane 
simultaneously. Shepard and Metzler (1971) measured the two axes separately 
without combining the two rotations. The additional time for depth rotated cubes 
was required for all plane rotation conditions except for the upside down stimuli, 
where the difference between depth rotated and nondepth rotated cubes did not 
reach significance. It is probably the case that participants used a more direct 
path for the inverted cubes (e.g., like flipping the objects as described by Murray, 
1997), and thus they were able to save some processing time in contrast to the 
180º plane rotation. 
The comparison between the body figures presented in front view and in 
back view is more difficult. The RTs and ERs were both constant for all plane 
rotation conditions when the stimuli were presented in front view, whereas they 
increased with increasing angle for back view stimuli. It is not clear whether the 
participants actually perform a mental rotation when they are exposed to body 
stimuli presented in the front view. It is possible that they use a totally different 
 64 
strategy since the behavioural data for the front view stimuli are not dependent on 
rotation angle. This is similar to other studies that have shown that a spatial 
inference in mental environments does not depend on the direction of the body to 
the object (e.g., Franklin & Tversky, 1990). It is therefore possible that the 
different results for body figures presented in front and back view imply a change 
in scale; from small scale for back view to large scale in front view. However, 
based on the behavioural data, it may be more appropriate to limit the 
comparison between MBRT and MORT to the back view body figures and the 
cubes rotated in plane only. In both cases, RTs depend on rotation angle and the 
geometry of the mental rotation is matched. An extension of the results showing 
the difference between front-view and back-view body figures would clearly be 
desirable. As far as the results indicate, the stimuli rotated in plane only show the 
same pattern for both types of tasks while the behavioural responses differ when 
the cubes and the bodies are also rotated in depth. It remains a hypothetical 
question whether the perspective transformation necessary for the body figures 
rotated in depth is the only reason for this difference. 
Interestingly, in the MBRT, the RTs were shorter for upside down body 
figures in front view (facing the observer) than for upside down body figures in 
back view. The front view stimuli were thought to require an additional 
transformation since they were rotated in depth with respect to the participants. 
However, the participants may have chosen the shortest path when they rotated 
themselves mentally (Parsons, 1987a). This is possible because the stimulus 
could be viewed in two alternative ways; as a figure rotated 180° in plane and 
180° in depth (i.e., upside down) or as a figure lying on the back (resting in the 
supine position). Several participants reported after the experiment that they have 
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viewed the 180° stimuli not upside down but rather in the supine position. This 
suggests that they mentally rotated the representation of their body backward to 
solve the task. The fact that some participants verbally reported the strategy they 
used for solving the task (i.e., they mentally rotated themselves backward) is not 
yet conclusive regarding the mechanisms that underlie their responses. 
It is noteworthy that no increase of RTs was found in the MORT when 
inverted cubes were rotated in depth. In this context, it is interesting that Parsons 
(1987a, part C in Experiment 2) revealed a linear increase for body figures in 
front view presented within a surrounding environment. Parsons‟ finding suggests 
that the participants are no longer able to reinterpret the orientation of the 
stimulus (they then view it upside down instead of lying on the back). In addition, 
it is noteworthy that there is a spatial compatibility effect involved in this result. If 
for example participants identify the outstretched arm (crossed or uncrossed) 
close to the body (e.g., at the height of the shoulder), correct answers are 
spatially compatible for the upside down body figures in front view whereas 
correct answers for upside down body figures in back view are spatially 
incompatible. Future studies need to separate these two possible explanations. 
In this chapter, expertise effects were investigated in comparing dancers 
and nondancers. Even though there was no effect of expertise in the expected 
direction (dancers‟ performance was not better in the MBRT), there was a 
significant difference between dancers and nondancers in the MORT. Contrary to 
Ozel et al. (2002) who found improved performance in mental object rotation for 
sport experts like gymnasts, the dancers were in fact slower than the nondancers 
in here. The dancers‟ impaired performance (longer RTs) in the MORT could be 
due to the fact that they were trying to apply a different strategy to solve the task. 
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Some of the dancers reported that they tried to rotate themselves mentally to 
align with the cubes they saw on the screen. This may have resulted in a more 
complex perspective transformation. Therefore, it is possible that their experience 
led to an inappropriate strategy and thus interfered with task performance in the 
MORT. Despite the fact that dancers have improved abilities in the perception of 
postures (Euzet & Gahéry, 1996), a more accurate proprioceptive discrimination 
(Barrack et al., 1984), and a stronger body representation (Ramsay & Riddoch, 
2001), the MBRT did not show any effect of expertise. The lack of expertise 
effects between the dancers and the nondancers in the MBRT may have been 
due to characteristics of the tasks (e.g., difficulty, stillness of the frames) or to 
capacities of the participants. It is possible that the expertise of dancers concerns 
a dynamic use of imagery involving complex sequences of movements and highly 
coordinated motor plans. It could be shown by several authors, that the expertise 
of movement is crucial in the movement observation and detection  
(e.g., Beardsworth & Buckner, 1981; Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, 
& Haggard, 2005). However, this should not be the case for static body postures. 
Therefore, the line drawings of human bodies we used for the MBRT could have 
been just too static for any effect of the dancers‟ expertise to unfold. This is 
further supported by verbal reports from almost all the dancers after the 
experiment. They described their use of mental imagery in a more dynamic 
context. Furthermore, some dancers indicated that they are able to vividly 
imagine a pirouette or a battement, but not any other types of movements that 
are not specific to their field of expertise. Several studies have shown that the 
effects of expertise acquired in dance or related sports activities do not transfer to 
other types of movements (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). Moreover, the relative 
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contribution of vision or proprioception in sport experts and dancers is not yet 
clear and seems to depend strongly on the actual task (Crémieux & Mesure, 
1994; Golomer & Dupui, 1999; Golomer, Dupui, Sereni, & Monod, 1999; Hugel, 
Cadopi, Kohler, & Perrin, 1999). However, dancers are trained to rapidly imitate 
and execute a new movement. In the training trials of the experiment, the 
experimenter could observe that the dancers even had to inhibit their body 
movements. While sitting in front of the desk, they often tried to bring their upper 
body part in line with the body figure presented on the computer screen. 
Therefore, the highly specific and over-learned connection between perception 
and motor execution in dancers may have interfered with task performance. 
Furthermore, it is certainly possible that more pronounced differences between 
dancers and nondancers could have emerged with a more difficult task. 
The results from the comparison between mental object rotation and 
egocentric body transformation in dancers and nondancers indicate that the time 
necessary to perform a mental body rotation or a mental object rotation may not 
only depend on the angle of stimulus presentation. Even though exactly the same 
rotation conditions were applied to both tasks, two completely different response 
patterns were evident. It is unlikely that the stimulus per se is responsible for this 
difference because both stimuli evoked an increase in RTs with increasing 
rotation angle in plane without depth rotation. However, when the stimuli were 
also rotated in depth, the response patterns differed and thus may reflect different 
strategies. The strategy participants use when they are facing the body figures is 
still not clear. However, since the RTs do not vary with the angle of stimulus 
presentation it seems rather unlikely that mental rotation is the mechanism 
participants use. Interestingly, task difficulty reversed when the stimuli were 
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inverted and body figures presented in front view were easier. These findings 
suggest that participants use different strategies depending on the perceived 
orientation of the stimulus. This tendency seems to be stronger for egocentric 
body transformation than for the mental object rotation task. Finally, dancers‟ 
training and expertise in motor imagery did not seem to improve performance in 
any of these tasks. However, the absence of any difference in performance does 
not necessarily rule out a difference in strategy between dancers and 
nondancers. Neuroimaging studies are necessary to further investigate potential 
differences between dancers and nondancers. 
Summary 
Based on the findings from the previous section (Experiment 1), professional 
dancers were tested as experts in the mental object rotation task (MORT, solid 
cubes used by Shepard & Metzler, 1971) and the mental body transformation 
task (MBRT, line drawings of human bodies similar to those used by Parsons, 
1987a). Differences between experts in movement and body observation were 
hypothesised to verify whether the visual stimulus or whether the rotational axis is 
sensitive to the motor and body experience of dancers. A difference between 
dancers and nondancers would give further support that the two tasks, MORT 
and MBRT rely on dissociable mechanisms. The same tasks as in the previous 
section (Experiment 1) were used. The responses of dancers were corresponding 
to the normal participants-group, with the exception that dancers showed higher 
mental rotation costs in the MORT. 
As seen in Experiment 1, also dancers showed an increase in reaction 
times in the mental rotation of objects and the egocentric body transformation 
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with increasing angular disparity when no rotation in depth was necessary. 
However, in both tasks, dancers needed more time to respond. It may be that 
dancers did not show any benefit in the egocentric body transformation task, 
because we are all experts in seeing bodies. Pictures of a real body in different 
postures and abstract drawings representing different body postures were used 
in a paired matching sample experiment (Experiment 3) in the following section in 
order to investigate the effect familiarity has on the body representation. 
Experiment 3: Mental Matching of Body Postures  
Introduction 
Human beings have the ability to visualise the perspective of somebody else. 
Most studies have focused on the ability to visualise external scenes as a third 
party sees them and have investigated the mentalising processes necessary to 
infer mental states (e.g., Vogeley et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
However, a second element of perspective-taking is related to the body: An 
observer can mentally simulate the body configuration adopted by a third party. In 
fact, mentally thinking oneself into another body is necessary to visualise the 
perspective of somebody else: I can only work out what you see if I correctly 
represent the gaze direction given by your eye, head, and body positions. 
Dance provides an interesting example for the study of body 
perspectives. In order to improve performance or to memorise a movement 
pattern, dancers often imagine themselves executing the movements that they 
watch another person performing. When the model‟s spatial orientation does not 
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match that of the observer, for example, if the observer has a frontal view of the 
model, then simulating the model‟s posture requires a mental perspective 
transformation (Zacks et al., 1999). However, the transformation can be done in 
several ways. Examples referred to as egocentric body transformation include 
mentally rotating one‟s own body into alignment with that of the observed person 
or rotating the other‟s body into alignment with one‟s own. Alternatively, instead 
of the body representation, one‟s spatial frame of reference can be mapped. The 
transformation processes involved in spatial frame references and rotating bodies 
differ.  
It is important to highlight, however, that all these different forms of 
perspective transformation involve an element of mental rotation, similar to that 
classically described for external geometrical objects (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). 
Although the geometry used when the participants are themselves part of the 
spatial transformation remains unclear. Zacks and co-authors suggest 
dissociative neural systems for object-based and perspective based 
transformations (Zacks et al., 2000; Zacks, Ollinger, Sheridan, & Tversky, 2002; 
Zacks et al., 2003). The authors propose a multiple system framework where 
different types of mental transformation are implemented by anatomically distinct 
neural substrates. The assumption is supported by the event-related fMRI study 
of Zacks et al. (2003) which showed that mental transformation of bodies involves 
a different neural system than mental transformation of objects as it was 
emphasised by previous behavioural experiments: In contrast to the classical 
mental rotation task, no linear increase in reaction time was found for mentally 
transforming bodies (Parsons, 1987a; Zacks et al., 2002). A frequently reported 
difference between mentally transforming bodies and objects is the participants‟ 
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frame of reference. In egocentric body transformation tasks, participants have to 
change their frame of reference. In mental object rotation, however, the 
participants‟ frame of reference remains stable and the two objects are aligned 
along a particular axis. Interestingly, behavioural results have repeatedly shown 
evidence that the axis of the rotation alters even within a class of stimuli. This 
means that as the reaction time is not always monotonically and linearly 
increasing with increasing angular disparity, the path of mental rotation may be 
altered. One of these alterations is the change from incremental steps to a quick 
flip along the shortest path. A number of authors suggest that visual features like 
familiarity are responsible for this change (Ashton, McRarland, Walsh, & White, 
1978; Mast, Zaehle, Long, Jola, & Lobmaier, under revision; Robertson & Palmer, 
1983). This assumption is in correspondence with the data from egocentric body 
transformation and mental object rotation in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
For example, when participants have to match their perspective with an inverted 
front facing figure they do not mentally rotate incrementally 180º along the x-axes 
and 180º in depth along the z-axis as expected. It took participants clearly less 
long to respond for front-facing, inverted figures, and they reported having 
mentally flipped themselves backwards as described previously (Experiment 2). 
This means that participants seem to exchange or merge incremental steps when 
matching their perspective from the default position upright, from the back 
(Cooper & Shepard, 1975; Robertson, Palmer, & Gomez, 1987) to an inverted 
figure from the front by a quick flip. A similar decrease in reaction time was found 
when participants had to name familiar but inverted objects compared to when 
the objects were rotated by a few degrees only (Murray, 1997). Murray suggested 
that incremental rotational steps to align the familiar object with its canonical 
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orientation are replaced by a quick flip along the shortest path. However, it 
remains unclear whether the quick flip reflects simply a quantitative advantage for 
some mental rotation operations that have been over-learned because of the 
visual familiarity of one‟s own and other bodies or whether it reflects a 
qualitatively different, nonspatial way of manipulating body representations. In 
both cases the axis of rotation seems to be known by the participants before the 
stimuli are rotated or flipped onto the canonical axis. Bodies as well as familiar 
objects are a special set of stimuli as they possess an inherent axis that is 
canonically aligned with respect to the environment in a way that abstract objects 
need not be. The canonical axis of the observer‟s own body may therefore play a 
role in tasks which require spatial transformation between an observer and a 
model, or between two model stimuli (e.g., Corcoran, 1977).  
In the present study, a symbolic, abstract notation of body postures was 
used in order to investigate the role of both the inherent axis of a stimulus and its 
familiarity in mental rotation. The term „abstract‟ is used to emphasise that the 
body represented in the Labanotation is not pictorially isomorphic to a real body. 
As the surface form of the body represented in the Labanotation does not 
resemble a real body, the quick flip effect and the use of a canonical axis can be 
investigated even when the surface form in the presentation does not explicitly 
suggest them. This will give further insight into the rotational operations carried 
out in egocentric body transformation. 
The Labanotation (Hutchinson, 1977; Laban, 1928) was developed to 
describe complex human movements in three-dimensional space. Visual cues 
that spatially correspond with a real human body were eliminated and replaced 
with an abstract score.  Limb positions are shown on a staff rather than their true 
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spatial locations, and all postures are shown as if viewed from the back. An 
example of a posture‟s orientations is illustrated in Figure 7 (p.77). The 
egocentric perspective has to be inferred from the abstract drawings and is thus 
implicit rather than explicit. The information about particular body movements is 
transformed into the egocentric perspective of the reader‟s body. That is, the 
Labanotation represents body postures from the back, using an „in-the-body‟ 
perspective, despite the absence of any visuo-spatial features corresponding to 
the normal view of one‟s own body. The question was therefore, whether the 
body transformation tasks would show a quick flip effect, with disproportionately 
good performance in transforming between front and back perspectives, even 
when the visual surface form does not naturally suggest any particular spatial 
transformation. An affirmative result would suggest that (1) body representations 
evoke an inherent, canonical axis, even when this is not apparent in their surface 
form, and (2) body representations support a „flip‟ or „transposition‟ type of 
transformation, distinct from mental rotation, even when this is not favoured by 
their surface form. Such conclusions would suggest a specific cognitive function 
for relating one‟s own body to the bodies of others, with important implications for 
social cognition. 
Method 
Participants 
Twelve volunteers with a mean age of 28.9 ± 11.7 years, 9 female, all right-
handed, participated in the study after giving their informed consent approved by 
local ethical committee. Nine participants were dance students from the Laban 
Trinity College London, either at their undergraduate or postgraduate level in 
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dance, or students from the professional diploma course in Dance Studies. All of 
which had at least 2 years of classes in Labanotation. The remaining participants 
were experienced Labanotation readers who work either in the field of 
Labanotation or in the field of dance.  
Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of four different body postures (i.e., two classical ballet and 
two novel positions) chosen on the basis of pilot data (Jola & Haggard, 2006). 
The postures were balanced over body parts involved in the gesture and the 
gestures side, alignment, and direction across the stimuli (see Figure 7, p. 77). 
Each posture was modified for the mismatching condition in four different ways. 
The postures were either: 1) outline matched (similar visual shade of the 
posture), 2) mirrored, 3) subjected to a small change defined by a direction and 
level change of one body limb only, or 4) subjected to a clear change, consisting 
of a new arrangement of the Labanotation symbols which resulted in a clearly 
different but biologically possible posture while the constituent symbols remained 
largely the same. 
The postures were either presented as pictures of a professional female 
dance performer or represented in Labanotation. The pictures were taken with a 
digital camera and had a homogenous background. The performer was naïve 
with respect to the hypothesis of the study. The Labanotation drawings were 
written with CALABAN LT computer-aided software 
(http://aweb.bham.ac.uk/calaban/). All notations were verified by Jean Jarrell, a 
Lecturer at the Laban Trinity College. 
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Task 
The participants were instructed to make same-different judgements about pairs 
of body postures presented sequentially on a laptop Computer screen. The prime 
picture was presented for 1500 ms. After an inter-stimulus interval with a central 
fixation cross for 500 ms The target was presented on the screen for a maximum 
of 8000 ms. The participants had to respond as quickly as possible after the 
target picture appeared, by pressing one of two indicated keys on a keyboard 
with their right or left index finger to verify whether the postures were the same or 
different. The pattern of response was counterbalanced across participants. Each 
experimental condition was defined by the relationship between the prime and 
the target. The design included three factors, each with two levels: target type 
(target is a picture vs. Labanotation), perspective (no change vs. change), and 
matching (posture is the same vs. different). The matrix of Table 4 (p. 77) 
illustrates the different combinations for the two factors target type (columns) and 
perspective (rows).  
The prime was always a photographic image of a female dancer in one of 
four postures. The target was either an image of the dancer or a corresponding 
Labanotation equivalent of the posture (each in 50% of the trials). In half of the 
trials the prime and the target posture differed in their perspective. However, as 
the Labanotation has an inherent back-view perspective, pairs with Labanotation 
targets showed only the perspective combinations back-back and front-back. By 
the same token, two additional perspective combinations, front-front and back-
front were only available for picture targets. Consequently, target type (picture or 
Labanotation) and perspective (front or back) were not orthogonal but also not 
predictable. Furthermore, this modification in the picture-picture match was used 
to test whether the participants validated the target position from their egocentric 
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default position (upright back posture) or whether they instead changed their 
frame of reference to the perspective of the prime. This gave a total of 128 trials, 
consisting of 4 basic body postures, 4 minor modifications of each posture 
(mismatch), 2 locations for the postures (each of the four postures was randomly 
presented as the prime or the target), 2 target formats (picture or Labanotation), 
and 2 perspective types (no perspective change, perspective change). For 
picture targets, each modification was assigned randomly to one of the two 
perspective types.  
Procedure 
The participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Before the experiment 
started, participants‟ familiarity with all the symbols used in the experiment was 
verified. Participants underwent a training session with five trials in order to 
become familiarised with the task prior to the experiment. None of the postures 
within the training session were used in the experiment proper. If the participants 
made more than one mistake in the training session, the session was repeated 
(up to a maximum of three times). Accuracy in error rates (ERs) and reaction 
times (RTs, from correct trials only) were analysed. Matching and mismatching 
trials were merged. 
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Figure 7. Body postures in pictures (upper row) and in Labanotation (lower row) used as 
stimuli in the picture-Labanotation matching task of Experiment 3. (a) and (b): two ballet 
positions with commonly aligned arms and legs, that is, arabesque and tendue, 
respectively; (c) and (d): two novel positions with nonstandard bent limb. 
Table 4. 
Conditions of Experiment 3 Illustrated with One Trial (i.e., Body Posture). 
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Note: As the Labanotation is always from the back, only the orientation conditions front-back and back-back are 
present for Labanotation targets; to ensure that participants could not foresee the target from the prime, also the 
orientations back-front and front-front for picture targets were included. 
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Results 
Out of all 12 participants 3 had more than 25% ERs and were therefore excluded 
from the analysis. Mean RTs and mean ERs are shown in Figure 8 (p. 79).  
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors target type (picture vs. 
Labanotation) and perspective (no change vs. change) on ERs showed 
significant main effects of both factors target type, F(1, 8) = 36.90, p < 0.001, and 
perspective, F(1, 8) = 23.04, p < .01. Furthermore, the interaction of the target 
type and perspective was significant, F(1, 8) = 7.76, p < .05. Paired samples  
t tests for picture targets showed that ERs were significantly higher with 
perspective change (14.9%) than without perspective change (4.5%; p < .05). In 
contrast, no significant difference in error rates was found between the 
perspective changes when the target posture was presented in Labanotation 
(15.6% vs. 13.5%, p > 0.26). That is, picture-Labanotation matches were much 
less affected by perspective change than picture-picture matches. This difference 
in ERs between picture targets and Labanotation targets is clearly visible in 
Figure 8 (p. 79). 
The repeated measures ANOVA on RTs revealed significant main effects 
for both factors target type, F(1, 8) = 88.61, p < .01, and perspective,  
F(1, 8) = 21.40, p < .05, as well as a significant interaction between them,  
F(1, 8) = 19.64, p < .05. The perspective condition for both target types was 
compared with paired samples t tests separately. The analysis revealed 
significant differences between perspective change and no perspective change 
for picture pairs with increased RTs when the perspective was different between 
target and prime, 1.33 s versus 2.05 s, t(8) = 9.48, p < .001. No significant 
difference in perspective was found for Labanotation targets, 3.43 s versus  
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3.69 s, t(8) = 1.74, p = .12, as can be seen in Figure 8 (p. 79). The ERs for 
Labanotation targets were independent of perspective change in contrast to 
picture targets. This means that differences in RTs for Labanotation targets 
cannot be explained by a change in accuracy. 
Figure 8. Mean reaction times and mean error rates (+SE) in the picture-Labanotation 
matching task of Experiment 3 (n = 9). X-axis: picture and Labanotation target conditions 
with no (i.e., same perspective, black bars) and with (i.e., different perspective, white 
bars) perspective change; y-axis (left figure): reaction times in seconds; y-axis (right 
figure): error rates in %. 
Targets in the picture-Labanotation matching always presented the postures from 
the back while picture targets were showing postures equally often from the front 
and the back. In order to exclude a possible confound of target orientation 
repeated measures ANOVA with the factors perspective (no change vs. change) 
and target orientation (back vs. front) for picture-picture matching targets were 
computed. Corresponding to the former analysis, significant main effects were 
found for perspective in ERs, F(1, 8) = 15.45, p < .01, and RTs, F(1, 8) = 73.46,  
p < .001. However, no significant interaction of target orientation and perspective 
change was found. The factor target orientation showed a nonsignificant trend for 
longer RTs for front targets, p > 0.07. 
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
 (
s
)
Picture         Labanotation 
same different same different
0
5
10
15
20
E
rr
o
r 
R
a
te
 (
%
)
Picture         Labanotation
same different same different
 80 
Discussion 
In this study, the nature of the body representation involved in egocentric body 
transformation was investigated in the special case where the surface form of the 
body representation is nonpictorial. Experiments on egocentric body 
transformation have generally used pictures or drawings of bodies and body 
limbs in different spatial relations to the participant. Reaction time and accuracy 
were measured in a same-different discrimination task where half of the target 
postures were pictures while the other half were postures written in an 
established but abstract notation for body postures. The pictures showed the 
dancer either facing the observer or seen from the back. The egocentric body 
transformation had to be performed solely on internally generated body 
representations. By the use of the Labanotation, the underlying processes in 
thinking oneself into the body of a third party without preventing visual familiarity 
could be investigated. Internally generated body representations seemed to 
modify egocentric body transformation when a perspective change is necessary. 
The overall accuracy obtained in the matching task showed that the 
Labanotation was encoded to a body representation allowing posture matching. 
In general, encoding a Labanotation drawing makes the task more difficult. 
However, a perspective change in the postures only increases task difficulty 
when the postures are given as pictures and has no additional effect when the 
second posture is presented in Labanotation. Therefore, the relatively good front-
back performance in picture-Labanotation pairs compared to picture-picture pairs 
was not due to a change in the speed-accuracy trade-off in that condition.  
Picture-Labanotation matches had increased reaction time in comparison 
to picture-picture matches. The additional time reflects the time participants need 
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to read the Labanotation and transform it into an internally represented body 
configuration. In line with the previous Experiments 1 and 2, the expected mental 
rotation effect for picture targets was observed. The time to recognise body 
postures as pictures increased when the perspectives were different. In contrast, 
no such mental rotation effect was observed when the body was represented by 
the abstract Labanotation symbols. 
The lack of mental rotation costs with Labanotation is consistent with 
previous reports of a quick flip onto a canonical or inherent axis. The quick flip 
onto a canonical axis avoids slow incremental transformation by successive 
stages characteristic of mental rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). In previous 
work, the quick flip has been linked to familiarity with the stimulus and with the 
existence of a viewpoint-independent or object-centred mental representation of 
the stimulus object with its own intrinsic canonical axes (Murray, 1997). These 
results suggest that the human body is internally represented as such. Even 
when the surface form is not body-like, the data suggests that an internal body 
representation is generated. Moreover, it seems that the basic perspective, or 
inherent axis of this body representation, is an „in-the-body‟ or egocentric 
perspective, in which observed or visualised body postures are simulated on the 
body of the observer.  This result could also be interpreted as an effect of 
expertise, because Labanotation readers are used to the in-the-body, back-view 
of Labanotation. Learning Labanotation therefore involves learning to flip the 
perspective when comparing a Labanotation score with a dancer facing them. To 
use an analogy, deaf American signers do not show mental rotation costs for 
linguistic signs (Emmorey et al., 1998). The authors suggested that habitual use 
of the American Sign Language did increase their mental rotation skills. However, 
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in an additional experiment, which is not cited in this thesis, Labanotation readers 
compared to nonreaders did not differ in picture posture matching. The expertise 
from Labanotation flip therefore seems nontransferable to mental transformation 
of analogue body pictures. The symbolic representation of the body enables a 
different way of dealing with human body forms which is nonanalogue. 
Could the lack of a mental rotation effect in the Labanotation matching be 
explained by a higher cognitive load for Labanotation targets? On the one hand 
the increased reaction times and error rates for picture-Labanotation matches 
suggest that it could. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the effect must 
arise from a qualitatively different coding mechanism for Labantotation and not 
merely from a quantitative difference in the complexity of the code itself. In 
particular, several studies of mental rotation showed that the more the complex 
the stimuli, the steeper the linear increase in reaction time with angular rotation 
(Bauer & Jolicoeur, 1996; Folk & Luce, 1987; Shepard & Metzler, 1971) or at 
least not flatter (Cooper & Shepard, 1975). 
Furthermore, the results did not suggest that the only symbols were 
processed by categorical exclusion, which meant that postures were identified as 
different on the basis of one single symbol mismatch (Ashton et al., 1978). Such 
a facilitation strategy cannot explain the difference between Labanotation and 
picture reaction times. The results also reflected parallelism of cognitive 
processes (Sternberg, 1969). For example, the transformation between pictures 
and the back-view of Labanotation could have occurred in parallel to reading the 
details of the Labanotation itself. Picture-Labanotation matching might then 
indeed involve a mental rotation process, but this would be hidden in the longer 
overall reaction time. That is, presentation of a Labanotation target could trigger 
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two parallel processes, namely simultaneous encoding of Labanotation and 
mental rotation of the picture to an „in the body‟ perspective. However, both 
Labanotation reading and mental rotation are, especially for reading beginners 
measured in this study, demanding processes on their own. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that they were done in parallel. In the reading classes, beginners prefer 
to carry a sheet of paper with the score when they have to transform the notation 
into movement, as looking at the score screened from the classroom projector 
would ask for additional mental rotation processes. 
So far, the results from this experiment indicate that mental 
transformations based on abstract notation of body configuration stimuli are 
perspective independent. Moreover, performance in matching picture-picture 
pairs can give additional information about body representation. Corresponding 
orientation between prime and target was easier for both picture target 
orientations (i.e., front-front and back-back). Therefore, one can assume that the 
pictures were matched in terms of their visual surface form. However, the data 
showed a trend towards a main effect for shorter reaction times when the target 
pictures were back facing compared to front facing, independent of prime 
orientation. This is in line with recent findings on body and body limb perception, 
which assumed the observers‟ default internal body representation is upright from 
the back and this orientation should therefore be treated separately from other 
orientations (Ashton et al., 1978; Cooper & Shepard, 1975; Jola & Haggard, 
2005; Mast et al., 2006; Parsons, 1987a, 1987b, Robertson et al., 1987; Shelton 
& McNamara, 2001; Wraga et al., 2003). Robertson et al. were unable to 
disentangle rotation of the internal body representation from changes in the 
egocentric frame of reference for front facing stimuli. Therefore, whether the 
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participants positioned themselves mentally into the figure (i.e., self rotation, 
change of the reference frame) or rotated the figure like an object into their 
spatial reference frame (i.e., egocentric rotation, stable egocentric default 
reference frame) remained unclear. These data indicated a trend to transform the 
prime to the participants‟ default position. 
Evidence for an internal body representation which has a perspective-
independent frame of reference was found. In general, tasks are more 
demanding when mental rotation is required (Shepard & Cooper, 1982). No 
increase in difficulty for posture matching with perspective change when the 
target posture was presented in Labanotation could be observed. The egocentric 
frame of reference was transformed without the processing difficulties associated 
with perspective change when abstract symbols were representing the body. It 
clearly matters whether the internal posture representation is generated from 
spatially equivalent or nonequivalent configurations of the human body. It seems 
that how the reference frames are transformed in mental object and mental body 
rotation is mainly determined by the type of stimulus. Pictured human bodies 
seem to have an inherent perspective and automatically evoke a particular 
relationship with the observer‟s own body. Similar characteristics can be 
assumed for familiar objects when they have a canonical view. Several studies 
found evidence for similar properties in mental rotation (e.g., Parsons, 1995; for 
an overview see Wraga, Creem, & Proffitt, 2000). 
It was hypothesised that mental rotation costs would occur when the two 
postures in the same-discrimination task differed in their perspective. These 
mental rotation costs were caused either by a transformation of the egocentric 
perspective or by a transformation of the presented body. A lack of mental 
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rotation cost would indicate a quick flip which could be either qualitatively 
different from mental rotation or a special accelerated version of mental rotation. 
Abstract, nonspatial body representations showed a gradual mental rotation 
pattern or a quick flip pattern like those found for transformation of familiar 
objects and body figures. The results showed that body representations 
generated from body figures are perspective dependent, while internally 
generated body representations generated without bodily-corresponding figures 
are perspective independent. 
In general, these results supported the hypothesis, that the human body 
can be represented and transformed using a symbol notation which refers to the 
human body. This symbolic body representation contrasts with the spatial 
analogue representation of the body given by vision. The canonical axis used for 
body representation appears to involve an egocentric perspective, or back view. 
In particular, processing symbolic representations involved accelerated or „quick 
flip‟ transformation even though this axis is not explicitly represented in the 
notation itself. In contrast, matching of body pictures involved mental rotation of 
surface forms and did only reference to the perspective of the participants‟ own 
body when the matching postures are facing in a different direction. 
Summary 
Mental transformation of visual stimuli has been widely studied. For familiar 
stimuli such as human bodies, a quick flip or mental realignment to a canonical 
upright orientation along the shortest path has been assumed. However, it 
remains unclear whether and how such special, accelerated transformations 
depend on familiarity with the stimulus and its orientation. 
 86 
In the present study, an established notation system for the human body, the 
Labanotation, was used to investigate spatial transformation of visually presented 
body forms. The alignment of the symbols on the notation staff is spatially 
incongruent with a human body, but always relates to a body from the back, as if 
in first-person perspective. Participants with experience in reading Labanotation 
had to match body postures in a same-different discrimination task. The postures 
were presented either as photos of dance postures from a variety of viewing 
angles or as Labanotation drawings. Comparisons of pairs of photos showed the 
familiar mental rotation effect, with the time to respond being dependent on the 
angular discrepancy in perspective between the first and second photos. 
However, presenting first a photo and then a Labanotation drawing produced no 
increase in reaction time with increasing angular discrepancy between the two 
represented body stimuli. Readers of Labanotation achieved a „quick flip‟ 
between a posture represented in an explicit perspective on a photo and the 
egocentric perspective used for the notation. Thus, the abstract nonspatial 
representation of Labanotation enabled a quick flip of the reference frame. The 
combination of a spatial matching task and a learned symbolic code for body 
postures suggests that processing of human forms need not rely on analogue, 
embodied representations as reported previously. 
Therefore, the form of the mental representation or their transformation 
processes is dependent of the visual presentation whilst the relation of the 
egocentric perspective to the canonical axis orientation of the external stimuli 
plays an important role. In the following chapter, experiments that investigated 
mental representation of the egocentric space are reported. 
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Chapter Three 
Body Representation based on Somatosensory 
Information 
Experiment 4: Body References in Proprioceptive Perception  
Introduction 
Proprioception means perception of oneself. It is the sense which provides us 
with sensory information of ourselves from the inside. Physiologists have studied 
proprioceptive sensors for several decades. In the current neurophysiological 
literature, the term „proprioception‟ is used to refer to the set of sensory signals 
that originate peripherally in the body and which inform the brain about the 
positions and movements of parts of the body in space: the kinesthetic sense 
(Proske, 2005). These signals are thought to derive from muscle spindles, joint 
receptors, tendon organs, and skin receptors. The most studied of these, and 
perhaps the most important ones, are the muscle spindle afferents. 
The afferent signals from sensors such as muscle spindles are fairly well 
understood, although their use in motor control, particularly their contribution to 
the sense of position, has been heavily debated (Matthews, 1977). When a 
muscle is stretched, the spindle afferents signal the change in its length and the 
velocity of that change. Although we do not often consciously attend to these 
signals, the evidence that muscle spindles play a partial role in the experience of 
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position sense is at least twofold (see Goodwin, McCloskey, & Matthews, 1972b): 
First, the activation of afferent muscle signals triggers an illusory perception of 
movement. Second, position sense persists when joints are paralysed, whereas 
peripherally deafferented patients who lack muscle spindle afferents are wholly 
reliant on vision for postural and limb motor control. Therefore, muscle spindles 
and joint receptors are involved in the positional sensing of body limbs, and other 
sensory systems such as vision can contribute. For a powerful model on body 
representation it is essential to understand the functional integration processes of 
multisensory signals. 
The aforementioned studies have generally focused only on local 
proprioception. For example, tendon vibration studies have typically measured 
illusory flexion or extension by stimulating muscles spindles (Goodwin, 
McCloskey, & Matthews, 1972a). Microneurographic studies have recorded 
afferent signals from individual nerve fibres in humans (Vallbo, Olausson, 
Wessberg, & Kakuda, 1995) in order to identify how these signals vary with 
displacement of individual body parts. Nevertheless, we sense a coherent 
representation of the surface of our body as a whole. Therefore, it is important to 
understand how the sensory signals arising from different parts of the body are 
combined in order to construct this integrated representation of the whole body. 
That is, local information about the length of each muscle or the angle of each 
joint can be combined to represent the configuration of an entire limb, or indeed 
the whole body. However, we experience on a daily basis where our body parts 
are in space, but not the actual lengths of individual muscles. For example, a 
person who reaches under the table to tie their shoelace without looking at it, 
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clearly uses a representation of the position of the foot and of the hand, and is 
moreover able to relate them in an appropriate way. 
The term „body schema‟ has often been used to refer to abstract postural 
representation of the configuration of the body in space (Head & Holmes, 1911; 
Paillard, 1991). However, relatively little is known about how the brain combines 
multiple local signals from each point in the kinematic chain in order to produce 
an overall body representation. Only a few experimental studies have 
systematically investigated how different types of proprioceptive information from 
one or more body parts are combined. In tactile perception though, Martinez 
(1971) found evidence for a body-centred postural frame for bilaterally 
symmetrical movements. It is notable, that after surgical disconnection of colossal 
fibres, participants are not able to match the positions of one hand with the other 
(McCloskey, 1973). Thus, the colossal fibres provide a cross-referencing of 
different limbs in order to gain a positional sense of the whole body. Interestingly, 
Vallbo and al-Falahe (1990) found that pronounced differences in muscle spindle 
firing were not necessarily present during visually or proprioceptively guided 
movements. Therefore, afferent signals such as from the muscle spindles are not 
the pure basis for performance differences; cognitive representational processes 
play a particular role in the position sense too. 
However, the representation of the body is dependent on sensory inputs. 
Several studies have created conflicts in the integration of different body parts 
into a whole body representation by manipulating sensory inputs. In these cases 
the brain appears to impose coherence. For example, when participants hold the 
tip of their nose whilst experiencing an illusory extension of the elbow induced by 
tendon vibration, they feel as if their nose is elongated (Lackner, 1988). This 
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suggests that participants maintain an internal body image which includes 
information about body part size. Nevertheless, it also shows that the imposition 
of coherence breaks down, as the nose is experienced as abnormally sized. 
Other examples producing physically-impossible percepts using tendon vibration 
include hyperextension of the forearm (Craske, 1977) or physically-impossible 
configurations of the whole body (Lackner & Taublieb, 1984). Thus, the position 
sense of the body and the body schema is calibrated over time and is actually 
provided by the relation of body limbs to each other, particularly when they are in 
spatial contact (Lackner, 1988; Lackner & Taublieb, 1983). 
In many cases, the brain appears to maintain separate representations of 
individual body parts. For example, it has been found that wearing displacing 
prisms independently adapts the proprioceptive representation of the arm used 
during the adaptation phase, under the constriction that the head and trunk 
remained fixed (Hamilton, 1964; Harris, 1963; Prablanc, Tzavaras, & Jeannerod, 
1975). Though the mechanisms of visual and proprioceptive integration during 
prism displacement are still unclear (Rossetti, Desmurget, & Prablanc, 1995), it 
seems that vision recalibrates proprioception of the two limbs independently 
either when the arm is continuously displayed during prism adaptation or when 
the head is immobilised. To summarise, a continuum of bodily integration seems 
to exist, with some aspects of body representation being purely local, while 
others display strong interaction and coherence of information throughout the 
body representation. 
Position matching is an established method for investigating the spatial 
representation of the body (von Hofsten & Rosblad, 1988; Wann et al., 2001). In 
the version used here, participants indicated the perceived position of their target 
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hand at a range of locations (target locations) on a horizontal surface, by 
reaching with their other hand to the matching location on the underside of the 
surface. Interest in previous studies has focused on different sources of sensory 
information about target locations. For example, pointing errors are generally 
bigger when only proprioceptive information about the target location is provided, 
compared to when the same target location is defined purely by vision. A small 
but significant further improvement is found when both visual and proprioceptive 
information about the target location were available. This suggests that a 
multisensory combination of visual and proprioceptive information provides a 
better representation of the position of the hand in space than either sense alone 
(Haggard et al., 2000; van Beers, Wolpert, & Haggard, 2002). Since the reaching 
movement made by the hand beneath the work surface to match the target is the 
same in all conditions, these differences are attributed to the sensory information 
about the target location that is available in each condition, as opposed to the 
motor control of the matching hand. 
Here, the nature of proprioceptive representations of hand position and 
the way in which they are combined with visual information was investigated in 
more detail. To do this, the matching accuracy of skilled dancers, who are 
proprioceptive experts, was compared with nondancer controls. Dancers showed 
outstanding performance when matching the positions of single elbow or 
shoulder joints in the study by Ramsay and Riddoch (2001) and also in passive 
knee-joint matching as investigated by Lephart, Giraldo, Borsa, and Fu (1996). In 
contrast, Barrack et al. (1984) found that nondancer controls were more accurate 
in knee-position matching. However, no study was found that investigated which 
aspects of proprioception are superior in dancers. This expert group was chosen 
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particularly to investigate whether they were better able than normal to combine 
proprioceptive information from several joints and muscles to generate a superior 
representation of the overall configuration of the body as a whole. An affirmative 
answer would suggest that the mind can form superordinate levels of 
proprioceptive body representation, presumably as a result of training, and that it 
would reveal the dimensions of its spatial organisation. Here, the focus was 
particularly on whether each limb is represented in its own independent 
proprioceptive frame of reference or whether both limbs are integrated to provide 
a common „propriocentre‟ analogous to a hypothesised egocentre in space 
perception (Gibson, 1979). The focus was also on the relative importance of 
proprioception and of vision in the representation of hand position. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirteen expert dancers and 14 nonexperts volunteered to participate in the 
experiment, which was approved by the ethics committee of University College 
London. Each participant received standardised information regarding details of 
the experimental procedure and gave their written informed consent prior to the 
testing. The expert group had an average age of exactly 19 years and contained 
2 males. All experts were right handed professional dancers or dance students at 
a graduate or undergraduate level recruited from dance colleges and Universities 
in London, such as the London Contemporary Dance School and the Laban 
Trinity College. The control group had an average age of 21.79 years ± 0.05 
months and contained 3 males, 2 of which were left-handed. All participants were 
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University students with no experience in dance or performance training, and all 
were naïve with respect to the hypothesis of the study.  
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
A Perspex table (820 x 620 x 5 mm) was mounted upon three tripod stands 
(Hama Tripod Star 42) at a height of 120 cm. On top of the table was a black 
sheet indicating the target locations. A digital photograph of each matching 
attempt was taken using a Logitech camera positioned centrally underneath the 
table and fixed on the floor upon a small tripod. The target locations were marked 
with white sensible circular stickers (7 mm diameter). These were aligned on the 
left-right axis in the middle of the black sheet, with a centre-centre distance of 
11.1 cm (see Figure 9, p. 94). 
The participants were seated comfortably in front of the Perspex table. 
Their sternum was aligned with the central marker. For each participant, a spirit 
level was used to adjust the Perspex table and the camera lens horizontally. 
Before each condition, a photographic image was taken to calibrate the position 
of the table by lining up the centre of the image with position 410 x 310 mm on 
the Perspex sheet (marked with a 7 mm diameter white circular sticker). 
A black circular sticker (7 mm diameter) was then placed centrally on the 
nail of each of the participants‟ index fingers. On instruction to match a specific 
target, the participants placed the index finger of their matching hand on the 
underside of the table. The participants‟ vision was occluded in the condition 
without visual feedback using a black blindfold. The blindfold was kept in place by 
means of elastics. For each trial, a digital image was taken of the matching hand 
underneath the table in order to calculate matching error. The participant was 
asked to return both hands to their lap in between each repetition. 
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Task and Design 
The experiment was a target location matching experiment with a between-
subjects design (dancers vs. nondancers). The task was to match one of five 
target locations on top of the table as accurately as possible by placing the index 
finger of the matching hand at the estimated corresponding location underneath 
the table. The information provided from above the table, the target hand, was 
dependent on the sensory condition, whilst the matching movement remained the 
same in all three conditions as illustrated in Figure 9 (p. 94). 
Figure 9. The target matching task and mismatching measures of Experiment 4. Left side: 
illustration of the three experimental setups for the sensory conditions P:P (only 
proprioceptive information about the target location available from the target hand; 
participants blindfolded), V:P (only visual information about target location available; 
target hand rested in the lap position), and VP:P (multisensory condition with the target 
hand on the target location, which was visible to participants); right side: example of a 
matching attempt and the bias measures V (Vector), x (x-bias), and y (y-bias). The 
matching error is the Vector computed from mean of the x- and y-biases, the constant 
errors. 
In the proprioceptive condition (P:P), participants were blindfolded and the index 
finger of their target hand was put on one of the target locations above the table 
by the experimenter and then released. The participant kept their target hand on 
the target location and tried to match it from underneath with the other hand, thus 
receiving only proprioceptive feedback. In the multisensory condition (VP:P) the 
participants had visual and proprioceptive information about the target location. 
P:P V:P VP:P
y
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The experimenter named the number of the target location to be matched. The 
participant then had to place and keep their index finger on the visible target on 
top of the table while attempting to match this target location from underneath 
with the index finger of the other hand. The task in the visual condition (V:P) was 
the same except that the participant kept the target hand still on their lap, thus 
providing only visual information about the target location. 
Before and after each trial, the participant had both hands relaxed on their 
lap. Each of the 5 target locations was repeated 6 times in a randomised order 
with the right or left matching hand in each of the 3 sensory conditions. Sensory 
condition and the matching hand used were counterbalanced blockwise across 
participants. Each participant therefore performed a total of 180 trials. 
Analysis 
The pixel coordinates of the participants matching attempts were extracted from 
each picture with the Java image processing program ImageJ (Version 1.34, 
http://rsb.info.nih.gov/ij/) on Windows. The coordinates of the target locations 
were assessed for each condition and each participant separately. The matching 
errors were then computed by the differences between the matching and target 
locations, converted from pixels into centimetres. The error variables vector, 
regression slopes, and constant x- and y-errors were analysed in SPSS (Version 
12). A subset of the data (480 trials in total) was independently rated by a second 
rater, and the inter-rater reliability was highly significant (p < .001) with a 
correlation of 0.8 (Pearson‟s r) in the X dimension and 0.9 in the Y dimension 
between the two raters measurements. 
To access a general matching bias independent of the direction, the 
sensory condition was analysed by the vector bias of the matching error. For 
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analysis of hand bias, the constant errors of the x- and y-axis were analysed 
independently to allow the extent of the cross-over effect to be investigated. As a 
clear prediction about the factor group was present, with the dancers predicted to 
show a smaller matching bias, one-tailed t tests were used throughout. 
Results 
Of the 27 participants, 3 participants had to be excluded from the analysis. One 
expert constantly changed their hand posture and 2 control participants pointed 
to locations in the far right or left target locations beyond the range of the 
photograph in more than 80% of the trials in one condition. Consequently,  
12 participants remained in each group. In 7 of these cases, the participants‟ 
nails were just off the captured picture in fewer than 20% of the trials within a 
condition. For these trials the pointing locations were inferred from the finger 
shape of the captured images. 
Gender and handedness were equally matched between groups, but a 
nonparametric H-test showed that the dancers were significantly younger than 
the controls, χ2(1, N = 24) = 13.87, p ≤ .001 (Kruskal-Wallis). Several studies 
have shown that proprioception improves with age (Goble, Lewis, Hurvitz,  
& Brown, 2005). As the hypothesis was that dancers would be more accurate, a 
higher average age of the control participants decreased the probability of false 
acceptance in this study. 
Overall Accuracy 
The accuracy of the target position matching in the three sensory conditions P:P, 
V:P, and VP:P was compared between dancers and nondancers by measuring 
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the vector bias of the matching error. The vector bias is the magnitude of the 
vector (V) given by the bias on the x- and y-axis in each matching attempt 
computed from the Pythagorean Theorem, (xbias
2 + ybias
2)½ = Vbias. The magnitude 
of the vector bias indicates how far the participants were mismatching the target 
independent of the direction of the error. It therefore provides a measure of 
overall accuracy. The mean vector biases for group and sensory condition are 
shown in Figure 10 (p. 98). The figure clearly shows that both groups showed 
smaller vector biases in the sensory conditions in which visual information about 
the target location was available, namely V:P and VP:P. Furthermore, the figure 
indicates that the matching biases were smallest in the multisensory condition 
VP:P and that the matching vector bias increased when only proprioceptive 
information about the target location was available. In this latter condition 
however, the bias was smaller for dancers than nondancers whereas in the case 
of multisensory information dancers seemed to match less accurately than 
nondancers. 
The univariate two-way ANOVA with the factors group (dancers vs. 
controls) and sensory condition (P:P vs. V:P vs. VP:P) showed a significant main 
effect for sensory condition, F(2, 44) = 2.87, p < .04. There was also a significant 
interaction between the two factors group and sensory condition,  
F(2, 44) = 47.57, p < .001. Independent samples t tests showed that dancers 
were significantly more accurate than controls in the P:P condition, t(22) = 1.73,  
p < .05, whereas the bias in the other two sensory conditions did not differ 
significantly between the two groups. 
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Figure 10. Mean target location matching error (+SE) for dancers and nondancers of 
Experiment 4 (n = 12 in each group). X-axis: sensory conditions P:P (only proprioceptive 
information available from the hand at the target location), V:P (only visual information 
available from the target location), and VP:P (visual and proprioceptive information 
available from the target location) for dancers on the left and for nondancers on the right 
side; y-axis: Vector bias in centimetres indicates participants’ constant matching error. 
Biases in Proprioceptive Representation 
The mean constant errors in the x- and y-directions were also analysed as 
directional error to provide some information about the spatial reference frames 
used. The results are shown in Figure 11 (p. 101). Note that, in this figure, data 
were coded accordingly to the target hand in the P:P and VP:P conditions. In the 
V:P condition, there was no target hand, because the targets were purely visually 
perceived. Note that in order to allow direct comparison with conditions involving 
proprioceptive targets, the condition in which a visual target was matched by 
reaching with the unseen left hand is referred to as a right target. 
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Dancers                                        Nondancers
V
e
c
to
r 
B
ia
s
  
(c
m
)
V:PPP:P V:P V:PPP:P V:P
 99 
First, systematic error patterns in Figure 11 (p. 101) can be seen in the P:P 
condition, with clear differences in the perceived positions between the two 
hands. The right target hand is perceived as being shifted to the right and rotated 
clockwise, whilst the left target hand is experienced with a leftward translation 
and a counterclockwise rotation, producing the cross-over effect reported 
previously (Haggard et al., 2000). However, this cross-over effect seemed less 
prominent in the dancers than in the controls. In the VP:P condition, 
misperceptions of the target hands were much less prominent and seemed to be 
of a comparable size for the two groups. Finally, in the V:P condition, nondancers 
showed a bowing in both hands, while dancers seemed to experience a similar 
shift as in the P:P condition, with a clear cross-over effect. 
The focus was on the spatial organisation of proprioceptive 
representation. Translational and rotational components of the cross-over effect 
were analysed statistically by fitting separate linear regressions to the x- and y-
values given by the six repeated trials at each target location. Furthermore, 
regression coefficients across hands, groups, and sensory conditions using a 
three-way ANOVA were compared. 
The regression slopes for y-errors against target location showed 
significant effects of hand, F(1, 22) = 94.70, p < .01, a two-way interaction 
between hand and sensory condition, F(1, 22) = 62.14, p < .01, and a further 
three-way interaction with group, F(2, 44) = 3.13, p = .05. These analyses confirm 
statistically the hand-specific rotation bias for proprioceptive targets seen in 
Figure 11 (p. 101) and suggest that this effect differs between dancer and 
nondancer participants. The intercept of the y-error regression showed no main 
effects of group or interactions involving group and was therefore not analysed 
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further. The regression slope for x-errors showed no main effect of group or 
interactions with group and was therefore also not analysed further. However, the 
regression intercept for x-errors against target location showed main effects of 
hand, F(1, 22) = 69.59, p < .01, and condition, F(2, 44) = 7.68, p < .01, a two-way 
interaction between these factors, F(2, 44) = 43.33, p <.01, and a further three-
way interaction with group, F(2, 44) = 3.60, p = .04. These analyses confirm 
statistically the translation towards the target shoulder seen in Figure 11 (p. 101). 
Multisensory  Fusion 
In the VP:P condition, both visual and proprioceptive information about target 
position was available. In order to find out whether a proprioceptive reference 
frame was still used, the extent was tested to which the characteristic biases of 
proprioceptive representation were present in this fusion condition. Therefore, 
differences between the y-regression slopes for the left and the right hand were 
compared, which would capture hand-specific rotational biases in proprioception. 
Each participant‟s rotational proprioceptive bias was normalised in the VP:P 
condition according to their bias in the P:P condition, and their results were 
expressed as percentages. 
Dancers showed a greater percentage of this rotational bias in the VP:P 
condition (37%, interquartile range expressed as IQR, 20%) than did the controls 
(23%, IQR 27%). These values differed significantly, Mann-Whitney U = 104,  
p (Z(U)) = .03. A nonparametric test was chosen for this comparison because 
normalisation by very small rotational biases in the case of a few participants 
heavily distorted the distribution of percentage values. 
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Figure 11. Dancers’ and nondancers’ directional errors in the target location matching task in 
Experiment 4 (n = 12 in each group). X-bias and y-bias in all three sensory conditions; P:P (top figure), 
V:P (middle figure), and VP:P (bottom figure); x-axis: target locations (black circles) and mean 
matching attempts (x-bias) for right (grey squares and lines) and left (black squares and lines) target 
hand; y-axis: y-bias for dancers (left figures) and nondancers (right figures). 
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This procedure was repeated for the hand-specific translational proprioceptive 
bias by calculating the difference between the x-regression intercepts for the two 
hands and normalising each participant‟s translational proprioceptive bias in the 
VP:P condition according to their bias in the P:P condition. Dancers also showed 
a greater percentage of the translational proprioceptive bias in the VP:P condition 
(46%, IQR 43%) than did controls (23%, IQR 24%). These values again differed 
significantly, Mann-Whitney U = 101, p (Z(U)) = 0.05. Thus, the dancers‟ 
performance in the multisensory condition suggested that they relied more on a 
proprioceptive frame of reference than the controls. 
Further Analyses 
Two further exploratory analyses were performed to follow up patterns visible in 
Figure 11 (p. 101). First, the figure shows that the proprioceptive rotational bias of 
the cross-over effect is asymmetric: The slope is more prominent for right than for 
left hand targets. This unpredicted result suggested a possible hand dominance 
effect. To capture this asymmetry the two signed regression slopes were added 
together and restricted the analysis to the right-handed participants. The resulting 
asymmetry was significantly different from zero, t(19) = 42.5, p < .01, confirming 
a more prominent proprioceptive bias for the dominant hand in right-handers. 
This advantage for the nonpreferred arm-hemisphere in the use of position-
related proprioceptive information of right handed participants over the preferred 
arm-hemisphere has also been recently reported by Goble, Lewis, and Brown 
(2006). This asymmetry did not vary significantly with group or sensory condition. 
Figure 11 (p. 101) illustrates a further unpredicted result. In the V:P 
condition, dancers showed a reduced version of the cross-over effect seen in the 
P:P condition. In contrast, control participants showed a pattern closer to the 
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perceived bowing of visual space reported previously (Wolpert, Ghahramani,  
& Jordan, 1994). Analysis of the y-regression slopes for the dancers‟ V:P data 
only, confirmed the residual cross-over effect in this condition, F(1, 11) = 24.38, p 
< .01, and also the asymmetry between right and left hands in the right-handed 
dancers, t(10) = 2.47, p < .03. This point is outlined in the discussion section 
below. 
Discussion 
In this 3rd chapter, effects of expertise on the mental representation of the body 
and its relation to the egocentric space were investigated by asking expert 
dancers and control participants to match the perceived position of their hand in 
space. The three sensory conditions used differed with regards to the 
sensorimotor feedback available from the target location, while the matching 
movement underneath the table was kept the same in all sensory conditions. 
Differences in matching the target position can therefore be attributed to the 
sensory condition of the target hand above the table and do not refer to the 
matching movement. 
The results replicate previous findings of better than average 
proprioceptive representation of the upper limbs in expert dancers (Ramsay  
& Riddoch, 2001). More importantly, the spatial pattern of matching errors 
revealed the way that proprioceptive information is built up from local signals 
such as those originating from muscle spindles into a spatially organised 
representation of the body. A key finding was the constant error in proprioceptive 
matching which depended on the combination of target hand and target location, 
known as the cross-over effect from previous studies (Haggard et al., 2000). The 
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perceived position of the right hand at targets in the frontoparallel plane was 
shifted towards the right shoulder and rotated counterclockwise in the direction of 
shoulder extension in this study. The perceived position of the left hand at the 
same target locations showed opposite translational and rotational biases, thus 
leading to the cross-over pattern. These biases suggest that there was no single 
egocentre used for proprioceptive representation. Rather, each limb was 
represented in a frame of reference linked to its own „propriocentre‟. The present 
experiment revealed several new features of this propriocentric space. 
First, the propriocentres for each limb are themselves supposedly linked 
to a superordinate representation of the body as a whole. Expert dancers showed 
to have less disparate propriocentres than normal control participants. Put 
another way, dancers represented their two arms as unified within a single, 
coherent body representation to a greater extent than controls. This difference 
could have arisen because dancers have acquired a more coherent body 
representation during the course of training or because individuals who have 
more coherent body representations are more likely to become dancers. Several 
studies have shown effects of training in both directions on internal body-
consciousness (Adame, Radell, Johnson, & Cole, 1991; Skrinar, Bullen, Cheek, 
McArthur, & Vaughan, 1986; Skrinar, Williams, Bullen, McArthur, & Mihok, 1992), 
thus supporting the suggestion that a change in the body representation due to 
training is likely. 
Second, the two propriocentres seemed to be asymmetrically organised, 
with the dominant right hand showing a more strongly biased proprioceptive 
frame of reference than the nondominant left hand. This latter finding suggests 
that the existence of separate propriocentres for each limb is not simply due to a 
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constant error in the perception of a particular joint angle. It does, however, 
reflect the functional representation of the region of peripersonal space defining 
each arm‟s normal sensorimotor action. A previous study of perceived position 
(Tillery, Flanders, & Soechting, 1994) posited the existence of an inter-individual 
„motor fovea‟ for each hand, defined as an area of peripersonal space where 
matching errors are reliably low. The results suggest that each arm has a 
characteristic spatial bias pattern as well as a characteristic spatial accuracy 
pattern with between-subjects differences. Interestingly, a previous study has 
shown that the trunk serves as a reference for dancers and nondancers when 
participants have to position their legs at a particular angle (Mouchnino et al., 
1993). The difference in the functional use of arms and legs seems to play a 
particular role in the formation of reference points of the human body. 
Third, the results addressed the question of multisensory fusion. Previous 
results have suggested optimal multisensory integration with visual and tactile 
sensory information about object properties (Ernst & Banks, 2002) as well as with 
visual and proprioceptive sensory information of one‟s own body (van Beers et 
al., 2002). That is, the weighting of the multisensory integration is dependent on 
the reliability of each of the two signals. Here, the presence of translational and 
rotational proprioceptive biases was used in conditions where both visual and 
proprioceptive information about target position was available, as a novel way of 
measuring how proprioceptive information is weighted. Van Beers et al. found 
that vision dominated proprioception in general, but this was dependent on the 
spatial direction in relation to the participants egocentric shoulder position in 
which the matching movements were made. Furthermore, the proprioceptive 
signal was stronger when the target hand was actively moved by the participant 
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compared to when it was passively moved (Janwantanakul, Jones, Magarey,  
& Miles, 2002). This means the participants‟ matching in the VP:P condition could 
have been more accurate than in the P:P condition because of the stronger 
proprioceptive signal available. However, other studies did not find this 
advantage for actively moved hands in position sense (Djupsjobacka & Domkin, 
2005; Lönn, Crenshaw, Djupsjöbacka, Pedersen, & Johansson, 2000). Thus, 
efferent information may be necessary for position sense, but it is available in 
both active and passive movements as shown by Gandevia, Smith, Crawford, 
Proske, and Taylor (2006). The estimated contribution of proprioception in the 
fusion condition in this experiment was 23%, consistent with other values derived 
using quite different procedures by Ernst and Banks. More importantly, dancers, 
who had more accurate proprioception than controls, weighted proprioception 
significantly higher in the fusion condition. 
To the best of my knowledge, this was the first report of strategic inter- 
and intra-individual differences in multisensory position matching. However, how 
the uncertainty of a sensory signal was taken into account by the brain when 
integrating them to produce a single multisensory representation is unclear. The 
brain can obtain each signal‟s information value either by estimation from the 
noise in incoming sensory information or the estimation can be based on 
knowledge acquired through experience. It is possible that lower noise in the 
dancers‟ proprioceptive signals changed the proprioceptive weight in 
multisensory representation. Indeed, several studies have shown that 
proprioceptive accuracy develops with age (Goble et al., 2005; von Hofsten  
& Rosblad, 1988), thus supporting a modification by acquired proprioceptive 
experience. 
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A quite unexpected result from this experiment was the persistence of 
proprioceptive biases in the V:P condition in dancers but not controls. This was 
the case even though the participants had no proprioceptive information about 
target position in this condition since their target hand was resting in their lap. 
This seems to support the idea that experience modifies the weighting of sensory 
signals even if it can lead to reduced performance. Dancers might perhaps have 
used kinesthetic imagery in this condition, imagining their target hand was in fact 
on the visual target location, and then matching the resulting proprioceptive 
image with the matching hand. This speculation is supported by the finding that 
dancers displayed right-hand dominance effects in the V:P condition similar to 
those in the other conditions, in which a genuine proprioceptive representation of 
target position was allowed. It was also previously suggested by Golomer, 
Crémieux, Dupui, Isableu, and Ohlmann (1999) that dancers might shift the 
sensorimotor dominance from vision to proprioception. Therefore, only dancers 
may mentally simulate the proprioceptive sensation associated with visually 
perceived peripersonal space. It seems thus that not only can vision partly 
substitute proprioception in patients lacking proprioceptive information (Ghez  
et al., 1995; Ghez & Sainburg, 1995; Nance & Kirby, 1985; Rothwell et al., 1982; 
Sainburg, Ghilardi, Poizner, & Ghez, 1995), but the dancers‟ results pattern 
suggested that experts can also substitute visual information with proprioception, 
even in cases where the proprioceptive sense had to be mentally simulated. 
Finally, the results have specific relevance to dance. The importance of 
proprioceptive representations in learning, attaining, and maintaining body 
positions has long been recognised in performers in general (Alexander, 1971; 
Feldenkrais, 1972) and in dance in particular (Fitt, 1988; Fortin, 1995). Several 
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papers have previously reported superior proprioception in expert dancers 
(Golomer & Dupui, 2000; Golomer, Dupui et al., 1999; Lephart et al., 1996; 
Mouchnino et al., 1993; Ramsay & Riddoch, 2001; Schmitt, Kuni, & Sabo, 2005; 
Vuillerme, Teasdale, & Nougier, 2001). Yet, the precise ways in which dancers‟ 
proprioceptive representations differ from those of nondancers have not 
previously been investigated. A possible improvement in proprioception by 
training has been questioned (Ashton-Miller, Wojtys, Huston, & Fry-Welch, 2001). 
In addition to being generally more accurate in proprioception, dancers showed a 
more coherent proprioceptive representation of their body. Their sense of hand 
position in space was less limb-specific and used a frame of reference closer to a 
common egocentre rather than to disparate propriocentres for each limb. 
Moreover, these factors lead dancers to weigh proprioceptive information more 
and visual signals less compared to controls when forming multisensory body 
representations. Put another way, the dancers‟ body schema was more intrinsic 
and less extrinsic than the nondancers‟. There is a lively debate in the dance 
literature about whether the ubiquitous presence of mirrors in training 
environments does or does not assist in attaining and maintaining desired 
positions. However, it has rarely been investigated experimentally (Radell, 
Adame, & Cole, 2003). The results suggest that dancers are in any case less 
influenced by visual information about body position. Further studies might 
investigate whether performance on proprioceptive tests, or robustness of 
proprioception to visual over-ride, make good prognostic tools in dance trainees. 
To conclude, these results suggest that proprioceptive information is not 
represented only at the local level of individual muscle lengths. Rather, local 
proprioceptive information is combined into at least two superordinate levels of 
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organisation. The 1st level of organisation involves combining local signals from 
individual degrees of freedom into a representation of the position of the hand in 
space. This level of representation is required to match one hand‟s position with 
the other. Moreover, a 2nd level of superordinate representation can be 
suggested, in which the propriocentres of the individual limbs are related to a 
common egocentre. The degree of integration of these propriocentres into a 
common egocentre differs between individuals, either due to sensorimotor 
experience or due to unidentified genetic factors. The process of integrating local 
somatic sensory information into a coherent representation of the whole body is 
an important part of bodily self-consciousness (O‟Shaughnessy, 1995). 
Summary 
Continuous integration of multiple sensory information gives us a clear 
knowledge of where our limbs are in space. Recent studies have shown evidence 
for optimal integration of the available sensory information. The current 
experiment investigated whether the contributions made by proprioceptive and 
visual sensory information to create a whole body representation were sensitive 
to expertise. Dancers as experts were compared with controls in a target position 
matching task. When proprioceptive information from the target hand was 
provided, dancers and nondancers showed a rotational shift towards the shoulder 
of the matching hand. Thus, the data replicated previously reported hand-bias, 
illustrating two proprioceptive centres located at each shoulder. The dancers‟ 
hand-bias was smaller than that of the controls, but they also showed a similar 
effect without proprioceptive feedback. This study showed, for the first time, that 
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expertise leads to a more centrally integrated body representation which can be 
accessed by mentally simulated sensory information. 
The question herein is whether the shift of the body centres affecting the 
perception of the egocentric space was necessary for the proprioceptive body 
representation. In the following Experiment 5, the sense of touch was used to 
investigate how space on the body surface is perceived. 
Experiment 5: Body References in Tactile Perception 
Introduction 
The world around us can be perceived by multiple sensory systems. This study 
investigated how localisation of tactile experience is altered by visual and motor 
feedback. Touch is a specific sensory system in several respects. It is the most 
differentiated and important member of the somatosensory system (Schmidt, 
1995) and clearly the most intimate of all senses. Also, of all sensory systems, 
touch is the only double sensation. By using our sense of touch, we can perceive 
different surfaces and shapes of objects through active touching and we can 
localise passive tactile sensations on our body (Gibson, 1962; Loomis  
& Lederman, 1984). Imagine yourself coming home late at night, for example. 
Even in complete darkness, you can identify a set of keys next to other objects in 
your pocket by actively touching them, and by scanning the door with your 
fingertips keyholes are found. Once inside, we are able to find our way through 
the interior through tactile sensation on different locations of our body, for 
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example when unexpectedly hitting furniture. Clearly, touch is relevant in 
perceiving our bodies as well as objects in the external world. 
Most tactile sensations are elicited by external stimulation on the skin. 
The skin covers the whole of our body defining an important line between the 
inside and the outside, between our egocentre and the external environment. 
Nevertheless, the coherent sensation of the whole body, which is closely 
connected to the sensation of ourselves, is mainly provided by proprioception 
(O‟Shaughnessy, 1995). Proprioception is a somatosensory system which 
receives information mainly from joint receptors and muscle spindles about the 
body position (see Experiment 4). We can, for example, hit a mosquito biting us 
on the appropriate location on the body without conscious effort. This means we 
can easily locate the point of touch on our body or name the body part where we 
have been touched, but to hit the mosquito we need to integrate the sensed pain 
with information from other sensory modalities such as vision or proprioception. 
Several studies have shown cross-modal effects between most sensory 
modalities. For example, both touch and proprioception are necessary when 
haptically perceiving 3-D objects. Several studies also showed a close 
connection of touch and vision. Vision generally improves spatial tactile resolution 
in humans (Kennett, Taylor-Clarke, & Haggard, 2001). However, in blind people, 
tactile spatial acuity is superior to sighted people, indicating cortical plasticity 
(Van Boven, Hamilton, Kauffman, Keenan, & Pascual-Leone, 2000) by sensory 
substitution. Furthermore, intermodal matching of vision and tactile sensation 
leads to a distortion in position sense: When a subject‟s hand is stroked while 
looking at a rubber hand being stroked congruently, the participant experiences 
his or her own hand at the position of the artificial rubber hand (Botvinick & 
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Cohen, 1998). Thus, visual and tactile-proprioceptive simultaneity are responsible 
for this so-called „rubber hand illusion‟ which can be enhanced by motor activity 
(Tsakiris et al., 2006). The integration of different sensory modalities, such as 
touch, vision, and proprioception, play an important role in our everyday life. 
However, how the aforementioned sensory systems, vision and proprioception, 
connect and intervene in tactile perception of the body surface is not fully 
understood. 
When the skin is stimulated externally, mechanoreceptors within the skin 
send information to the brain where the information is integrated with other 
sensory information in a whole body representation and then, if necessary, 
transferred to motor commands for appropriate action. In the somatosensory 
cortex, the body is somatotopically organised reflecting the tactile resolution by 
the size of the receptive fields. Functionally important body parts, such as the 
fingers, have a higher tactile resolution and are reflected by a bigger area in the 
somatosensory cortex. The homunculus is a commonly used metaphor for this 
cortical map of the body. It represents the surface of the human body by its 
cortical size. The resolution of the touch sensors on the skin can be gained by the 
classical two-point discrimination first investigated by Weber (1975). Contrary to 
the somatosensory cortex, the body is less structurally represented by its parts in 
the motor cortex. Thus, the body is thought to be represented by two distinctive 
systems; motor and perceptual. These two forms of body representation are 
widely discussed either as body schema dealing with the relation of perception 
and action or as body image bound to visual perception of the body (Paillard, 
1999). Is the perception of the body by tactile sensation particularly influenced by 
the motor or visual bases of the representation? 
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The division of the body into different body parts is a stringent characteristic in 
body perception which is dependent on sensory feedback. Behavioural and 
neurological evidence accounts for the division into body parts from tactile 
localisation experiments and the somatotopic representation, respectively. In 
tactile localisation the responses were more accurate when the tactile stimuli 
were closer to a joint (Cholewiak & Collins, 2003). Thus, the joints act as 
particular reference points. However, recent studies have shown that the 
proprioceptive and motor body representation have several reference points 
(Gentilucci, Jeannerod, Tadary, & Decety, 1994; Haggard et al., 2000; 
Mouchnino et al., 1993) which can be shifted by physical expertise such as dance 
(see Experiment 4) or by actually executing a movement (de Vignemont et al., 
2009). This means that there is a connection between action and tactile 
perception. In moving, proprioceptive feedback is provided. The bias in pointing 
to target locations in egocentric space thus indicated two propriocentres, one at 
each shoulder, instead of one at the body centre (see Experiment 4). The data of 
this study showed, that expertise diminishes the proprioceptive bias by a shift 
towards the centre of the trunk. Furthermore, unifying effects of the body parts 
into a whole, less segregated body were found by motor activity (Tsakiris et al., 
2006). With respect to the cortical projection of the body in the somatosensory 
cortex, a perception of our body as divided into different body parts can at least 
be partially assumed for the body image, the proprioceptive perception. However, 
as mentioned above, the motor cortex is less somatotopically organised. 
Notwithstanding behavioural and neurological findings which also suggest 
intervention by other sensory systems, detection of a tactile stimulus is 
dependent on the receptive field with respect to the tactile stimulation. Sensory 
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signals from tactile sensations are integrated with afferent information from other 
sensory modalities, namely eye movement afferents (vision) or proprioceptive 
feedback (action), and transformed into efferent commands. 
The present experiment was conducted to investigate the perception of 
the tactile body surface by observing localisation biases in different sensory 
response modes. The tactile perception was accessed on the palm and the 
forearm, across the wrist. If the wrist acts as a reference point in tactile 
perception irrespective of the visual or motor response mode, then the response 
pattern was expected to be the same for both response modes, thus resulting in 
fewer errors in all conditions the closer the participant has been touched to the 
wrist. In contrast, if tactile sensation is coupled with one of the other senses, 
namely  vision and proprioception as often suggested, then differences in the 
response pattern were expected dependent on the response mode 
(proprioceptive information is pertinent in the motor response mode). 
Choleviak and Collins (2003) delivered tactile stimuli at one of seven 
locations 25 mm apart on the forearm and asked participants to localise the 
stimulus on an isomorphic linear seven-button keyboard. They observed greatest 
accuracy near the joint. However, the use of 25 mm measure units was not 
precise enough. Furthermore the authors relied on the transfer of tactile 
localisation on a visual display, involving solely the body image. In contrast, 
Parrish (1897) asked participants to point to where they have been touched, 
appealing to the body schema. The authors found the same effect of joint 
attraction. In the experiment described below, these two kinds of measures were 
investigated in order to study the influence of joints on tactile localisation, using 
visual and motor response modes. 
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Considering the reported differences in body representation by action and 
perception, joints segmenting body limbs should have less of an effect in action 
than vision. Furthermore, vision has been found to increase accuracy of tactile 
location in general. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that efferent information 
of the touch itself, as well as the efferent and afferent commands for action and 
visual perception, is decisive in perception of tactile location on the body surface. 
In the case vision and action do not provide equal information, a difference in 
multisensory integration should be observable with more accurate responses in 
tactile location by visual than by motor response. 
Method 
Participants 
Eighteen healthy participants took part in the experiment which was approved by 
the ethics committee of University College London. Each of the participants 
received standardised information regarding details of the experimental 
procedure and gave their informed written consent prior to testing. The mean age 
was 28.6 ± 1.6 years. Half of the participants were females and 2 participants 
were left-handed. All participants were naïve with respect to the hypothesis of the 
study. 
Materials, Design, and Procedure 
Participants sat at a table, with the left forearm and the left hand comfortably 
extended on the lateral side hidden within a box. Neither the left forearm nor 
hand was visible for the participants. Tactile stimuli were delivered with the tip of 
a pen for approximately 1 s. The loci of stimulation were marked on the 
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blindfolded participants‟ left forearm at -40, -30, -20, -10 mm, 0 (wrist) and on the 
palm, +10, +20, +30, +40 mm before the experiment started (the wrist was 
localised at the skin fold when the participant bent the hand towards the forearm). 
After being touched, the participants were asked to localise the tactile stimulation 
presented to their left arm in two response modes, either visual or motor. For the 
visual response a ruler was positioned on the box directly above and parallel to 
the forearm. The ruler positioning was offset by a random distance on each trial 
to prevent participants remembering ruler values across trials. Participants had to 
report the ruler position where they felt they were being touched, in bird‟s eye 
view. For the motor response, participants had to point with their right index finger 
to the location on the box immediately above the tactile stimulus. The 
experimenter noted the location using the ruler. The 2 response modes were 
blocked and counterbalanced. Each of the 9 tactile locations was touched 5 times 
in a randomised order in both response modes making a total of 90 trials.  
Analysis 
Performance was analysed using the signed error (mean of the difference 
between perceived location and actual location) in order to observe the direction 
of the estimation error. Differences in the mean (M) ± standard error (SE) in 
centimetres for the location estimation in the two response modes vision and 
motor were tested for significance with SPSS, Version 11.5. During testing, it 
could be noticed that 1 male and 1 female participant touched the end of the box 
with their left finger tips and were therefore analysed separately.  
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Results 
The ANOVA with the factors response mode (visual vs. motor) and stimuli 
location (-4/-3/ … +3/+4) showed a significant main effect for stimuli location,  
F(8, 120) = 6.72 , p < .001. The factor response mode did not reach significance. 
Figure 12 (p. 118) displays the shift of the mean signed error for each stimulus 
location. The distance between the stimulus location (black point) and the motor 
or visual response is the mean signed error. As can be seen in the figure, the 
touch locations are perceived closer to the body centre at all stimuli locations 
manifested in a proximal shift. Within-subjects contrast analysis showed that this 
shift is significantly linear, F(1, 15) = 12.59, p < .05, with decreasing errors for 
more proximal locations as shown in Table 5 (p. 119). Despite a significant 
difference for response mode, the signed error was constantly smaller in the 
motor (-2.47 ± 1.00) than in the visual response mode (-3.56 ± 1.12) as can be 
seen in the Figure 12 (p.118). As 2 participants touched the end of the box, 
individual responses for each participant including those were figured out, in 
order to verify whether any effect of this additional tactile information can be 
observed. These individual responses are displayed in Figure 13 (p. 120). Lines 
above the dotted horizontal line at zero indicate a distal shift (positive signed 
error) whereas lines below are given by a proximal shift (negative signed error). A 
signed error of zero would lie on the dotted horizontal line across the graph.  
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Figure 12. Accuracy in touch location estimate as mean signed error in Experiment 5 (n = 
16) with actual locations of touch on the forearm (black circles), motor responses (grey 
line and squares), and visual responses (black line and squares). X-axis: touch locations 
on the forearm (minus), the wrist (wrist), and the palm (plus); y-axis: deviation from the 
stimuli location by the signed error in centimetres. 
The two black bold lines highlight those participants who touched the end of the 
box during the testing. It is clearly visible that 4 participants overestimated the 
distance from the body to the touch at all nine stimuli locations, resulting in a 
distal shift. One of these is the male participant who was excluded from the 
analysis. This male participant was retested, as were 2 participants with a distal 
shift, to verify whether any faults in the testing procedure were responsible for 
this direction difference in the signed error. Shifts in the signed error of these  
3 male participants from the test and re-test measurement (i.e., 1st and 2nd 
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measure), are shown Figure 14 (p. 121). The box was modified so that none of 
these participants could reach the end of the box in the re-test measurement. All 
retested participants had larger than average hands and it was evident that 
touching the end of the box was very likely in the primary test by these 
participants. 
The motor response mode 
showed a clear distal shift. A 
repeated measure ANOVA with 
only 3 participants and the 
factors measurement (1st vs. 
2nd) and response mode (visual 
vs. motor) showed a significant 
main effect for response mode, 
F(1, 2) = 77.56, p < .05, with a 
significant bigger signed errors in 
the visual (-2.2 ± 0.41) compared 
to the motor response mode 
(1.14 ± 0.26), paired t test,  
t(2) = 8.81, p < .05. The main 
factor measurement showed a 
strong trend with only 3 
participants, F(1, 2) = 12.91,  
p = .069. The interaction did not 
reach significance. 
Table 5 
Mean Signed Error (±SE) in Centimetres 
for both Response Modes (vision and 
pointing) of all Participants at all Target 
Locations on the Left Forearm of 
Experiment 5. 
Target Location Deviationa 
+4  -3.936 ± 1.941 
+3  -3.548 ± 1.984 
+2  -3.854 ± 1.990 
+1  -3.104 ± 1.054 
wrist  -2.761 ± 1.967 
-1  -2.517 ± 1.963 
-2  -2.432 ± 1.108 
-3  -2.423 ± 1.155 
-4  -2.518 ± 1.997 
Note: Target locations were each 1 cm apart from 
each other. Deviation in cm. 
a
n = 16. 
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As the factor measurement showed a strong trend, a paired-samples t test was 
conducted. This analysis showed significant differences between the 1st and 2nd 
measure in the visual response mode, t(2) = 9.25, p < .05. Furthermore, the 
difference between the visual and motor response mode was significant for the 
2nd measure, t(2) = 4.64, p < .05, but not significant for the 1st measure, 
t(2) = 2.78, p = .11. In addition, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted for the factors stimuli location (-4/-3/ … +3/+4) and measurement (1st 
vs. 2nd). The main factor stimuli location was significant, F(8, 16) = 3.80, p < .05, 
with decreasing errors for more proximal locations. The signed errors of the 2nd 
measure showed a strong trend to be bigger (-2.94 ± 0.87) and shifted towards 
the body compared to the 1st measure (1.88 ± 0.54 cm), F(1, 2) = 12.91, p = .07. 
Figure 13. Individual responses in the target location matching task in Experiment 5. The 
distal and proximal shift of the 2 participants who touched the end of the box with their 
finger tips (male and female, respectively) are highlighted (shadowed black bold line);  
x-axis: tactile locations on the forearm (minus), the wrist, and the palm (plus); y-axis: 
mean signed errors in centimetres of all trials in both response modes for each single 
participant. 
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Figure 14. Primary and 
secondary measurement in 
the target location matching 
task of Experiment 5. The 
touched locations on the 
forearm are indicated by black 
circles; x-axis: stimuli 
locations on the forearm 
(minus), the wrist, and the 
palm (plus); y-axis: deviation 
from the stimuli location by 
the signed error for  
3 participants in the visual 
(squares) and motor 
(triangles) response modes in 
the primary (bold line) and in 
the secondary (dotted line) 
measurement.  
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Discussion 
How the visual and motor response modes modify tactile localisation estimation 
was investigated in the experiment described above. Participants were touched 
at nine different locations on their left arm distributed from the palm to the 
forearm. Thereafter, they had to estimate where they felt they had been touched 
either visually or by pointing with their right index finger on the box that covered 
their left arm. The data showed that participants in general estimated the location 
closer to the body than where they had actually been touched. Thus, the bias can 
be described as a proximal shift with a small decrease of the shift towards the 
body. The more the peripheral participants were touched, the greater the 
mislocation-span. The shift was equal for visual and motor responses. That is, 
the body centre acted as a reference for both visual and motor responses, 
although there was a strong trend for a bigger proximal bias for visual responses. 
Furthermore, the data showed individual differences in the shift direction. 
While most participants showed a proximal bias by underestimating the distance 
from the body centre to the location of touch, 4 participants overestimated the 
body to touch distance, leading to a distal mislocation. A retest of 3 of these 
participants showed that it is likely that those participants touched the end of the 
box in the primary setting, like the 2 participants who were excluded from the 
analysis for which it was noticed during the 1st testing. The reversed shift was no 
longer present in the 2nd measurement. As 1 participant was touching the end of 
the box and was therefore excluded from the initial testing, the experimental 
setting was adjusted in the retesting in order to prevent any contact at the 
fingertips. All retested participants had larger than average hands. Therefore, it is 
likely that the touch was not noticed during the 1st measurement and that this 
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additional tactile information from the fingertip was responsible for the reversed 
shift in the distal direction. The retest confirmed a bigger effect for the visual than 
the motor response mode. The analysis of the data from the 2nd measure 
revealed a significant difference between the visual and motor response. 
Interestingly, the errors were significantly different for the nine target locations. 
Again, the bias was smaller for the locations closer to the body than the more 
peripheral locations. Even though only 3 participants were retested, significant 
main effects in the response mode as well as in the target location were evident 
between the 1st and 2nd measurement. However, it has to be mentioned that  
α error corrections were ignored. Further experiments investigating the sensory 
integration of touch sensation and visuo-motor senses should be conducted, 
factoring in additional tactile information in the experimental design. For example, 
it remains unclear whether the additional tactile information was relevant due to a 
change in reference points, due to an increase in tactile sensation, or simply due 
to the information where the arm ends. 
The results are threefold. Firstly, the mislocation reflects that touches are 
generally experienced closer to the body than where actually applied. This is 
supported by the finding that the proximal bias was insensitive to the response 
mode. Secondly, when the participants were touched further away from the body 
centre, the shift towards the body was bigger and vice versa. This is like an 
inverse attraction. In a common attraction, the force is increasing with decreasing 
distance to the attractor. Here, we found less attraction closer to the trunk. 
Experience with objects and the egocentric body aura may play an important role 
for this effect. Objects are grasped and immediately taken to the egocentric body 
area for further inspection, but not too close to the body centre for handy 
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manipulation. Thirdly, the additional analysis with the data from the 2nd 
measurement showed that, presumably, the attraction of the body centre is 
stable, whilst additional tactile reference from the tip of the fingers shifted the 
errors distally. This peripheral drift by the additional touch at the fingers is 
stronger in the visual response mode. 
In the light of self-protection it is interesting to note that a touch is 
experienced closer than it is actually applied – this might help protect us when we 
are touched by people or objects. The data also corresponds with the real life 
experience when small objects are taken closer to the body centre, the eyes, for 
visual inspection. In contrast, our arms have a much bigger radius of action. 
Finally, vision is highly sensitive to integrating additional tactile information. 
Recent studies showed that the egocentric body representation has multiple 
reference points. The present data did not replicate the influence of joints seen in 
previous studies (Cholewiak & Collins, 2003; de Vignemont et al., 2009; Parrish, 
1897). In contrast, accuracy in tactile localisation linearly increased from the most 
distal to the most proximal stimulation point, from the palm to the forearm. The 
body centre has been found to act as a reference in other studies, namely for leg 
movements (Mouchnino et al., 1993) and arm movements, especially in expert 
dancers (see Experiment 4). Also, the head acts as a reference for rotations 
(Gentilucci et al., 1994).  
To summarise, this study showed that sensory experience is highly 
modifiable. In addition to recent investigations, the data revealed that first, the 
perception of the body limbs and the sensory experiences were shifted, in the 
form of an attraction, by single or multiple reference points as it was the case in 
the sensory modality of touch, and that second, the pattern of the bias remains 
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constant while the direction of the experienced sensation or the mismatch in 
localisation is dependent on the task and the experience. For example, consider 
tactile sensitivity: Localisation is always bound to the body, which changes its 
size and form during development. The sense of touch is active from the very first 
moment in life (and before). To consciously experience touch and localise it as 
accurately as possible, tactile information is integrated into a representation of 
the body. The body representation and therefore tactile sensation has to „grow‟ 
with its body. Moreover, it is well known that the resolution in touch perception 
can be increased by extensive training. For example, in severely visually 
impaired or blind people, the sense of touch superimposes visual perception. 
These findings together with the experiment above support the assumption of 
highly modifiable perception in the tactile sensory system. 
Summary 
Different studies have suggested that the body representation is segmented into 
its parts with the joints acting as landmarks. In this study, the representation of 
the body has been investigated by tactile experience across the wrist. 
Participants had to localise where they thought they were being touched. The 
participants significantly underestimated the distance at all locations from the 
body centre to the tactile location, whether they were pointing or whether they 
indicated the tactile location visually by naming the location on a superimposed 
ruler. The more the peripheral participants were touched, the bigger the proximal 
bias. However, a few participants showed a clear overestimation in localisation 
which resulted in a distal bias. Moreover, the results from retesting a subset of 
these participants revealed an underestimation in the tactile location according to 
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the group‟s mean. All of these participants had very long hands. While retesting 
these participants, it became evident that they supposedly touched the end of the 
box in the primary measurement. Thus, the response mode did not affect the bias 
significantly whereas – observed by coincidence – additional experimentally 
unintended tactile stimulation from the tip of the fingers resulted in a reversed 
bias. Therefore, the body centre acted as a reference point in tactile localisation 
only in those cases where the fingertip of the left arm did not touch the end of the 
box. Furthermore, in each the proximal and distal mislocation, the bias was 
bigger the more peripheral participants were touched. The body representation 
based on tactile sensation is body centred; additional tactile sensations were 
integrated as superordinate reference points; and independent of the sensory 
response mode.  
The multisensory integrations in body representation based on tactile 
localisation (Experiment 5 in this chapter) were less effective than in the case of 
vision (Experiments 1 to 3 in chapter 2) or proprioception (Experiment 4 in this 
chapter). Nevertheless, other authors found alteration of the body representation 
in the tactile sense in response to movement (de Vignemont et al., 2009). This is 
of particular interest as the sense of touch is special in the case of information 
received from the external world. Therefore, it is of great importance to study the 
adaptability of movement representations, in particular the effect of different 
internal states. The adaptability in the movement representation is investigated in 
Experiment 6 (chapter 4). Two issues of motor representation adaptability were 
addressed by studying the effect of internal states in motor execution and motor 
imagery training.  
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Chapter Four 
Movement Representation based on Imagery Training 
Experiment 6: Learning a Novel Movement with Motor Imagery 
Introduction 
Athletes and artists use a diverse range of training methods to improve their 
motor performance. Thereby mental training techniques play an important role 
alongside general cardiovascular, strength, and flexibility training. Motor imagery 
of movement is one example of a mental technique. It has been referred to as 
conscious simulations of movement and consists of mental rehearsal of a 
movement without any motor execution. Other mental techniques feature the 
direction of the attention, such as focusing on the movements themselves 
(internal focus) or on the movement effects (external focus, effect anticipation, 
and feedback). 
The effect of mental techniques on movement performance is not yet 
clear for imagery nor anticipation. Nevertheless, athletes themselves strongly 
believe in the benefit of mental techniques and use them irrespective of its 
efficacy (Cumming & Hall, 2002; Hanrahan & Salmela, 1990; Hanrahan  
& Vergeer, 2000/2001; Short, Tenute, & Feltz, 2005). For example, Hanrahan 
and Vergeer (2000/2001) compared dancers‟ self-rating with experts‟ rating in the 
height of the grand battement (rising working leg from hip into the air). The 
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authors found that dancers using imagery overestimated their performance and 
the effect imagery had (Hanrahan, 1995). Such strong beliefs in training 
techniques prime their regular use by sport athletes and other arts performers to 
improve movements that are already constituent parts of their motor repertoire as 
well as in learning new movements. However, no empirical evidence for the 
relation between particular mental techniques and specific performance effects 
when acquiring a novel movement has been demonstrated yet.  
Performance changes due to imagery training have been measured in 
force gain, movement range increase, or movement accuracy improvement. 
Several studies showed that motor imagery enhanced performance of a 
movement that can already be performed (Blair, Hall, & Leyshon, 1993; 
Hanrahan et al., 1995; Mulder, Zijlstra, Zijlstra, & Hochstenbach, 2004; Yágüez  
et al., 1998; Yue & Cole, 1992; Yue et al., 1996; Zijdewind, Toering, Bessem, 
Van Der Laan, & Diercks, 2003). For example, Hanrahan et al. found that the use 
of specific mental images in preparation and during the execution of a movement 
increased the movement‟s accuracy, especially in particular, familiar dance 
movements. However, no general rule can explain the success of imagery on 
performance increase. Similarly, studies that focused on force increase by 
imagery training showed seemingly contradictory results. For example, 
participants in the study of Yue and Cole (1992) showed a significant increase in 
abduction force of the 5th digit after imagined isometric contractions in  
20 sessions spaced across 4 weeks. However, Herbert, Dean, and Gandevia 
(1998) reported no significant increase in force after imagery training on easily 
executable movements, such as the flexion of the elbow. Type of imagery or 
mental technique, the biomechanical specificity of the type of movement, the 
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maximal muscle strength, the particular body parts involved, the level of the 
movements‟ representation, as well as the general imagery or movement skill 
level (expertise) are factors that are supposed to influence the degree of the 
obtained benefit. For instance, the effect of imagery on the actual movement 
performance measured in abduction amplitude was found to be dependent on the 
ability to execute the movement prior to imagery training (Mulder et al., 2004). 
Similarly, neuro-cortical changes based on motor imagery training were found to 
be dependent on the type of movement as well as on the extent of physical 
practice (Takahashi, Hayashi, Ni, Yahagi, Favilla, & Kasai, 2005). 
Importantly, an increase in force is not necessarily related to an increase 
in muscle mass. The neuromuscular system adapts in response to imagery as 
well as physical training at different levels. Physical training can modify cortical 
maps, motor commands, descending drive, muscle activity, motor units, and 
sensory feedback as classified by Duchateau and Enoka (2002). Corcos, Jaric, 
Agarwal, and Gottlieb (1993), for example, showed that physical training changes 
the motor programs. Herein, the term „muscle strength‟ is only used when an 
increase in force is related to an increase in muscle mass by extended muscle 
activity. In imagery, corresponding muscles are not supposed to be actively 
contracted; therefore, peripheral adaptations are unlikely. Jacobson (1930) and 
others (e.g., Bonnet, Decety, Jeannerod, & Requin, 1997), however, measured 
neuromuscular activity using Electromyographic (EMG) whilst participants were 
imagining. This peripheral activation led to the suggestion that imagery activates 
descending pathways and the corresponding muscles below threshold. The 
neuromuscular system was therefore assumed to be modified by imagery which 
can result in changes in the movement when executed. Nonetheless, 
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performance increase by imagery training could be shown even in cases where 
EMG inactivity during imagery was controlled (Yue & Cole, 1992), thus showing 
evidence in favour of imagery as a purely central mechanism. Furthermore, Yue 
et al. (1996) found an increase in force despite muscle atrophy, suggesting that 
muscle activation in imagery was unlikely. In addition, an imagined movement 
showed cortical activity similar to the actual execution of a movement (Lotze et 
al., 1999). Imagery training revealed enlargement of motor areas and a decrease 
in threshold activation by TMS after 5 weeks of imagery training akin to the 
central changes observed by physical training (Pascual-Leone et al., 1995). 
However, in a recent fMRI study by Nyberg, Eriksson, Larsson, and Marklund 
(2006) the brain activity was distinct for the imagery group compared to the 
performance group. 
The neuromuscular stage of a movement is crucial for imagery training 
effects. For example, movements may be differentially affected by motor imagery 
when they are established in the motor repertoire (i.e., those with a consolidated 
motor representation) compared to novel movements. Healthy participants can 
generally access a motor representation of a movement consciously. Few novel 
movements can be considered purely novel. Most studies investigating the 
effects of imagery training on movement learning actually studied the effects on 
learning a new movement sequence, such as sequential control of individual 
finger movements. It is only recently that studies on motor imagery training in 
learning novel movements have been conducted on healthy participants (Mulder 
et al., 2004) and on relearning a movement in stroke patients (Carey et al., 2004; 
Dickstein, Dunsky, & Marcovitz, 2004; Dijkerman, Ietswaart, Johnston,  
& MacWalter, 2004; Gaggioli et al., 2004; Johnson-Frey, 2004; Liu, Chan, Lee,  
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& Hui-Chan, 2004a, 2004b; Malouin, Richards, Doyon, Desrosiers, & Belleville, 
2004). Furthermore, the perceptual contribution in learning movements without 
any accessible motor representation has rarely been investigated. Some authors 
have suggested that movement observation and imitation play a particular role in 
learning how to perform a novel movement (e.g., Mattar & Gribble, 2005). 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear to what extent and on which level in the nervous 
system motor imagery is involved in these processes (e.g., Clark, Tremblay,  
& Ste-Marie, 2004;   Duchateau & Enoka, 2002; Jeannerod, 1995; Vogt, 1996). 
In order to receive a clear image of the impact of motor imagery training, 
all possible bodily and cognitive constraints have to be considered. The present 
investigation was designed to gain further insight into the processes of imagery 
by studying imagery effects on a novel movement which has never yet been 
executed in daily life. In correspondence with Mulder et al. (2004) the continuous 
abduction movement of the big toe was taken for the investigation as a novel 
movement. The abduction of the big toe is a special movement in several ways. 
First and foremost, many people have difficulties making an abduction movement 
of their big toe although they can quite easily flex or extend it. The joint at the big 
toe is unique with respect to anatomical mechanisms compared to joints at the 
other toes (Coughlin, 1996). 
The learning effects in this experiment are of interest for several reasons. 
Recent studies investigating imagery training found different effects of expertise 
(e.g., Driskell, Copper, & Moran, 1994). Mulder et al. (2004) investigated the 
imagery effect on the abduction of the big toe and found improvement only when 
the participants could execute the abduction prior to the training. However, in 
contrast to Mulder et al., the force increase was measured in addition to the 
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abduction amplitude. If imagery training and physical training have distinct neural 
correlates, differences in the performance other than force or movement range 
extension should be observable. Therefore, time parameters were also 
considered separately in the force measurement to look at changes in maximum 
force, maintaining force, and the onset of movement. The additional 
measurement of the isometric contraction also allowed measuring low level of 
muscle activity. 
Based on the findings of previous studies, an increase in maximum force 
and maintaining force was proposed to be biggest in response to execution 
training. Previous studies on imagery training have not included time 
considerations such as the rate of force development. For example, in several 
athletics disciplines, such as sprint or javelin, the rate of force development and 
the onset of movement are of great importance in competition. Kimura, Imanaka, 
and Kita (2002) found that the onset of movement is mediated by mental factors 
rather than by the effects of peripheral muscular preparation. It is expected that 
mental imagery training decreases the onset of movement over the training 
sessions. Furthermore, a comparison between dancers and nondancers allowed 
identification of potential differences in mental imagery and movement abilities in 
the individual. An understanding of how motor commands can be built, accessed, 
and modified, particularly by using deliberate imagery, is essential for sport 
athletes and may foster programs for motor rehabilitation. 
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Method 
Participants 
The participants were recruited at the University of Zurich and at a training and 
performance centre for professional dancers. Eight undergraduate students and 
10 professional dancers participated in this study. All participants gave written 
informed consent to participate in this study, which was performed in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The participants received written instructions 
explaining the task and the procedure. The participants (3 male, 15 female) were 
tested individually in a quiet room. The mean age was 29.0 ± 6.1 years. All 
participants were right handed according to Briggs Handedness Questionnaire 
(Briggs & Nebes, 1975). According to Maupas, Paysant, Datie, Martinet, and 
André (2002) each possible aspect of footedness was tested (stability, accuracy, 
and dynamic). All but 2 participants had an overall dominance of their right foot 
and all participants had a dominance of fine motor activity on the right foot 
(grasping an object). Participants were paid for their participation and they had 
never taken part in any similar study. The dancers‟ interest was motivated by 
their knowledge about the importance of the feet‟s stability for balance (Mann & 
Inman, 1964) and the big toe‟s involvement in movement precision (Howse, 
1983). None of the participants received any training of the big toe prior to the 
participation in this study. Only participants who reached an overall rating score 
in the Vividness of Motor Imagery Questionnaire (VMIQ, Isaac et al., 1986) for 
the kinesthetic imagery of 70 or less (possible range, 24-120; best score 24) and 
participants without previous muscular and skeletal injuries or pain of the lower 
limb were included in the analysis. 
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Design 
In order to investigate the effect of motor imagery on novel movements, a 
learning experiment with a between-subjects design was chosen. Participants 
had to learn the abduction movement of the big toe by repeated isometric 
contractions of the abductor hallucis. The groups performed different training 
tasks. Those were imagery, execution of the big toe, or execution of a control 
movement. Each participant was assigned to one training group prior to the first 
training. Each group consisted of 6 participants; the groups were approximately 
balanced for age, gender, and expertise in dance. 
The measurements and the sessions‟ procedure were the same for all 
participants with one measurement phase before, one after the training phase for 
six sessions during 2 consecutive weeks. Each week consisted of a session on 
Monday, one on Wednesday, and one on Friday. As illustrated in Table 6  
(p. 137), each session included a training phase and two measurement phases, 
the abduction amplitude (referred to as amplitude), and abduction force (referred 
to as force). Each session started and ended with the amplitude measurement 
once in each condition, visual anticipation, and eyes closed. The force was 
recorded 5 times before and 5 times after the training phase. 
The training phase consisted of 15 repeated movements of either the 
executed or imagined abduction of the big toe on the right foot or a control 
movement of the right hand for each group. One session lasted approximately 16 
min for the experimental phases (training and measurement phases), plus 
approximately 15 min of preparation prior to the experiment (questionnaire, 
disinfection, and foot massage). 
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Equipment 
The participants were seated in a chair with their knees flexed at approximately 
110° and their right foot fixed in the apparatus. A light and tone device on the 
table indicated the pace of the abduction movements. The testing apparatus 
consisted of an iron plate on which the two levers necessary for the 
measurements were attached solidly by strong magnets inserted on their lower 
side. As illustrated in Figure 15 (p. 137), a separate lever was used for the 
amplitude and for the force, respectively. The apparatus was positioned against 
an obstruction bar to provide stabilisation. The feet of the participants were 
positioned on disposable drapery and the small toes were fixated so that they 
would not move. Additional pieces of felt were used to provide comfortable but 
sustainable fit. It was important that the participants concentrated on the 
movement of their big toe without having to ensure stabilisation of the foot.  
The lever for the measurement of the amplitude was movable. The 
corresponding muscle for the abduction originates from the tuber calcareous 
(heel). For that reason the torque of the moveable amplitude lever was at the 
level of the tuber calcareous, thereby providing a larger radius for more precise 
measurements (scale ranging from -6.0 to 41.0 mm, resolution 1 mm). The lever 
was adjusted at the height of the cuticle of the big toe. The big radius provided a 
better abduction measure. The lever remained still at the maximally reached 
amplitude.  
The lever for the force was stiff. The force lever measured the applied 
force isometrically. The force was recorded by means of an analogue force 
sensor with a piezoresistive micro-machined silicon sensing element 
(HONEYWELL, MICRO SWITCH Force Sensors, http://sensing.honeywell.com) 
adjacent to the back end of the lever. The muscle contraction was thus nearly 
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isometric (maximal abduction forces yielded a 1 mm displacement of the lever). 
The applied force was measured in newton (N) continuously (low linearity errors 
± 0.5% span, range between 15 and 55 N maximum), amplified and converted to 
a binary signal (8 bit resolution). The maximum force at the sensor was set to  
10 N with a resolution of 0.04 N. A microprocessor connected to an IBM DOS by 
a serial port processed optic, acoustic and force signals at a sampling rate of 
31.5 Hz. 
Tasks Procedure 
The movement was explained in detail to all participants. Then, they were asked 
to make a flexion and extension of the big toe. Subsequently, all participants 
were instructed to passively abduct the big toe by pulling down along the medial 
side of the foot with the forefinger to experience to abduction movement. 
Furthermore, it was explained to the participants that people are usually not able 
to execute this movement from the very beginning, and they were encouraged to 
try. After disinfection of the foot, participants received a 10 minute relaxing 
massage on the right foot in order to attain a standard level of muscle tonus 
before the experiment started. The participants‟ right foot was then fixed onto the 
measurement apparatus with Velcro fastener. Pictures of the fixed foot were 
taken before the measurements to ensure identical positioning in the consecutive 
sessions. 
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Table 6. 
Experimental Procedure in Minutes for Each Participant in Each Session of Experiment 6.  
Figure 15. Experimental apparatus with foot fixation and measurement levers. Left image: 
movable lever for abduction amplitude with scale in millimetres; right image: stiff lever for 
abduction force measurement in newton. 
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Training Phase 
The participants‟ foot rested in the apparatus throughout the entire session. The 
force training phase consisted of repeated presses and relaxations in the 
execution and mentally rehearsed presses and relaxations in the imagery group, 
respectively. The control group trained the „Mister Spock‟ finger sign with the right 
hand (i.e., abduction of the 4th and 5th finger together with adduction of the 
middle and index finger). Participants in the execution group had to press against 
the lever as strongly as possible with their big toe and then relax. Participants in 
the imagery group were instructed to imagine pressing with their big toe against 
the lever without actually making any overt movement or muscle contraction. 
They were told to imagine the movement as vividly as possible while keeping the 
foot muscles relaxed. The experimenter supervised the force values on-line 
presented on a computer screen to ensure the absence of any movement for the 
imagery and the control group. The number of repetitions (15) and the frequency 
of the repeated executed or imagined movement was equal in all groups. 
Participants were prepared for the press by a preparatory signal (double beep)  
3 s before the signal to press. A green light indicated the press phase (7 s). 
Participants relaxed for 20 s before the next trial. In the imagery group, the light 
signals were replaced by a single beep for press and a prolonged beep for 
relaxation. 
In the training phase during actual pressing or imaging, respectively, all 
participants were interrupted randomly three times at one of six time points  
(1-6 s after press) by a double beep. They were asked to rate their sense of effort 
at the moment of the interruption on a scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high). This 
subjective rate of effort was used to control for the mental activity of the imagery 
group. 
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Measurement Phase 
The amplitude was measured under two perceptual motor control conditions 
administered in randomised order for all participants. In the perceptual motor 
control condition the participants had to press with their big toe against the 
moveable lever whilst looking at the point of the scale where they wanted the 
lever to go, thus visually anticipating the goal of the movement and receiving 
visual feedback of their actual performance. In the eyes closed condition the 
participants had no visual feedback during the movement. In each condition, the 
amplitude was measured once before and once after the training phase (four 
amplitude measures per session). The investigator inspected the scale and noted 
the size of the abduction. The perceptual control condition was included from the 
2nd session on as the experimenter observed striking differences in the 1st 
testing session. 
For the force measurements, each participant had to press against the 
stiff lever for 4 s and then relax for 3 s. This sequence was repeated four times 
pre- and four times post-training (i.e., four repetition trials, eight force 
measurements per session). Participants received a preparatory tone signal 
(double beep) 1.5 s before the red light signal indicated data collection. After 3 s 
a green light was switched-on for 4 s initiating the press phase and the 
subsequent relaxing phase when it was switched-off. As long as the red light was 
on for another 4 s the measurement was progressing. The pause between 
presses was 10 s. 
Analysis 
The collected force data were imported into Vision Analyzer (BRAIN PRODUCTS 
GmbH, Brain Vision Analyzer Version 1.5, http://www.brainproducts.com) with the 
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generic data reader and manually typed marker files. The raw data were 
automatically segmented in slices of 11000 ms length, baseline corrected to zero 
(-1500 ms before start). Peak detection, exerted force, and the integrated surface 
underneath the force curve (Ns) of the averaged repetition trials were exported 
for further analyses. 
Firstly, the initial amplitude and force values were assessed to test for 
individual differences prior to the experiment. The initial values were defined as 
the first trial in session 1. Then, training induced changes in amplitude and force 
were tested for statistical significance in SPSS Version 11. Significant training 
induced changes were tested as significant increases in performance with 
respect to the participants‟ 1st session (e.g., session 2-1, session 3-1, etc.) and 
by significant increases between sessions (e.g., session 2-1, session 3-2, etc.). 
Repeated measures analysis for the within-subjects factor session and the 
between-subjects factor group were conducted. Differences between groups for a 
specific session and differences within groups were further analysed with contrast 
analysis as well as paired samples t tests. In order to assess for significant 
ordered differences (e.g., retention force increases over training sessions) the 
nonparametric Jonckheere Terpstra test (JT; Jonckheere, 1954) was conducted. 
The sample was also tested for normal distribution in abduction amplitude and 
force performance with one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z (K-S Z). The values in 
the text are given as mean (M) ± standard deviation (SD) in millimetres for the 
movement amplitude and in newton (N) for the force (analyses with the median 
showed equivalent results). 
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Results 
Of the 18 participants, 4 participants had to be excluded. One of these 
participants had an initial force peak higher than 2 x SD above the overall mean 
and was therefore considered as an expert in executing the abduction movement. 
Another participant had a hallux valgus angle around 35° which made a reliable 
adjustment of the levers impossible. In addition, 2 participants had long-lasting 
pain or a severe operation at their lower limb. Therefore, the groups consisted of 
4 participants in the imagery, 4 participants in the execution, and 6 participants in 
the control group.  
No differences were found between the dancers and nondancers; they 
were thus pooled together for further analyses. Furthermore, no significant 
differences within a session, that is, before versus after the training, was found. 
Each session‟s performance was therefore computed by averaging the repetition 
trials before the training phase ignoring the trails after the training phase. This 
means that the first two values for amplitude or the first four values for force were 
merged at each session. 
Abduction Amplitude  
The movement range of the abduction was measured by the amplitude in 
millimetres. The mean values for each session with and without vision are listed 
in Table 7 (p. 147/148). None of the participants had an initial amplitude of zero; 
the minimum amplitude was 3.0 cm and the maximum amplitude was 17.5 cm. 
The overall mean initial amplitude for all groups was 7.7 ± 4.0 and did not differ 
from a normal distribution, p = .63, K-S Z. The initial amplitude did not differ 
between groups, F(2, 11) = 0.40, p = .71,  and equal variances could be 
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assumed, Levene Test for Variance Homogeneity, F(2, 11) = 0.42, p > .10.  
A three-way ANOVA with the within-subjects factors perceptual control (visual 
anticipation vs. eyes closed) and amplitude change (session 2-1 till session 6-1) 
and the between-subjects factor training group (execution vs. imagery vs. control) 
revealed a significant main effect for the within-subjects factors perceptual 
control, F(1, 11) = 16.10, p < .05, and amplitude change, F(4, 44) = 7.12,  
p < .001. The amplitude showed a significant linear increase with bigger changes 
for later sessions, F(1, 13) = 26.22, p < .001. Perceptual control led to 
significantly higher a changes compared to eyes closed (0.41 ± 3.14 vs.  
-.10 ± 2.77) in a two-tailed paired t test, t(13) = 3.59, p < .05. The factor training 
group was not significant, nor did any interaction with training group reach 
significance (all p‟s > .25). 
Figure 16 (p. 143) displays the amplitude changes (session 2-1 till 
session 6-1) for the three training groups. The decrease in amplitude from 
session 1 to session 2 is not significant. As illustrated in the figure, session 3 
showed a clear increase in amplitude change in contrast to session 1 but for the 
execution group only. With respect to this observation, one-tailed t tests were 
conducted. The analysis showed a trend towards higher amplitude changes for 
the imagery than the control group at session 5 with respect to the 1st session, 
t(8) = 1.26, p = .12, and a higher amplitude increase for the execution group 
compared to the control group at session 6 in respect to session 1, t(8) = 1.86,  
p = .05.  
Abduction Force 
With respect to the analysis of force, three movement dynamic parameters were 
analysed; reaction time, exertion force, and the rate of force change. All three 
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parameters were based on the force onset, which was defined as the first 0.04 N 
increases after the starting signal followed by a continuous increase in force. The 
reaction time (ms) was the time between the starting signal and the force onset. 
The exertion force (Ns) was defined on the basis of induced force curves over the 
first 2 s from the force onset. The rate of force change, N(t), was obtained by the 
first derivative, N(t) = dN/dt, calculated from the force onset to the peak force 
reached in 1.4 s. 
Figure 16. Mean abduction amplitude for execution (n = 4), imagery (n = 4), and 
control (n = 6) training groups of Experiment 6 over six training sessions. X-axis: 
session measure, changes in abduction amplitude are indicated as individual 
differences to the 1st measurement for each subject, that is, from measurement 
session 2 to session 6 each with respect to the subjects’ 1st session; y-axis: mean 
abduction amplitude in millimetre. 
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Exerted Force 
The mean initial exertion force (Ns) of the 1st abduction was 452.94 ± 489.77 for 
all participants together and did not differ significantly from a normal distribution, 
K-S Z, p = .31. The difference between the groups for the initial exertion force 
was not significant, F(2, 11) = 0.47, p = .63, Levene Test for Variance 
Homogeneity F(2, 11) = 2.63, p > .10 . None of the participants had zero exertion 
force, min = 9.49, max = 1785.08. 
Figure 17 (p. 145) displays the mean force curves for each session for the 
execution and the imagery group only. A clear increase in exerted force from 
session to session can be observed in the imagery group. The execution group 
showed a similar increase in force, unless between sessions 3 and 4. A test for 
the order of continuously increasing exertion force over the six sessions was 
significant for the imagery group only, JT, p < .05.  
The ANOVA for the within-subjects factor exertion force change (session 
2-1 till session 6-1) and the between-subjects factor training group (execution vs. 
imagery vs. control) revealed a significant main effect with increasing force 
change, F(4, 8) = 3.80, p < .05. The between-subjects factor group showed a 
nonsignificant trend, F(2, 11) = 2.28, p = .15. The independent one-tailed t test 
revealed a significantly higher mean increase in force change in the execution 
(628.46 ± 351.46) than in the imagery group (72.87 ± 284.45), t(6) = 2.02,  
p < .05. The execution group also showed a strong tendency for a higher mean 
increase in force change in contrast to the control group (298.38 ± 308.35),  
t(8) = 1.57, p < .08. Differences between imagery and control did not reach 
significance. 
Differences of force changes were compared within each training group. 
The one-tailed paired t test showed a significant increase in the mean exerted 
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forces in the execution group compared to session 1 in session 3, t(3) = 2.61,  
p < .05, session 4, t(3) = 3.41, p < .05, session 5, t(3) = 5.32, p < .05, and 
session 6, t(3) = 3.28, p < .05. The imagery group showed a significantly stronger 
exertion force at the last (session 6) compared to the 1st session only,  
t(3) = 2.60, p < .05. The control group showed significant differences to session 1 
at session 3, t(5) = 2.75, p < .05, and session 6, t(5) = 2.49, p < .05. 
 
Figure 17. Mean force curves for execution and imagery group over 6 measurement 
sessions of Experiment 6 for each session separately (n = 4 for each group). X-axis: 
session measurements 1 to 6, with signal to press (dotted vertical line that crosses x-axis 
at zero); y-axis: mean force curves in newton (N). 
Reaction Time 
Statistical analysis with the within-subjects factor reaction time changes (session 
2-1 till session 6-1) and the between-subjects factor training group (execution vs. 
imagery vs. control) revealed a significant main effect in reaction time change 
with a decrease over sessions, F(4, 8) = 2.81, p < .05. The between-subjects 
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factor training group did not show a significant main effect. However, as can be 
seen in Figure 18 (p. 147), the imagery group showed a clear decrease in 
reaction time. Therefore, within-subjects contrast analyses for the training groups 
were conducted separately. These analyses showed a significant linear decrease 
over sessions in reaction time for the imagery group only, F(1, 3) = 16.65,  
p < .05. In contrast to reaction time before training at session 1 tested with one-
tailed paired t tests, the reaction times of the imagery group decreased 
significantly at session 3, t(3) = 5.20, p < .01, session 5, t(3) = 4.06, p < .05, and 
session 6, t(3) = 3.30, p < .05. 
Rate of Force Change 
The univariate ANOVA with the within-subjects factor dF/dt change (session 2-1 
till session 6-1) and the between-subjects factor training group showed a 
significant main effect for dF/dt over sessions, F(4, 8) = 2.89, p < .05. One-tailed 
paired t tests showed that the increase in dF/dt from session 6 with respect to 
session 1 was responsible for the main effect, t(13) = 2.21, p < .05. The between-
subjects factor training group did not show a significant effect.  
Relationship between amplitude and force measures 
Given the increase in both the amplitude and force, as described above, could 
lead to the assumption that these parameters are dependent. Correlation 
between amplitude (mean of all trials from a given session) and force (exertion 
force area of all trials before the training phase) are displayed in Table 7  
(p. 147/148). However, significant correlation was identified for the control group 
only. For both the imagery and execution group, changes in amplitude and force 
seemed to be independent of each other.  
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Sense of Effort 
The subjective effort ratings showed a significant increase with higher ratings at 
later time points for all three groups, execution, JT p < .05, imagery, JT p < .001, 
and control, JT p < .05. 
Figure 18. Mean movement reaction times for execution (n = 4), imagery (n = 4), 
and control (n = 6) training groups of Experiment 6 over six training sessions.  
X-axis: session measures indicated as changes in reaction time over the 6 training 
sessions are given as individual differences to the 1st measurement for each 
subject, that is, from measurement session 2 to session 6 each with respect to the 
subjects’ 1st session; y-axis: mean movement reaction time in milliseconds  
Table 7 (next page).  
Correlation Analysis of the Mean Abduction (trials before and after the training 
phase) and the Mean Force (trials before the training phase) for Each Session 
(session 1 to session 6) of Experiment 6. 
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
2-1 3-1 4-1 5-1 6-1
M
o
v
e
m
e
n
t 
R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
 (
m
s
)
Session Change
Control
Execution
Imagery
 148 
Note. 
a
n = 6. 
b
n = 4.  
c
n = 4. 
d
n = 14. *p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed. ***p < .001, two-tailed. 
Group Session     r Abduction (mm) Force (N) 
Controla 1 -.70 6.27 474.30 
2 -.93*** 6.25 562.82 
3 -.88* 6.93 860.84 
4 -.94** 7.26 619.93 
5 -.89** 7.59 866.56 
6 -.85* 8.27 953.25 
Executionb 1 -.83 5.53 502.76 
2 -.65 6.56 848.79 
3 -.67 7.78 1352.11 
4 -.27 8.38 1021.95 
5 -.11 8.77 1042.25 
6 -.37 9.58 1390.99 
Imageryc 1 -.29 7.61 298.26 
2 -.10 7.39 313.93 
3 -.40 7.83 404.55 
4 -.03 8.82 449.49 
5 -.50 10.25 534.22 
6 -.54 9.95 653.47 
All Subjectsd 1 -.50* 6.44 432.14 
2 -.52* 6.67 573.42 
3 -.53* 7.43 870.83 
4 -.48* 8.02 686.10 
5 -.47* 8.69 821.80 
6 -.52* 9.13 992.67 
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Discussion 
It is well known that appropriate training results in strength increase of the trained 
muscles. Thus, sport athletes and recently also professional dancers (Wyon  
& Redding, 2005) follow systematic fitness training including physical and mental 
training in combination with careful assessment, goal determination, regularity, 
and evaluation. However, physiological and neuronal effects of various training 
forms are still debated and most training studies have been conducted on already 
established movements. If we were aware of the factors allowing movement 
improvements via mental imagery training to happen, imagery could be used 
more efficiently in sports as well as in rehabilitation as for example with stroke or 
neglect patients. In this study, performance effects of execution and motor 
imagery training on the abduction of the big toe and a control group who 
physically trained the „Mister Spock‟ finger sign were compared. For most people, 
it is very difficult to abduct the big toe; the concurrent motor command – if 
existing after all – cannot be easily accessed. The data showed two specific 
central effects. First, imagery reduced movement reaction time, and second, 
sensory afferences gained from visual feedback were taken into account during 
motor execution.  
The data in this study revealed significant training effects in exertion 
force, reaction time, rate of force change, and in the abduction amplitude of a 
novel movement over 6 sessions, although none of these movement parameters 
showed an immediate effect of training within a session (i.e., comparing 
measurements before with after a training session). Therefore, assessing a motor 
command of a nonestablished movement can improve with a small amount of 
repetition trials. Differences between the training types were restricted. A lack of 
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a significant difference between the three training forms can be explained as 
follows: First, for an improvement in performance rather than muscle mass 
increase neuronal changes are necessary. Second, all training groups have to 
rely strongly on motor imagery when trying to execute such a novel movement. 
This means that motor imagery and neural adaptations played an important role 
in all three groups. This is supported by several studies demonstrating that force 
increase during the early phases of strength training is provided by neural 
changes (Enoka, 1988; Gabriel, Kamen, & Frost, 2006; Moritani & deVries, 1979; 
Sale, 1988). 
Abduction Force and Reaction Time 
A striking result is that execution compared to imagery or control showed a trend 
for an increase in exertion force whereas only imagery showed a significant 
decrease in the reaction time. Therefore, participants in the imagery group 
learned to execute the abduction movement significantly quicker compared to the 
execution or control group whereas the execution training showed the biggest 
exertion force increase. The activation of motor neurons in the training phase was 
specific to the execution group. Thus, neural adaptations respond in a specific 
way with or without repeated muscle contraction.  
The advantage of execution over imagery training in exertion force 
corresponds with other studies that investigated the effects of imagery. However, 
in contrast to other studies, execution and imagery training did not show 
significant training effects compared to the control group (Yue & Cole, 1992; 
Zijdewind et al., 2003). Although initial differences between the groups were not 
significant, it has to be highlighted that the lowest initial exertion force was 
observed in the imagery group. The unexpected increase in the movement 
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performance for the control group has been reported elsewhere (Herbert et al., 
1998; Zijdewind et al., 2003). In this study, the control and imagery group 
executed the abduction movement of the big toe 8 times per session, which 
amounted to 42 times in total. Therefore, it seems that relatively little training of 
the abduction movement resulted in a clear effect of the movement performance. 
Although the imagery and the execution group showed some changes over and 
above those found in the control group, all groups had enough execution trials in 
the measurement phases to train the abduction of the big toe. The fact that the 
abduction movement of the abductor hallucis can be trained even by a very small 
number of trials below training threshold has considerable therapeutic relevance. 
Abduction Amplitude 
Evidence for a clear impact in the abduction amplitude was observed in both 
anticipation and training. The amplitude was consistent bigger in the visual 
anticipation condition and repeated abduction training led to a linear increase in 
amplitude from session 1 to session 6 in all three groups. 
In the last session, participants who trained the abduction by execution 
showed significantly bigger amplitude increases compared to the control group. It 
is unclear whether additional training sessions would have revealed greater 
differences between the training groups. Interestingly, in all training forms, the 
amplitude showed a nonsignificant reduction after the 1st training session 
compared to the initial abduction movement. The range of a movement is clearly 
related to biomechanical limits (Coughlin, 1996). Unfortunately, the passive range 
of motion was not measured. Knowledge about the absolute passive range of the 
abduction movement would allow indicating possible ceiling effects. 
Nevertheless, the visual focus of moving the lever through its maximum rendered 
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an increase in maximum amplitude which was significantly beyond that obtained 
with eyes closed. This is in line with other studies that showed enhancement in 
motor learning and rehabilitation when directing the focus on external effects, 
whilst ignoring the body-inside (Wulf & Prinz, 2001). Consistent with this, Graves 
and James (1990) showed that visual feedback has an impact on the force of 
unfamiliar movements. The central nervous system uses visual information for 
feedback-based control of precision grasping movements (Paulignan, Frak, Toni, 
& Jeannerod, 1997), force production (Slifkin, Vaillancourt, & Newell, 2000), and 
motor learning (Wulf & Prinz, 2001). However, in addition to the aforementioned 
studies, visual feedback was shown to increase the performance of a single 
movement, thus providing further evidence that both sensory afferences and 
motor imagery are involved in motor planning (Decety & Jeannerod, 1996). 
Motivation was not responsible for the bigger amplitude in the eyes open 
condition because participants noticed their performance increase in the 
anticipation condition themselves and expressed high motivation to beat their 
maximum in the eyes closed condition. 
These results are not consistent with those of Mulder et al. (2004). For 
some of the participants, the authors reported initial abduction amplitude of zero 
while all participants in this study showed some minimal abduction force and 
amplitude. The experimental apparatus in this study was very sensitive and could 
detect very small changes. None of the participants in this study had zero degree 
abduction amplitude or zero retention force at the 1st abduction measure. 
Zijdewind et al. (2003) found similar effects on the abduction force increase with 
imagery training. The authors showed a significant effect of imagery after the 5th 
week of imagery training of the ankle plantar flexor muscles. These muscles are 
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much stronger than the abductor hallucis and participants in the current study 
only trained over a 2-week period. The amount of training for the abduction 
movement in our experiment might not have been enough to reveal any group 
differences. 
Duration, Retention, and Expertise of Motor Imagery 
The results revealed new effects of imagery and are in contrast with previous 
studies on imagery training (Driskell et al., 1994). First, no immediate training 
effect could be detected. Second, imagery training led to a continuous increase in 
exertion force, whereas physical practice led to a clear decrease after the 2-days 
rest period at session 4. The 4th training and measurement session was the only 
one with a 2-day rest period from the previous session (weekend between 
session 3 and 4). It is notable that the pause had no effect on the force increase 
for the imagery group. Thus the changes induced by imagery seemed to sustain 
across longer resting periods. However, the maximum force is higher in the 
execution group. It is possible, that the higher the maximum muscle strength, the 
harder it is to maintain the force level (i.e., the more sensitive to reversibility). 
Nevertheless, the constant force increase found in the imagery group looks as if it 
might reach the same level as the execution group after a bigger number of 
training sessions. If this is true, in situations where strength cannot be trained 
constantly, imagery training might maintain force increases over time. Third, 
neither imagery expertise effects between dancers and nondancers nor effects of 
training between groups were significant.  
 154 
Reaction Time 
Increase in the speed of voluntary muscle contraction is accomplished by neural 
adaptations such as changes in the firing pattern of motor unit activation  
(Van Cutsem, Duchateau, & Hainaut, 1998) or the greater recruitment of fast 
twitch type motor units (Kauranen, Siira, & Vanharanta, 1998). Therefore, 
imagery training clarified and specified the motor command. However, without 
EMG activity, it cannot clearly be ruled out whether the reduction in reaction time 
is due to central (premotor time from a go signal to EMG activity) or peripheral 
changes (motor time corresponding to muscle contraction, time from EMG activity 
to movement, Weiss, 1965). Nonetheless, central processes such as attention or 
fatigue cannot be the main cause of faster responses. First, in correspondence 
with Panton, Graves, Pollock, Hagberg, and Chen (1990) differences in reaction 
time between control and execution could not be found. Therefore, the lack of 
decrease in reaction times in the execution group cannot be due to fatigue effects 
as also previously shown by Kauranen, Siira, and Vanharanta (1999). Second, 
there is no evidence for attention differences across the three groups.  
Force and Abduction Amplitude Correlation 
The correlation between force and amplitude of the big toe remains significant 
only without training. This finding supports the idea of further underlying 
neuromuscular changes by execution and imagery in contrast to the control 
group and it shows the relevance to compare several movement parameters. 
In contrast to previous studies, the percentage of maximal voluntary contraction 
was not acquisitioned (Allen, Gandevia, & McKenzie, 1995; Herbert et al., 1998). 
The voluntary force activation of the trained elbow flexor muscle in the study by 
Herbert et al. was close to its maximum before training. In contrast, Zijdewind et 
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al. (2003) supposes that the ankle plantar-flexor muscles are difficult to activate 
maximally so that imagery training could enhance the neural drive during a 
maximal voluntary contraction. This is congruent with this study where the 
abduction of the big toe is difficult to execute.  
Sense of effort 
The participants‟ own rating of effort increased linearly with the time from 
pressure to the rating interruption (between 1 s and 6 s after start to press) 
whether they imagined or executed the movement. This linear similarity in sense 
of effort in the execution and the imagery group indicates the high degree of 
mental activity in the imagery group. Alkadhi et al. (2005) found high correlations 
between self-rated imagery vividness and the degree of brain activation which 
was interpreted as reflecting neural correlates of the motor cortex process. 
Therefore, the assumption that the sensed effort reflects underlying cognitive 
processes is plausible.  
The present study shows an impact on force and amplitude of the 
abductor hallucis with a small number of voluntary isometric contractions and 
abduction movements over the course of 2 weeks. The abductor hallucis is a long 
intrinsic muscle of the foot with a mean length of 115.8 mm (Kura, Luo, Kitaoka, 
& An, 1997; Mann & Inman, 1964). The contraction of the abductor hallucis is 
mainly responsible for the abduction movement of the big toe. The function of the 
abductor hallucis and its counterparts play a major role in the therapy treatment 
of hallux valgus, a painful deformity of the big toe (Coughlin, 1996). The 
abduction of the big toe therefore provides the possibility to study the effect of 
training on a novel not yet established movement, which is also important to 
provide proper alignment of the big toe. Furthermore, the study also showed that 
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the most effective way to execute a difficult movement is by incorporating 
sensory afferences through visual anticipation of an external event. Moreover, the 
greatest benefit for a reduction in onset of movement and the biggest resistance 
to decay gained retention force can be achieved by imagery training. Therefore, 
when considering movement rehabilitation, it is plausible to use imagery instead 
of execution to specify the motor command and to use perceptual control 
strategies to improve the actual performance at any stage of rehabilitation. 
However, it is necessary to acknowledge that particular movement parameters 
have to be considered when comparing effects of imagery with execution training. 
Conclusion 
With this investigation it could be shown that training of a nonestablished 
movement leads to neuromuscular adaptations which result in force and 
abduction amplitude increase as well as movement reaction time decrease within 
a 2-week training period. The specific effects of imagery training provided some 
insight into the neural adaptations when no efferent and afferent motor feedback 
is provided. Imagery training showed a low increase in isometric force and a clear 
decrease in reaction time from signal to move. Furthermore, the neural 
adaptation by imagery training was resistant to rest phases. This result therefore 
provides evidence that neural adaptations without motor feedback differ from 
those with motor feedback, mainly in the time course of accessing motor units. 
Without motor feedback in training, access of motor units can be learnt more 
quickly. Moreover, visual sensory feedback seems to have had an immediate 
effect. With visual feedback, the activated motor command to abduct the big toe 
lead to better performance. Further investigations involving techniques such as 
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twitch interpolation or EMG are necessary in order to allow inferences about the 
particular neural adaptations. For example, the current data did not allow 
deducing whether changes in reaction times were due to an increase in neural 
firing rate or whether the amount of motor unit recruitment in a voluntary neural 
activation increased. Furthermore, it is not clear whether motor or premotor time 
was reduced.  
For the first time, howere, it could be shown that there is evidence for a 
particular training effect after motor imagery. Imagery training only resulted in a 
decrease in reaction time whereas physical training revealed an increase in 
exertion force. Thus imagery and execution training differ in their level of 
performance and also in their particular performance dimensions. Imagery is not 
just less than execution, it is different, at least for a movement without a 
previously established motor command. 
Summary 
Recent research has provided evidence that repeatedly performed movements in 
the mind increases muscle force (i.e., Yue & Cole, 1992; Yue et al., 1996; 
Zijdewind et al., 2003). This experiment investigated whether motor imagery 
necessarily draws on already actively established motor commands. Participants 
trained the abduction of the big toe, a movement which is rarely executed in daily 
life, under various training conditions over a period of 2 weeks. A significant 
increase across all training sessions was found in abduction amplitude and 
abduction force, but no main effect for training was found. However, for the 
imagery group, the time of the movement onset linearly decreased. Furthermore, 
when participants visually anticipated the movement, they reached significantly 
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larger abduction amplitude. These results indicate that imagery does not rely 
exclusively on previously exercised motor commands and visual anticipation with 
feedback of an external effect also supports execution of an infrequent motor 
command. 
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Chapter Five  
General Discussion 
Summary Considerations 
Each of the experiments discussed in this thesis showed evidence that body 
(chapters 2 and 3) and movement representations (chapter 4) are adaptable in 
short- and long-term. These findings and experimental measurements are 
summarised in Table 8 (p. 160) and outlined in the following subsections.  
Representation Effects in Different Sensory Systems 
1) Vision 
The time needed to identify visually presented stimuli is taken as an indication for 
the transformation processes of the representations. These processes are 
dependent of the orientation of presented stimuli as well as of the representation 
form as shown in Experiments 1 to 3. First, identification showed little egocentric 
body transformation time costs when the body figure was presented upside 
down. Second, posture matching did not show such mental transformation costs 
when the matching posture was presented in Labanotation, an abstract symbol 
notation for dance. This means, egocentric body transformation is adaptable with 
respect to both the representation level and orientation of the visually presented 
body stimuli in short-term. 
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In respect to long-term effects, no significant main effect was registered between 
dancers and nondancers. However, a profound understanding of the symbols in 
the Labanotation revealed no mental rotation costs, thus suggesting that the 
symbols were transformed in an abstract form of body representation.  
Table 8.  
Short- and Long-Term Effects of Representations in Different Sensory Systems. 
Sensory System Response Mode Short-Term Effects Long-Term Effects 
Vision  
(1) 
 
Reaction Time 
Response Accuracy 
 
Visual Stimuli 
Type 
(Object vs. Body vs. 
Symbol) 
Stimuli 
 Orientation 
(Front vs. Back) 
Imagery Training 
(Symbol Knowledge) 
 
 
 
Somatosensory 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Response  Bias 
(Motor or Visual) 
Type of 
Response 
(Motor vs. Visual) 
Amount of 
Stimulation 
(Tactile Stimulus vs. 
Double Tactile Stimuli) 
Type of  
Sensory Stimuli 
(Visual vs. Proprioception) 
Proprioceptive Training 
(Dancers vs.  
Nondancers) 
Motor 
(3) 
 
Movement 
Parameters 
(Strength, Reaction 
Time, Movement 
Range) 
Type of  
Stimuli/Task 
(Anticipation vs.  
Eyes Closed) 
Motor and  
Motor Imagery Training 
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2) Somatosensation  
In the chapter 3 on somatosensory signals, two types of adaptive body 
representations were found with respect to the sensory modes proprioception 
and tactile sensation. In Experiment 4, proprioceptive body representation was 
based either on visual or proprioceptive information or both. The data showed 
that locations in the egocentric space were biased by two reference points, one at 
each shoulder, when proprioceptive information was provided. However, with 
visual information alone, a superordinate body representation with one reference 
point at the centre of the trunk was found in the case of existing motor expertise. 
Therefore, proprioceptive representation was adaptable with respect to the mode 
of sensory information received in short-term (vision or proprioceptive 
information) as well as with respect to motor expertise in long-term (dancers vs. 
nondancers). The data in Experiment 5 showed that the perceived body surface 
can swap immediately. Tactile stimuli applied on the forearm evoked a body 
representation with the trunk as the attractor. Tactile stimuli were perceived 
closer to the trunk than where the stimulation was applied. However, when tactile 
information was additionally received at the tip of the fingers of the stimulated 
hand, the point of attraction changed from the body centre to the periphery. The 
tactile stimuli were felt more peripherally than where they were actually applied. 
Thus, short-term adaptability of the body representation in response to tactile 
information at different locations on the body surface can be assumed. 
Long-term effects were evident by significant differences between 
dancers and nondancers with dancers being generally more accurate than 
nondancers in matching the arm position in egocentric space based on 
proprioception. Also, the data suggests that dancers generate a mental 
proprioceptive image of their body limbs in space. 
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3) Motor 
Finally, chapter 4 showed strong evidence for short- and long-term adaptability in 
a motor learning task. A movement without an established motor command could 
be executed quicker by imagery training than execution training or no training 
(i.e., training of a control movement). Additionally, participants were showing a 
bigger movement range when the point of maximum abduction was visually 
anticipated. 
Modular Representations versus Multisensory Integration  
Multisensory information is integrated to provide a coherent representation of the 
body in a multidimensional environment. Therefore, a model of cognitive 
processes should take consideration of these multisensory signals. However, a 
modular view of cognition still dominates many theoretical assumptions in 
cognitive neuroscience. Fodor (1983) was most prominent in the modular 
perspective. In the modular theory of mind, the mind is regarded as compositions 
of independent, closed, domain-specific processing modules – manifested in 
cortical areas that are receptive for a specific associated sensory system. For 
example, visual information is processed in visual areas in the occipital cortex, 
while sensorimotor and motor information are processed in the parietal 
sensorimotor and motor cortex, respectively. However, the body is 
phenomenologically experienced as a whole. The data discussed in this thesis 
also account for adaptation processes as part of multisensory integration. The 
experimental results suggest that representations based on various sensory 
systems are similar with respect to their short- and long-term adaptabilities. A 
model of the cognitive system that connects and integrates different sensory 
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perceptions to adapt mental representations and images accordingly, seems 
therefore more likely than a modular system. Other behavioural effects were 
reported that further account for multisensory integration. For instance, the 
McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976) in speech perception shows that 
conflicting sensations from vision and audition are automatically interpreted by 
the brain as an intermediate solution. Furthermore, a model of a representation 
based on multisensory integration or multisensory fusion is in line with recent 
studies on cortical processing (Macaluso, 2006). Cortical areas that were 
previously reported to be sensory specific show clear cross-over effects from 
different sensory systems. Therefore, the existence of disparate body 
representations - each linked to a singular sensory system or each based in 
modality representations in multimodal brain areas - has to be questioned. 
From an economical perspective, it seems unwise to propose a body 
representation for each sensory system or modality. The brain needs to be 
organised in a way to process multisensory information. According to the theory 
of modality-specific body representations, sensory information would need to be 
transformed into different representations in order to create a coherent sense of 
the self. I would propose a model with a single representation that is highly 
adaptable. The data from this thesis supports such a representational platform. 
Short- and long-term adaptability in response to the characteristics of the 
representation has been found. For example, short-term adaptabilities observed 
were the orientation of body stimuli in Experiment 2 or the symbol level in 
Experiment 3. Long-term adaptabilities measured were for example the general 
level, of expertise in Experiment 5 or the process level in Experiment 6, where 
performance effects of imagery training are compared to execution training. 
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However, none of the experiments cover all the possible dimensions of body or 
movement representations that can be sensitive to adaptability mechanisms. The 
dimensions of cognitive tasks can be described by three primary activities: firstly 
by a perceptual input, secondly by mental operations, and thirdly by the output 
and response. In comparison, physical activities can be structured in strength, 
endurance, and movement qualities. Driskell et al. (1994) mentioned these 
classifications in reference to studies in more applied fields. Nevertheless, I used 
these dimensions for a deeper understanding of the results of the body and 
movement representations adaptability.  
In some of the experiments conducted on body representation, the visual 
inputs of the stimuli as well as the output and response modes were modified. 
The visual input stimuli were modified in the experiments on visual and 
proprioceptive sensory perception while the response was varied in the 
experiment on tactile perception. The movement representation was investigated 
by measurements in all three physical activity dimensions, strength, endurance, 
and movement quality as force, training endurance, and movement range. 
Furthermore, the visual input was modified when testing the movement range. A 
complete model of the body representations adaptability, however, should be 
based on a balanced selection of input and output modifications in all sensory 
systems. Only the investigation covering movement representation used a 
broader range of dimensions (e.g., movement reaction time, abduction amplitude, 
etc). Nevertheless, the physical dimensions are investigated in one single novel 
movement. The lack of a broader balanced selection of all dimensions and 
different forms of movements would not influence the impact of the singular 
investigations. However, it is worthwhile to consider these in order to achieve an 
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appropriate image of the human representations adaptability as well as for further 
investigations on this matter. 
Functionality of Representations 
Based on the reported findings, I suggest that the optimal use of the term 
„representation‟ is to describe a network within the brain that provides a 
constantly adapting platform. The adaptations are changes with respect to the 
state of the brain, which is actually both dependent of the relation between the 
body and its environment as well as responsible for the bodily behaviour in the 
environment. Many researchers prescribe to the idea that humans have several 
forms of images, such as visual, spatial, and motor images as well as several 
body representations, such as body image or body schema. Further, several 
motor representations are assumed for each set of motor programs, or at least 
for each chunk of our skilled movements. Unfortunately, the various terms are 
often confused. This is particularly the case for the terms associated with body 
representations. Instead of relating different forms of representation to different 
functions, one can increase the understanding of the human body and brain by 
investigating the processing rules or characteristics that underlie most of these 
body and movement representations.  
Adaptation 
It often seems that „adaptation‟ is used as a catch-all term. Generally, it stands for 
a persistent change in a system in response to environmental stimulus or input. 
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This means, in this thesis, the term „system‟ refers to the representational 
processes in the human brain and their adaptations to the changing environment, 
which are actually the sensory information from the external world as well as the 
information from internal mental states. It is important to note that looking at 
mental representations in the form of a system has several implications. First, it 
helps to draw a line between modifications in the mind from changes in the body 
(neuromuscular system) and the brain‟s structure (cortical maps). In the former, 
the term „training‟ is used to describe a form of adaptation processes. In the 
latter, however, the term „plasticity‟ is used in several studies to indicate how the 
organisation of cortical maps changes over time (for a review see Pascual-Leone, 
Amedi, Fregni, & Merabet, 2005). Second, it helps looking at the functional role of 
representations in respect to the mind. How can representation be of importance 
to the mind as a system?  
Another form of adaptation is within sensory systems on the level of 
sensory receptors. Receptors that receive the same information over a certain 
amount of time adapt and change their behaviour. For instance, receptors in the 
retina adapt to darkness. In the tactile system fibres are categorised as fast 
adapting and slowly adapting fibres with respect to their responses to sustained 
indentation of the skin. Other adaptation processes can be found in the olfactory, 
gustatory, and thermal system. To summarise, adaptation on the receptor level 
describes how the neural system deals with constant information. Therefore, the 
interplay between change and constancy in adaptation is an important feature of 
the body. It is notable that even though considerable plasticity in the neuronal 
representation of the body surface in the somatosensory cortex was shown, 
representations are also stable to a certain extent. For example, during the 
 167 
course of a recording session the receptive fields of particular neurons may 
remain fixed (Kass, Nelson, Sur, & Merzenich, 1981). Lackner (1988) suggested 
that this stable organisation, however, may be a result of balancing dynamic 
influences. When the balance is unsettled by inactivating part of the peripheral 
sensory input, the organisations of the cortical maps are immediately altered and 
continue to change over time. 
Functional Model for Representation and Imagery 
Various forms of representations in respect of content and their sensory basis 
have been discussed in recent literature. Within this thesis, adaptation effects of 
representations in each sensory system were found. However, instead of looking 
at the content of various representations, the focus herein is on the functional 
properties. Central are questions like “how do representations and imagery 
processes function?” and “why are representations and imagery built?”.  
Pani (1996) wrote an important review on such a functionalist perspective on 
mental images. Descriptive for this perspective is that the mental image is not 
viewed as “… a static hard existence, but a fluid fleeting thing, moulded by every 
exigency of the momentary task” (Pani, p. 37; quoted from Downey, 1929). 
Images and representations are not isolated mental objects with fixed properties. 
“An image provides representation in the adaptive regulation of activity, and this 
more or less local role will influence the structure of the image” (Pani, p. 294).  
The title “Body Representation and Motor Imagery: Effects of Adaptability” 
can be read twofold. First, several short- and long-term adaptabilities in body and 
movement representations based on various sensory systems as well as affected 
by motor imagery were found. Therefore, a similarity between all forms of 
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representations is their adaptability to various stimuli and responses. Second, the 
adaptability may be the grounding of representation and mental images. 
Representations enable a constant interaction between the adaptive cognitive 
system and the changing environment. Therefore, I hypothesise that we have a 
single form of representation, which is able to adapt to various sensory input and 
output forms and of which parts are conscious. The latter form is described as 
images. Whether parts of the representation become conscious or not may be 
dependent on the novelty and difficulty of the task. Adaptation is the basic 
characteristic of representation and at the same time the only reason for mental 
representation. Without the necessity of adaptation processes no representation 
would be necessary. Adaptation is thus considered as the cause and 
representation as the effect.  
Connectivity of Body and Movement Representations 
It has been proposed in the introduction to look at both body and movement 
representations‟ adaptability as we not only own and perceive our bodies; we are 
also agents of most of our own bodily movements. We are constantly moving our 
body, so movements are a particular feature of humans and animals. Also, both 
the spatial perception of body limbs (position sense) and the perception of 
passive movements (movement sense) play a part in sensory perception as 
shown by sensory disturbances in cerebral lesions. As stated in the early work of 
Head and Holmes (1911) the authors describe why cortical lesions most 
frequently disturb the recognition of posture and of passive movements:  
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Inability to recognize the position of the affected part in space is the most 
frequent sensory defect produced by lesions of the cerebral cortex. In 
some cases, this and the allied faculty of recognizing passive movement 
may be the only discoverable abnormalities. Whenever sensation is 
disturbed at all, these two forms of special recognition will be certainly 
affected. (p. 157). 
Furthermore, in all the cases stated in Head‟s paper, the disturbance of 
recognising posture and passive movements was shown to be greater towards 
the peripheral parts of the affected limb. Certainly, the studies outlined here 
indicate indeed that body and movement representations share common 
features. In particular, they both showed evidence of being highly adaptable. 
Outlook 
From behaviourism to cognitive science to cognitive neuroscience – what comes 
next? Within this thesis, representations were considered as based on the 
necessity of adaptability processes. This has one relevant implication to consider; 
the individuality of mind. The bigger the role of adaptation processes is 
acknowledged, the bigger the individual differences in the cognitive processes 
have to be assumed.  
It was in the era of cognitive science when scientists looked into the black 
box and determined mental representations and images. Later, with the use of 
new techniques in cognitive neuroscience, a few more cognitive processes could 
be localised in the human brain in a noninvasive way. Radical behaviourists 
thought that humans and animals show the same behaviour. Learning and 
adaptation mechanisms were understood to be only dependent on stimulus and 
response while cognitive matters were completely ignored. Somewhat similarly, 
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today individual differences are only partly investigated. In most experimental 
studies, participants are thought to behave relatively similar. However, despite 
investigations in neuropsychology focusing on particular cases, the subject is still 
viewed from a collective perspective. Experimental studies test significant 
differences between conditions or between different participant groups. However, 
with the knowledge of the present high adaptability factor, it seems that individual 
differences and individual neuronal consolidations cannot be overlooked 
anymore. The emphasis on individuality in representational concepts as it is 
expressed in here is, thus, not unique.  
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